Why the Gisele Pelicot case calls for a redefinition of rape in France

By Dori Felber, Read: 3 minutes 42 seconds

Time to redefine the outdated definition of rape in France? As the horrific testimony of Gisele Pélicot unfolds, many have argued for a redefinition of rape in France. This specifically followed after lawyer Guillaume de Palma, who is defending 6 of the accused, argued that “In France proof of intent is required” in order for it to qualify as rape. 

Gisele Pélicot is a survivor of a series of rape, orchestrated by her husband Dominique Pélicot. Over a period of 9 years (July 2011 to October 2020) Gisele Pélicot was repeatedly raped by her husband and individuals who he would invite, whilst she was drugged and unconscious. In total, Gisele Pélicot was raped 92 times by 72 men, as her husband filmed the abuse. These horrific acts came to light when Dominique Pélicot was arrested by the police for taking upskirt photographs of women in supermarkets. The police discovered thousands of images and videos that Pélicot had taken of the rapes and stored on his computing equipment. Pélicot is further accused of training Jean-Pierre Maréchal on how to drug and rape his own wife.

It is the State’s responsibility to prosecute sexual assault offences as a grave and systematic violation of human rights, and in order to do so, a comparison and evaluation must be made between the laws that are in place for rape in France (who has ratified the Convention) against the criteria set out in the Istanbul Convention. The above-mentioned Convention is the first instrument in Europe that sets out legally binding standards for the laws and procedures that are in place for such crimes, created with the intention to protect the victims and adequately punish the perpetrators.

The definition of rape is detailed in Article 36 (a) (c) of the Istanbul Convention as the following:

a. Non-consensual vaginal, anal or oral penetration of a sexual nature of the body of another person with any bodily part or object;

c.  Causing another person to engage in non-consensual acts of a sexual nature with a third person.

It further states that consent must be given voluntarily, which will be assessed according to the circumstances of the case (Article 36 (2)), and that this offence includes former or current partners and spouses (which are recognised by national law) (Article 36 (3)). Thus, the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator does not matter (Article 43). Lastly, Article 46 explains that, if applicable, additional aggravating conditions must be applied. This includes offence committed against a current spouse or committed against a person made vulnerable due to specific circumstances. 

Article 222-23 of Code Pénal Français details that rape is any act of sexual penetration, of whatever nature, or any oral-genital act committed on the person of another or on the person of the perpetrator by violence, constraint, threat or surprise. Upon comparison, it is immediately visible that the above-mentioned definition does not include the word ‘non-consensual’. The definition detailed above gives room for argument as to whether the offence constituted rape. The Istanbul Convention details that definitions of sexual assault offences must protect the victims to the fullest extent. The missing element of consent in the definition of rape lacks such a protection. Furthermore, stating that ‘rape is any act of sexual penetration committed by violence, constraint, threat or surprise’ conveys the idea that there needs to be intention. All of the above-mentioned acts necessitate pre-meditated intention. In order to threaten someone, one must know what they are threatening the victim for. This is equally true for constraint, violence and surprise. Consequently, the Article 222-23 necessitates pre-meditated intention for rape. Consequently, such a definition leaves room for lawyers such as Guillaume de Palma to argue that if there is no intention, there is no rape. From this, it is visible that the inclusion of consent in the definition of rape makes the protection of victims unequivocal. Lack of consent, for whatever reason, equals rape. 

In conclusion, when evaluating the definition of rape in France against the legal standard provided for by the Istanbul Convention, it is clear that France must redefine their definition of said offence in order to provide adequate protection for the victims and to sufficiently prosecute and punish the perpetrators. 

The new European Commission’s Environmental Crime Directive (ECD).

On the 27th of February 2024 the European Parliament adopted a number of revolutionary environmental measures enshrined in the Environmental Crimes Directive that penalized environmental crimes much more stringently compared to the past. The Greens/EFA Group from the European Parliament called for the establishment of a serious criminal liability in the case of destruction or widespread and substantial damage which is long-lasting or irreversible to an ecosystem, a habitat or the quality of air, soil or water. More specifically, the MEP of the Greens/EFA Group stated that:

‘This new directive is a victory for the environment (...). The outdated 2008 directive needed to be revised as a matter of urgency. With this new text, the EU is adopting one of the world's most ambitious pieces of legislation to combat environmental crime. It will allow for a  more effective and better protection of individuals who suffer as a result of such damage. The perpetrators of these crimes will therefore be prosecuted and punished more severely in the case of ‘qualified offences’, which encompass conduct comparable to ecocide. We also welcome the increase in the level of penalties and the introduction of significant additional sanctions (...).’

The global increase in environmental crime, ranging from 5% to 7% annually, is causing enduring harm to ecosystems, wildlife, human health, and the finances of both governments and businesses. As per estimates from UNEP and Interpol released in June 2016, the yearly financial impact of environmental crime is estimated to be between $91 billion and $258 billion. Despite this, the number of convictions for environmental crimes has not increased substantially.

The new directive clarifies to the Member States the definition of environmental offences and the punishment the offenders would suffer as a result. The new directive categorizes breaches of environmental obligations like illegal trade, handling of chemicals or mercury, and illegal ship recycling as criminal offences. The severity of punishment for offences related to illegal waste collection, transport, treatment, or the unauthorized sale of timber or timber products derived from illicitly harvested wood will not significantly vary between legal entities and individuals. Consequently, such actions could result in a imprisonment between 3 and 10 years in Member States. Additionally, companies engaging in such criminal offences would face fines equal to at least 5% of their global turnover or an amount equivalent to €24 or €40 million. In comparison to the 2008 directive, it raises the number of environmental crimes from 8 to 20 and establishes minimum requirements, allowing Member States to be more stringent.

Furthermore, the ECD elaborates under which category the commitment of serious environmental crimes would fall. That is within the term ‘aggravated offence’ that would lead to more severe sanctions. Furthermore, national legislators are to contemplate the inclusion of aggravating factors and supplementary sanctions and measures (in addition to monetary penalties) to enable a customized response to individual offences. Consequently, persons who cooperate with the enforcement authorities in identifying the offenders of such serious environmental crimes will benefit from the supporting measures in such criminal proceedings.

The identification of such crimes, the enforcement of criminal law, and the punishment of the offenders in environmental crimes would require the work of criminal law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and courts. This would presuppose a strong criminal law response that would lead to effective criminal law enforcement. Special training, the sufficiency of resources, and the efficiency of criminal law tools will be developed for the criminal law professionals to gain the needed qualifications and skills when combating environmental crimes. Considering the global nature and the cross-border element of environmental issues the new directive requires cooperation and coordination between the Member States.

In regards to this, the Commissioner of Justice Didier Reynders shared her hopes regarding the new directive on the 16th of November 2023 saying that:

‘This political agreement between the European Parliament and the Council is a major step forward in combatting environmental crime, a growing concern. This shows that the EU takes decisive action against environmental damage: the new rules set EU-wide standards to ensure environmental protection while providing for effective and dissuasive sanctions for offenders.’ The Commissioner for Environment, Oceans and Fisheries, Virginijus Sinkevičius, added that ‘Environmental crime causes devastating damage to our environment, harms our health as well as our economy. For too long criminals have profited from weak sanctions and lack of enforcement. With this strengthened law the EU steps up its action. It will better ensure that the most severe breaches of environmental rules are considered as crimes, that enforcers are more effective on the ground, and that environmental defenders are more protected and acknowledged.’

Moreover, the European Crime Directive criminalises the so-called ‘ecocide’, according to those who want to make it the fifth international crime prosecuted by the International Criminal Court. The directive refers to ‘cases comparable to ecocide’ in its preamble, but does not use the word in the directive explicitly. Ecocide is defined as ‘unlawful or wanton acts committed knowing that those acts have a substantial likelihood of causing severe and either long-term or widespread damage to the environment.’ The term was developed in 2021 by twelve international solicitors and made public by Stop Ecocide International. Thus, the European Parliament suggested enshrining the term in European law last year.

In conclusion, the European Crime Directive showcases the new priorities of the Union revolving around the growing environmental problems. To what extent will the new European Crime Directive be implemented by the Member States and what effect it is going to exert on the ongoing environmental crisis remains to be seen.

Europe’s Carbon Curtain

By Terk Felix Kraft, 5 minutes

Global warming forces Europe to rethink its industrial production and sets national decision-makers before a legislative paradox. Meanwhile, Brussels has come up with a controversial solution that has the potential to either harmonise or rip apart the world’s entire supply chain network.

In order to tackle climate change and species extinction, the European Green Deal prescribes to the European Union (EU), its countries, population, and decision-makers, a number of environmental targets to meet. One of these targets is climate neutrality by 2050 and meeting that aim is going to have an enormous impact on just about any aspect of our economy. In other words: Our elected officials will have to guide sectors 1 and 2 of our economy (agriculture and industry) towards largely climate-neutral means of production. However, once regulators start toughening environmental standards for goods produced in their country, they run into a paradox.

Backfiring Legislation

Let’s play a game: Imagine you’re a lawmaker and your aim is to raise environmental production standards, for example regarding CO2 pollution. You might do so by directly regulating business or through an Emissions Trading System (ETS), bringing to market a limited number of certificates that allow their owner to pollute. Whatever your precise formula, it inevitably increases production costs and disadvantages your country’s companies amongst their competitors from across the globe.

But is that bad, if it helps the environment?, you may ask. If only it did! By raising production costs, you have just incentivized firms from your country to move production abroad to places that might have even fewer and lower emission standards than those you had in the first place. Since all of us live on the same planet under the same atmosphere breathing the same air, you have effectively worsened the environmental situation for your constituents.

In addition, you’ve just wrecked a whole industrial sector, eliminated a range of specialised jobs, weakened your country’s position in global supply chains, undermined its Strategic Autonomy, and quite possibly shifted its trade balance. You’re essentially living an elected official’s perfect nightmare, one that is so prominent it got its own official title: Carbon Leakage.

Europe’s Patch on the Carbon Leak

Solving the paradox of practically increasing carbon emissions by toughening emissions standards might be one of the biggest riddles of our time - and the EU has taken it on to solve it! Just recently, on May 10th this year, the European Commission, Parliament, and Council signed the corresponding regulation, establishing a legislative monstrosity under its rather catchy name Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism or, in short, CBAM.

The EU’s CBAM designates a price to the carbon emitted during the production of carbon-intensive goods (aluminium, cement, fertiliser, electricity, hydrogen, iron and steel) outside the EU, upon entering its Single Market. As the EU itself raises its own climate ambitions, this protectionist measure is deemed necessary in order to prevent Carbon Leakage. The measure objectives are twofold: For one, it aims at protecting domestic production as it decarbonises.

Secondly, and this may be of even greater significance, it incentivizes producers abroad to adopt European environmental production standards in order not to have their products be slashed with what is effectively a carbon toll upon entering Europe’s rich, about 450 million-strong consumer market. Starting from October 1st, 2023, the gradual introduction of the CBAM shall take place in sync with phasing out the allocation of free allowances under the EU’s ETS.

Once fully implemented, CBAM will equalise the carbon price of imports with that of domestically produced goods of the same category. And whereas the EU claims its CBAM to be compatible with the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the exact set of rules and requirements for the reporting of emissions under CBAM shall be specified further within an implementing act. The WTO’s final verdict upon the EU’s CBAM, thus, is yet to come.

Ursula’s Climate Club

But the venture’s ultimate aim is not merely climate-neutral production in Europe, far from it. Utilising its sizable consumer market as leverage, the EU aims to convince producers (and, by extent, their legislators) outside the bloc of its high environmental production standards. In this way, the EU’s plans foresee consolidating the world’s major developed economies to form a kind of carbon free-trade area, a Climate Club. However, whereas countries like Canada and the United Kingdom have signalled interest, Washington, usually setting the tone on free trade, does not yet seem convinced.
At a later point, emerging economies such as Turkey and trade blocs such as MERCOSUR are supposed to find access to that same free-trade area - by climate-neutralising their agricultural and industrial production. The EU hopes its legislative endeavour will eventually cause a spill-over effect that reaches every corner of the globe, sets new climate-friendly production standards and, notably, establishes the EU as a global regulatory power in economic affairs. Ambitious? Certainly. Megalomaniac? Maybe.

Like the Sword of Damocles, the WTO’s final judgement on CBAM looms over the heads of busy Eurocrats elaborating product emissions tables. Meanwhile, Germany’s chancellor Olaf Scholz appears unimpressed. While refraining from elucidating the CBAM’s technicalities on camera, Scholz joyfully propagates the EU’s vision of a Climate Club to any global leader sparing an ear.

Legislative Gravity

But is this strong enough of an effort, grand enough of a pitch, to save the planet? Some MEPs, especially of the Greens/EFA Group, are not yet convinced. According to Rasmus Andresen, a German MEP for the Green Party, CBAM is going to contribute its part to global emissions reduction. He questions, however, whether CBAM “will be able to promote the establishment of a Climate Club in the sense of the Commission's legislative proposal within the required timeframe.” In other words: The tabled legislative act might lack the gravity to have a timely impact. Concretely, the MEP laments for the organic chemicals and plastics industries not being covered by CBAM as well as the time scope of the scheme’s time launch, which he describes as “very hesitant” and “a giant fly in the ointment”.

At the same time, Andresen considers it a success that, from 2030, all industrial products for which there is imminent Carbon Leakage risk (i.e. which can relatively easily relocate their production site) shall automatically become subject to CBAM. In this way, the scheme may - if belated - sharpen its accuracy.

Résumé

In the past, the EU has repeatedly proven its actorness in regulatory politics. Taking on major digital players in fields such as privacy and competition, it has been described as somewhat of a Regulatory Superpower. Publishing its legal text in a range of languages, Brussels is well aware of the spill-over effects its legislation has on states that might struggle to affirm the rule of law against foreign or corporate interests. Only time will tell, whether the EU will manage to transfer its regulatory abilities onto other, even more competitive policy fields or whether its ambitions end up hemmed in by more powerful global players.

To learn more about the topic, take a look at the EU’s climate ambitions:
European Green Deal:

https://www.commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en

https://ecamaastricht.org/blueandyellow-knowyourunion/europeangreendeal

European CBAM:

https://www.taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en

European ETS:

www.climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets_en

Did You Know That a Water Agenda for The Mediterranean Exist?Here Is Why We Should Care About It

Source: UfM official website

By Ilaria Settembrini, 9 minutes

I bet you did not know it. Fair enough. Still, the warming of the Mediterranean Sea is one of the fastest in the world and requires fruitful engagement by the EU. As an essential and historically contentious resource, water can offer Brussels new pathways for intergovernmental cooperation with the southern shores.

We came a long way together… 

2023 will mark 15 years since the establishment of a clear commitment of the EU towards ensuring water access in the Mediterranean region through a Water Agenda of the Mediterranean. The drafting of a water agenda was envisioned in December 2008 when, at the UfM Ministerial Conference on Water held in Jordan, the Euro-Mediterranean ministers promoted the establishment of a Water Expert Group (WEG). This group was set to provide a space in which states could gather information to develop shared goals for the future Agenda. Finally, it was in 2017 that the Malta Declaration mandated the finalization of the Agenda’s financial plan. 

On this matter, the Agenda and its financial plan represent the culmination of a progressive rapprochement between the shores after the first Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Water held in 1990 in Algiers. However, the establishment of such an Agenda enabled a more equalitarian partnership with the southern Mediterranean countries: the EU first promoted it but later ideated it in the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) intergovernmental framework. 

… for the Water Policy framework for Actions 2030.

Adopted in late 2018 with the mentioned financial plan, the 2030 Agenda recognizes, in particular, the intersectionality that such a water provision intervention brings with regard to other fields, such as climate change or migration. For this reason, the water agenda-related policy framework revolves around 4 multi-level pillars that embed different types of actions, from training to multi-partnerships, vis-a-vis the interlinkage of factors: 

Water-Energy-Food-Ecosystem (WEFE) Nexus: it recognizes the cross-sectoral integration between food poverty and hydric access problems and their repercussions on the ecosystems. In the framework of the Agenda, the EU Commission and the EIB (European Investment Bank) will support the Desalinization in the Gaza Strip. The envisioned project will allow the 2 million Palestinian inhabiting the land strip to have drinking water, which nowadays accounts for less than 3% of the hydric resources at disposal. At the same time, the intervention will also allow for a reduction of East Mediterranean pollution.  

• Water-Employment-Migration (WEM) Nexus: this pillar is set to change the regional dynamics regarding the dependency that local economies and market labor have built on water. WEM-related projects want to create more efficient economies to produce equilibrating changes in the socio-economic systems and face the ultimate Mediterranean challenge: migration. The EU’s commitment to the water agenda becomes a tool to fight against the root causes of migration. 

•  Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) Nexus: under these lenses, future cooperation aims at reinforcing the institutional capacity of local governments and municipalities to offer sanitary services. 

• Water and Climate Change Adaptation (WCCA) Nexus: last but not least, this pillar revolves around the fight against the interdependence between water allocation and climate change. In the background, each project will try to work for a reinforcement of the autonomy and governance of the Mediterranean countries in terms of water management. 

Taking action becomes imperative:

The international community generally agrees that the Mediterranean region is warming 20% faster than the rest of the world. Such a picture is exceptionally critical for a region that is already fragile and whose ecosystems are already affected by drought and food insecurity. The following data about the Mediterranean set the record straight: 

1. The expected rise of temperature by 2.2° in 2040 is set to reduce precipitations by 10-15%. 

2. In light of the hydric resources reduction, the water demand is expected to double, if not triple, due to the uncontrollable population growth in the Mediterranean. 

3. Results? By 2040 more than 250 million people will be water poor in the Mediterranean Basin: half of the current population in the region. 

When putting aside the negative effects of global warming, today's disparities over clean water in the region are already a constant. This is caused first of all by geological reasons: the water productivity of the area, in general, is almost half of the world average. Especially in North Africa, the region is threatened by floods and drought with a certain regularity. Such disparities exacerbate when we focus on the gap between urban and rural areas. Data gathered from the east to the western Mediterranean express this regional vulnerability. Already in 2019, 70 percent of Lebanon's population faced water shortages, while in 2022, Morocco experienced the worst droughts in 4 decades.  

On top of this, the political component of water plays a relevant role. Hydric resources have always been a divisive element. They commonly threatened political stability and social security, from the Middle East Peace Process in Palestine to the tensions that historically have developed between Egypt and Sudan/ Ethiopia over the Nile Basin. 

However, cynically, what should Europe's stance be on this? Pollution of the Mediterranean, migration, and last but not least, climate change touch upon the northern shores of the Mediterranean and require a common challenge approach by the EU on the base of this interdependence between the shores. Such water availability rollbacks do involve, for example, the European coasts. The 80-177 m3 of water per capita reserved annually for the MENA Region are similar to the 120 m3 per person at the disposal of Malta.

Do positive prospects open up? 

Climate change is recognized as one of the ground-breaking priorities of the von der Leyen Commission and its Green Deal. This also applies to the EUs' external actions. In that sense, the Agenda becomes an essential tool to fight climate change, given the intersectionality of the Mediterranean issues. 

On the one hand, the Union for the Mediterranean’s framework becomes an essential tool to reinforce Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in terms of water management. The Agenda and its financial strategy have been prepared in consultation with local stakeholders and private sectors, enabling effective communication between the shores of the Mediterranean. At the same time, sharing best practices for establishing a common and accessible Water Knowledge Platform can facilitate harmonization efforts. Cooperation strategies can build upon existing EUROMED information-sharing projects for hydric development (PRIMA Project 2018-2028). Also, at the sub-regional level, the Agenda provides space for policymaking to pass through dialogue roundtables.  For the EU, it means integrating the water strategy in the arenas furnished by intergovernmental forums associated with the UfM, such as the Western Mediterranean 5+5 Dialogue. 

On the other hand, considering the already mentioned polarization that water management causes, the cooperation framework by the Agenda can intensify cooperation within MENA Partners themselves. A strengthened collaboration could translate into new intra-regional horizons to share best practices in the South Mediterranean. In summary, the Agenda could have positive decentralizing effects since it can reinforce an already intricated South-South Cooperation. The promotion of common approaches and technology transfers could pass through the experiences that Tunisia and Morocco, as the southern partners who have developed their own 2050 Vision in the past two years, can share with the region. In summary, the Agenda becomes a vital aid for increasing Southern Neighbourhood’s ownership of the policy process on the line of CLIMA-MED (2018-2020). This EU-funded project engaged southern Mediterranean partners in shaping the strategies and proper technical assistance to elaborate sustainable and tailored national systems. 

In conclusion, since water scarcity is a warning alert for both shores of the Mediterranean, the UfM Agenda becomes a vital tool for damage control. However, aside from an emergency approach by the EU, the fragility of the Mediterranean should push for substantive changes not only because it is a necessary step but because it can create positive spill-over effects for international cooperation. 

Food products are healthier in the European Union!

Beatriz Santos Mayo, 6 minutes

Did you know that eating fast food products inside the EU is healthier than eating them elsewhere? Did you know some food additives have been restricted in the EU due to potential health risks? The European Food Safety Authority seeks to protect the food chain from the farm to the table and banned everything that may imply a risk to European Citizens. 
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) is an independent agency that advises and communicates to the European Union the existing and emerging risk associated with the food chain. The EFSA is a European agency with legal basis. It collaborates with the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the member states to provide the best service to European citizens.

The EFSA was created by Regulation (CE) Nº178/2002 after the alimentary crisis in the 1990s. The objective was to protect the customers and re-establish and maintain their trust in European alimentary products. 

Before the EFSA - Alimentary Crisis

The first crisis was in 1996. Flour and cattle feed were produced from the meat of sheep that had died from the "Scaprie" strain of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. The current food crisis started when sick cattle were utilized to create more flour for animal feed. People who ate the meat from these cattle developed the human form of the disease known as Creutzfeldt-Jakob, with symptoms strikingly identical to those of the affected animals, like Blurred vision or blindness, Insomnia, Incoordination, difficulty speaking, and difficulty swallowing. The second one was in 1999, when  Belgium removed all of its chickens and eggs from meat production, issuing a sanitary alert preventing food from these farms from entering the Community. Farms in France and Germany were also impacted. The distribution of recycled fats and oils contaminated with dioxins for animal feed was the cause of the existence of these harmful substances. In this instance, food fraud, including using toxic industrial fats in the food chain, is to blame for the crisis. Finally, in 2002 due to the discovery of dioxin in feed intended for these animals, Belgium, Holland, and Germany shut down 700 poultry and agribusiness farms in February 2002. Although the meat from these animals could reach the food chain, the contamination levels were not alarming. These organic toxins in the pollution influence the mind. Using harmful fats as ingredients, a breach in the food safety system, was the root of the contamination.

Values of EFSA

Excellence: The EFSA conducts rigorous and reliable risk assessments based on the latest scientific advances. Independence: The Scientific advice of EFSA is impartial. Its staff is free from conflict of interest, analyses the data, and objectively applies the methods.  Openness: EFSA evaluations of the alimentary risks are accessible and understandable for all interested authors in the different nutritious matters. Responsibility: EFSA works to improve alimentary security using responsible, sustainable, and practical resources. 

How does it work? - Aged Meet Case

The scientists at EFSA examined current procedures and pinpointed the pathogens and spoilage germs that might emerge and persist during aging and pose a risk to human health. These include enterotoxigenic Yersinia spp., Campylobacter spp., Clostridium spp., Salmonella spp., Staphylococcus aureus, Listeria monocytogenes, and E. coli (STEC) (particularly in beef).

They explained the criteria that would produce dry and wet meat with the same level of safety as fresh meat, expressed as combinations of time and temperature during the aging process. The EFSA experts recommended that the surface temperature of dry-aged beef not rise above 3°C while it is being aged.

Finally, EFSA scientists concluded that the precondition programs and Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems used to verify the safety of fresh meat equally apply to aged meat.

2027- Strategic Objectives

The launch of the new Transparency Regulation and the implementation of EFSA's Strategy 2027 occur simultaneously. Through better transparency and communication, this Regulation intends to boost stakeholders and the public's trust in EFSA while improving the accuracy of its risk assessments and the sustainability of its business model. This Plan includes implementation activities for the numerous demands made on EFSA under the Transparency Regulation. These are a natural continuation of the goals and actions outlined in EFSA's Strategy 2020 in many ways. Strategy 2027 also contains fresh actions resulting from previously unveiled, long-term EU policy reforms (e.g., F2F strategy). Three Strategic Goals serve as the strategy's focal points.

Three separate Strategic Goals that form the agency's main goal are anticipated to be accomplished according to the EFSA 2027 Strategy. These Strategic Objectives will direct EFSA in carrying out its mission in light of the opportunities and challenges mentioned above, aiming to boost stakeholder trust in its scientific advice and increase customer satisfaction, all without compromising the agency's core principles or the caliber of its work. Strategy Goal 1: The first strategic objective is to provide reliable scientific guidance and risk communication from farm to fork. Strategy Goal 2: Assure readiness for upcoming requirements for risk analysis Strategy Goal 3: Promote employee empowerment and organizational agility By policy and risk management choices backed by EFSA's work, one can anticipate seeing the following effects should EFSA effectively accomplish these strategic objectives: a guarantee of public health that takes into account environmental factors, animal welfare, and plant health and the maintenance of confidence in a system of food safety that offers a high level of protection for consumer interests and human health.

EU CITIZENSHIP FOR SALE

By Eleonora Pizzini, 8,5 minutes

In a Tweet from 2020, EU Justice Affairs Commissioner Didier Reynders made it clear that “European Values are not for sale”. However, some EU countries still offer this opportunity to third-country nationals.

Acquiring the citizenship of one of the EU’s Member States is usually a long and complex procedure for any foreigner, and it implies different steps according to the single Member States. The most acknowledged ways to get European citizenship are by descent or by naturalisation. Naturalisation is usually the most common case: after living and working stably in a specific country, a person can submit a request to obtain the nationality of said country. This path usually requires on average at least 10 years of living in the state and there may be additional requirements, such as taking a test, an oath, or minimum levels of income. Nationality by descent, instead, requires the applicant to present proof that one of their ancestors was an EU citizen and did not give up, nor lose the right to, their nationality. In this case, people can apply by submitting the necessary documents to the closest EU mission abroad (e.g. an embassy or consulate) and it will take, on average, between six months and one year to get an answer.

Both these methods are available in all 27 Member States and, of course, people could also become citizens because of marriage to an EU citizen. Yet, in this case there are also specific rules and procedures to follow to prevent fraud. What is evident from these possibilities is that everyone applying for citizenship to a specific country must have a clear and strong relationship with that state. However, a fourth, less-known option is also available for more wealthy foreigners. The procedure of granting so-called Golden Passports or Golden Visas has recently become criticised also in light of the developments between Russia and Ukraine.

What brought the problem into the spotlight?

In September 2020 Ursula von der Leyen gave her first State of the Union Speech, in which she underlined the importance of solidarity and unity among Member States. Recalling her words, one month later several MEPs raised, during a plenary debate with the new Justice Commissioner, the urgent need to stop EU Member States that granted those procedures. Part of this urgency was also motivated by the first-ever Report from the Commission on Investor Citizenship and Residence Schemes in the European Union. The report stressed how, until that point, these types of permits inevitably allowed money laundering, tax evasion, and corruption. The major countries under review from the Commission were: Malta, Cyprus, and Bulgaria. Following the European Parliament session and because of the report, the European Commission consequently also opened infringement procedures against Cyprus and Malta.

Golden Visas

It has to be said that there are some differences between Golden Visas and Golden Passports. However, the two are usually associated, and different sources generate great confusion on what the two procedures are by mixing them up. So, first of all, what are Golden Visas?

This type of scheme is offered by the following EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal, and Spain. It consists of a substantive investment done by third-country nationals that usually involves capital transfer, real estate acquisition, or a donation. Depending on the single state concerned, this could mean that individuals are required to buy real estate properties, state bonds, or, in certain cases, also create or invest in a private company. Golden Visas are also usually less expensive than Golden Passport schemes, with certain countries requiring a minimum investment of “just” €250,000.

The timeframe to obtain Golden Visas varies a lot between Member States, but fluctuates from three up to six or seven months on average. A Golden Visa usually lasts one year, and applicants may request a second Visa lasting two years – or in certain cases five – after the first one. Yet, only if they respect certain conditions, such as, for example, visiting and staying in the state for a minimum period during the first year.

In essence, Golden Visas grant a residence permit to an individual, and their family, if the person has a clear criminal record in their native country and could eventually lead to citizenship by naturalisation. Hence, even if this scheme does not formally require applicants to constantly reside in the country, if they want to apply to become an EU citizen, they still will need to do so. What is possible, though, is that the number of years normally required by the single state to reside in it can be less than the standard ones. Nevertheless, the aforementioned additional requirements, such as testing the knowledge of the language or the culture of the country, taking an oath, or other types of formalities, are still required.

Golden Passports

Golden Passports, instead, are what can be defined as the real problem. This type of scheme is granted just by three countries: Cyprus, Malta, and Bulgaria. Or better, it was, since as of today both Cyprus and Bulgaria stopped the procedure of offering this type of passport after pressure by the EU Commission. Hence, Malta remains the only country that still offers this opportunity.

MEPs and EU Justice Affairs Commissioner Reynders were addressing this second practice in particular in their speeches. In August 2020, Al Jazeera was among the first newspapers to publish a full investigation on to whom these passports and nationality were given in Cyprus. As a result, Cyprus stopped granting the Golden Passports in October of the same year. Among the 1400 requests Cyprus received between 2017 and 2019, 5% of those turned out to be submitted and granted to individuals either currently under criminal investigation, that already served time in prison, or to influential politicians and people holding public state positions, allowing for potential bribery and money laundering. Some of those citizenships were eventually revoked; however, the process of overturning a nationality is not easy and may take a lot of time. 

Famous names that appeared in the investigation were: Nikolay Gornovskiy, former board member of Gazprom, the Russian public-owned gas company. When Gornovskiy was granted citizenship in 2019, he was currently accused and convicted of corruption and abuse of power in the Federation. Mykola Zlochevsky, former Ukrainian minister of ecology and natural resources under the corrupted government of Viktor Yanukovich, was also granted Cypriot citizenship. Generally speaking, the number of businessmen, politicians or high-level figures to whom citizenship was granted despite their questionable and illegal past is high, and in the majority of cases they were convicted for money laundering or corruption.

But what are exactly the differences between Golden Visas and Golden Passports? And why are Golden Passports a threat?

Let us go step by step: Golden Passports are also a scheme to obtain an EU passport in return for an investment. Citizenship is, in any case, not instant; however, a major point of difference between Golden Passports and Golden Visas, or the standard requirements needed for acquiring citizenship by naturalisation, is that in the first case candidates do not need to reside in the country, almost at all to be granted citizenship, nor do they need to work in the country. The ways through which people can apply, and the requirements, are similar to those presented for Golden Visas. However, the minimum amount of capital invested at the beginning is normally higher at around 1 million euros. Moreover, the standard requirements necessary when applying for  citizenship by naturalisation fall.

The procedure, therefore, lacks basic legal standards set by the Member States and the EU to legally obtain a nationality: the scheme lets third-country nationals receive European citizenship without a genuine link with the naturalising country. Additionally, the Commission encountered a lack of strong background checks on candidates and on the procedure’s methods. The reason why in countries such as Malta, Cyprus, and Bulgaria it was possible to obtain  citizenship by investment is that the scheme contributed substantially to the country’s economy. While Bulgaria just partially benefitted from the procedure, Cyprus and Malta were actually the two countries that gained the most out of them. 5% of Cyprus’s GDP since 2013 was raised via Golden Passports - ca. €4.8 billions -, while Malta was able to account for 2.6% of its GDP just for the single year of 2017. This is also the reason why, as of now, Malta is the only country that has “paused” the programme, but is reluctant in removing it completely.

The current situation

Al Jazeera’s investigation pointed out that the majority of applicants asking for a Golden Passport were wealthy Russians, Belarussians, Chinese, and Ukrainians. With the ongoing attack from Russia on Ukraine, the EU imposed on Malta a block on new applications. Nevertheless, this reality allows for some reflections.

First of all, it has already been pointed out that these procedures sell citizenships and values, which is not what the current Commission, nor EU citizens, want. 

Secondly, Malta stopped the application process for Russian and Belarussian citizens on the 2nd of March 2022. The aggression of Russia to Ukraine can be said to have started on the 24th of February. For applications submitted to the Maltese authority between the two dates, there is still, potentially, the possibility that the country is going to accept individuals in favour of the Federation aggression, but who conveniently applied to elude EU sanctions. In fact, Malta stopped new applications, but older ones still appear to be “under process” and not blocked. The possibility that many wealthy Russians applied for Maltese citizenship cannot be excluded.

Lastly, it is generally an élite group of people who is able to pay the price to have access to these systems. Usually, this kind of people come from countries at war or that benefit from poverty in developing countries. In the majority of cases, individuals applying for Golden Passports are looking for an easy way to obtain a second nationality and enter without problems in the European Union despite possible sanctions. Additionally, in many cases these individuals are also looking for a way to not be extradited to their native country once they are convicted for a crime.

This is of course against European values and poses a threat not only to European citizens, but also to the European economy. As there seems to be no added value, nor benefit in granting these types of permits, as underlined by the EU, the procedures just pose “ethical, legal and economic concerns and several serious security risks” and should simply be stopped.

Digital Service Act & Digital Markets Act - European Union's new legislation to modernize regulation in digital services

By Beatriz Santos Mayo, 5 minutes

We must make sure that European laws change with the new situations. The European Union is a digital environment that protects users' fundamental rights and creates a level playing field that promotes innovation and progress. The core of digital innovations that impact our lives is the quick and widespread proliferation of digital services. Europe needs a cutting-edge legal system that protects users' privacy online, builds governance with the defense of fundamental rights, and upholds a transparent online platform.

One of the aims of the European Union regarding the digital environment is to protect the user's fundamental rights and create a level playing field that promotes innovation and progress.

“A Europe fit for the digital age” is a regulatory project where the Commission is committed to making this the "Decade of Digital" in Europe. With a strong focus on data, technology, and infrastructure, Europe aims to reinforce its digital sovereignty and define its norms rather than adopting those of others.

Inside “A Europe fit for the digital age” project, we have 15 different regulations and directives that manage the digital regulatory landscape. We can find the Digital Service Act and Digital Markets Act inside these legislative projects. 

Digital Service Act - your information is valuable online

The Digital Service Act is going to protect consumers. The idea behind the new rules is that anything which is illegal offline should be illegal online too. This guarantees that internet service providers will be accountable for their content control practices. The DSA's laws apply to online intermediaries and platforms.
New rules are necessary to set transparent and fair standards for the platforms. The legislation contains, among others, the following: 

• Online platforms will be required to delete illicit content, including counterfeit and dangerous goods promptly. 

• Under the "know your business customer" principle, online marketplaces may be compelled to track their traders, and any murky patterns intended to influence users' online behavior will be severely forbidden. 

The online platforms must agree with new regulations and apply them. The upcoming rules are designed to work harmoniously with current tech laws. This implies that prior attempts to comply with current cybersecurity requirements or data protection legislation will be worthwhile. Although new legislation adds more regulations and prohibitions, they still need to leave room for innovation. These new rules establish a safer and new market that offers consumers better and more innovative technologies.

Digital Markets Act - Gatekeepers in the spotlights

Online platforms that act as gatekeepers are governed by the Digital Markets Act. Gatekeepers are businesses on the internet that save your information in their databases.  Only a small number of significant online media outlets that act as gatekeepers will be subject to the obligations of this Act. The DMA lays out a list of guidelines that businesses recognized as digital gatekeepers must follow. For instance, the new regulations prohibit big platforms from favorably ranking their own goods or services and tracking users' online activity for targeted advertising without their permission.
Under the DMA, gatekeepers are subject to several and significant requirements, including:

• Use transparent, equitable, and non-discriminatory rating criteria when presenting goods and services to customers. Gatekeepers are now permitted to treat their products and services better than other businesses that engage with customers through the gatekeeper platform.

• Gatekeepers must be transparent about the cost and effectiveness of advertising services.

• Without the user's express consent, gatekeepers are not permitted to combine personal information about end users obtained through their core platform with data obtained from other services they offer or those of third parties.

The European Commission will enforce the DMA with assistance from the member states’ competition authorities. Under the DMA, the Commission will only have the power to bring legal action, decide which laws have been broken, and take further action. Businesses will benefit from greater equality, transparency, and a more fair and competitive market. Consumers,on the other hand, will benefit from a better variety of choices, better data protection, and the advantages of interoperability and data portability.

What is next?

The DSA will be directly applicable throughout the EU 15 months after it enters into force or starting January 1, 2024, whichever will come first. The DSA will take effect four months following its designation regarding the responsibilities for big online platforms and large online search engines.

The DMA was published in the Official Journal of the European Union on October 12, 2022. The DMA will take effect immediately if a given firm is named a gatekeeper, but this will only happen around August or September 2023. The fundamental dos and don'ts will be in effect only six months after designation. So, the DMA won't fully apply until approximately February or March 2024.

2022 - The year for us! The European Year of Youth

source: https://europa.eu/youth/news/launch-of-european-year-of-youth-page-0_en

By Leonie Klüver, 5 minutes.

Do you know that 2022 is the European Year of Youth? Have you ever participated in or benefited from an EU initiative specifically supporting the European youth? For example, the Erasmus+ program? Are you curious about the European Year of Youth and maybe how you can get involved? This article discusses what it is, why it was founded, and how you can participate!

Every year the EU decides upon a theme of action that will be emphasized to create awareness and shift behaviours of EU citizens and national governments throughout the year. On 15 September 2021, the EU announced that 2022 would be the European Year of Youth. The EU recognized the need to give young Europeans a platform to speak up, reflect, and engage with EU politics especially considering the impacts of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the inequalities in opportunities among young people. Under the slogan to shine a light on the importance of European youth to build a better future - greener, more inclusive, and digital, the European Year of Youth has three main goals. Firstly, it aims to draw inspiration for EU policies from the youth's actions, visions, and insights. Secondly, the year is dedicated to listening to the youth and considering their needs and concerns. Lastly, the EU hopes to support the youth this year by developing practical and inclusive opportunities. 

Another focus of the Year of Youth is to make it accessible for everyone. There is a strong emphasis on an inclusive, supporting, and empowering year for the entire European youth to promote participation but especially a sense of belonging. Thus, the EU defined its target group focusing on the youth:

•  with fewer opportunities, 

• from disadvantaged and diverse backgrounds;

• from vulnerable and marginalized groups; or

• from rural, remote, peripheral, and less-developed areas and outermost regions.

In addition to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, questions about a green transition to fight climate change, and a safe environment in times of digitalization are topics that are pressing for all but dictate the future of all young Europeans. Hence, the year attempts to restore positive perspectives for the youth by including them indirectly in EU policies. But how exactly is the year structured? What are the initiatives? Is there already a visible impact? 

Events

Across the EU and beyond, there are thousands of activities this year, ranging from a conference style to online panel talks, touching on numerous topics. The EU does not organize all these activities, but rather the EU cooperates with organizations, associations, NGOs, etc., that all work on facilitating and promoting the European project. The ECA is also part of the European Year of Youth and has organized several events in the past months for example, on Careers in Diplomacy or Consultancies in EU policy-making. If you are curious about upcoming events, you can check out the European Year of Youth website to learn about events in your area, or if you are in Maastricht, become an ECA member and participate in our events.  

Initiatives

Of course, events are only a part of this year's project. There are thousands of initiatives on various policy topics in which the youth plays an active part. For example, in the category ‘Green’ there are 14 initiatives that discuss green energy, waste and recycling, clean oceans, pollution, and nature protection. For example, as part of the European Climate Pact, you can become a Young Climate Pact Ambassador. With the support of the Commission through the provision of knowledge, visibility, and a platform, you can become active in your community to promote the protection of our climate. In the ‘Youth and the world’ category, you can play an advisory role for Commissioner Jutta Urpilainen and the DG International Partnerships. In other initiatives, the youth is more actively and visibly considered without the possibility of the youth being a part of it. Nonetheless, with the variety of topics in which the Youth are considered and actively consulted, the visibility of the youth is tremendously increased. Of course, this article did not touch even closely on all initiatives so if you want to learn about all of the initiatives visit the website of the European Year of Youth! 

source: https://youthvoices.eu/#/

Youth voices 

It can be quite challenging to be heard by anyone in the EU that can implement your concerns and ideas into legislation. Maybe almost impossible. That is why the platform youth voices was created in which everyone can record a voice note. Categorized by topics, you can make your voice heard about, for example, European values, Art and Culture, Employment, Green, Inclusion, etc. At the Youth Closing Event on 6 December 2022, the voices will be presented in front of EU officials and the messages considered for upcoming legislation. So why don't you make your voice heard on the platform after finishing this article? 

EU Youth Policies 

Already in 2010, long before the EYY, the EU developed its first Youth Strategy. In 2019 the EU renewed the Youth Strategy until 2017. The Youth Strategy focuses on three core action areas: to engage, connect and empower the European youth. This strategy intends to involve the youth in shaping EU policies, increase transparency on the financial commitment of the EU towards the youth and also make the EU Youth Dialogue more accessible for youth with fewer opportunities. Thereby, the Strategy aims to reduce the inequalities among EU youth and also engage them more intensely in EU policy-making. To make the strategy more specific, the EU and young Europeans identified 11 European Youth Goals:

1. Connecting EU with Youth

2. Equality of All Genders

3. Inclusive Societies

4. Information & Constructive Dialogue

5. Mental Health & Wellbeing

6. Moving Rural Youth Forward

7. Quality Employment for All

8. Quality Learning

9. Space and Participation for All

10. Sustainable Green Europe

11. Youth Organizations & European Programmes

To what extent the strategy and the Year of Youth have been successful and made an impact is difficult to determine as the initiatives are only starting to be implemented. Nonetheless, by developing a Strategy and allocating 2022 as the Year of Youth, the EU increases the visibility of youth. Furthermore, considering the initiatives as part of the Year of Youth, we - the young people of the EU - can engage more actively in the decision-making of the EU. Though the long-term influence is uncertain, it is safe to say that the strong emphasis on the youth created awareness across Europe of the need to involve us in decision-making. One thing we ought not to forget: as we start our careers in EU politics, it is up to us to promote the desires, needs, visions, and concerns of the youth. 

EU’s Upcoming Media Freedom Act - Tackling the Decline of Media Freedom in the EU

Source: European Commission

by Aari Helmelaid, 7 minutes

The decline of Press Freedom in the EU

On May 3rd, Europe celebrated World Press Freedom Day. However, it was done in the shadow of the recent Press Freedom Index that revealed some dark truths about the state of freedom of the media in The European Union. For example, Greece was ranked as the worst country in the EU for press freedom, ranking 108th out of 180 countries on the index, falling a substantial 48 spots compared to ranking 70th in the previous year.  

The Freedom of the press in the European Union has been in steady decline for the past couple of years. In some European countries, independent media outlets are targeted as enemies and are hindered in their work by draconian laws that aim to limit the spread of information that is not in line with the status quo of certain governments. In addition to this, individual journalists are targeted with threats of violence for reporting on issues of public interest. 

To protect and promote media freedom, the EU has a variety of legislative acts, but so far, no singular harmonised act. 

The European Union in the first place gives constitutional value to media freedom, committing to protecting it through Article 11 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which reads:

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.

2. The freedom and pluralism of the media shall be respected.”

However, It has become visible that primary law is not sufficient to protect media freedom in the EU, which is why, in January 2022, the Commission launched a public consultation on the upcoming European Media Freedom Act (EMFA) - a proposed act to safeguard the pluralism and independence of the media in the EU internal market.

Source: EU Neighbours

Why is there a need to regulate Media Freedom in the EU?

The world of press and media is a complex landscape filled with social and political intricacies. Journalists, bloggers, media companies and their sources are facing a wide range of obstacles that hinder their role as watchdogs for the public. They are confronted with an increase in the politicisation of the media, a decrease in the protection of the right to information, a lack of transparency of media ownership and a lack of independence of media regulators in several Member States. In some alarming cases, journalists in the EU have even been murdered, due to their work on high-profile crime cases. In 2021, a Greek investigative journalist reporting on crime, Giorgos Karaïvaz, was killed unexpectedly, for his work on controversial crime topics. In the same year, a well-known dutch journalist, Peter R. De Vries was also murdered in a mafia-style attack. De Vries in particular was closely covering the Marengo trial, a high-profile case involving seventeen members of the Mocro Mafia, a Dutch-Moroccan criminal gang accused of murder and attempted murder on several counts. After leaving the studio or RTL Boulevard (Dutch national television), De Vries was shot in the head. De Vries had a respected reputation as an investigative journalist and was respected by the Dutch public. His murder shook the nation and invoked emotional reactions calling for action both from home and from the European Commission. 

Direct attacks toward journalists show the urgency of the matter, but more subtle risks arise from a lack of transparency to the public regarding ownership of these portals. A lack of independence can be inferred in a media outlet if it is funded and staffed by bigger corporations or public authorities. When larger bodies own most of the media portals in a country, there is inevitably less media pluralism. Media pluralism is the notion describing that media shall have independence from private control. It promotes the idea of having a diversity of viewpoints available and consumed across the media without significant hindrances to accessibility and the rights of journalists to report. Press freedom, on the other hand, is related to the lack of state monopoly or state intrusion in the press. 

Although many EU states score among the top 20 on the Press Freedom Index, others fall into the lower rankings. In Poland (66th) and Hungary (85th), governments have intensified draconian laws against journalists. For example, the Hungarian government has for the last 10 years pursued a clear strategy to silence independent media through manipulation of the media market – pushing the forcible closure or government takeover of independent media. 

Due to the subtleness of the control of the media by governments, legislating for press freedom and media pluralism is a difficult task that the Commission must face. 

The state of media Freedom is also a concern in western Europe. For example, the Netherlands ranked 6th in 2021 and has fallen a significant 22 spots to 28th place in 2022. 

Audiovisual Media Services Directive 

The upcoming European Media Freedom act will build upon the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. This directive lays down rules for the independence of media regulators, promotes transparency of media ownership and recognises that editorial decisions should be free from interference. The Directive enables the Member States to ensure that major events are available on a free-to-air basis for their population. The Directive also facilitates the cross-border dissemination of TV channels based on the country-of-origin principle. This principle promotes the right of a company providing services in one country to be automatically qualified to provide services in any other Member State on the basis of home-country regulation. 

Not only does the directive regulate traditional audiovisual media providers, but it also extends certain audiovisual rules to video-sharing platforms. Services such as social media are hence included, where the provision of videos and programmes is not the principal purpose of the service, but still constitutes an ‘essential functionality' thereof.

Source: European Parliament

What can we expect from the European Media Freedom Act?

The EMFA is meant to take strong consideration of the Commission’s Recommendation on the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists. The Recommendation emphasises four main areas to improve the rights of journalists:

1. General Recommendations:

In light of the increasing number of attacks on journalists, the recommendation calls on the Member States to vigorously investigate and prosecute criminal acts targeting journalists. Member States should create more cooperation between law enforcement and media bodies to address the threats faced by journalists. It is also of utmost importance that the media has non-discriminatory access to information from public authorities.

2.  Protests and Demonstrations

As a great portion of violence against journalists occurs in demonstrations, the Member States should provide regular training to law enforcement authorities to ensure that journalists can work safely during high-risk events of public interest. 

3. Online safety and digital empowerment

Journalists frequently receive threats online and are hindered by cybersecurity risks and illegal surveillance. Hence why the Member States are encouraged to promote cooperation with online media platforms to tackle threats against journalists. 

4. Women and minority groups journalists and those reporting on equality issues

Female journalists and journalists from minority groups are especially vulnerable to threats. Member States should therefore support initiatives to empower these groups and those reporting on equality issues, thereby improving transparency and effective reporting on attacks. In General, equality and representation should be present in the media professional market and in its workforce.  

In Addition to this, the EMFA is also closely tied to the Digital Services Act package, which is another legislative initiative that is constituted by the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Market Act (DMA). The main goal of the package is to create a digital space where the fundamental rights of users are protected and to establish a level playing field fostering innovation & growth. Essentially the act addresses the rapid growth of digitalisation, social networking and online platforms, and their effect on the internal market. Online services have numerous benefits, but they are also prone to be misused and manipulated to spread disinformation and may put the fundamental rights of their users at risk. 

As is evident, the regulation of media freedom in the EU is still a chaotic patchwork of a variety of different hard and soft law instruments. The EMFA is set to be presented between July to September 2022. It remains to be seen how the EU will move forward with the European Media Freedom Act and whether it will bring concrete results to improving the safety of journalists and media pluralism in the member states. 

Updates on the European Green Deal - On the urgency of climate action and on the measures being taken

Source: European Commission

by Aydın Clara Orberk, 13 minutes

On the 4th of April 2022, the latest Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) report was released, urging governments to take measures for CO2 emissions to peak by 2025 and be reduced by a quarter by 2030. To paraphrase United Nations Secretary-general Antonio Guterres, unprecedented and unlivable conditions in significant parts of the world are forecast unless governments everywhere reassess their energy policies. 

The bottom line of the Report is twofold: We have alternatives in all sectors to at least halve emissions by 2030, but we have to act now. Indeed, measures are being taken on a European level. With all the talk about climate change, what is actually being done? This article discusses updates on the European Green Deal. It starts with proposals to make sustainable products the norm in the EU, then moves on to measures being taken in the highly polluting textile industry, and concludes with a critical stance on the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence proposal.

Updates on the European Green Deal

You may have heard about the European Green Deal (EGD), Europe’s roadmap to climate neutrality by 2050. Our blog first wrote about the EGD here. It is laudable that it comprises the largest legislative package to ever pursue climate goals. But it has yet to live up to its slogan, fair, just and deliverable, as argued on our blog here. Two new sets of proposed measures within the EGD framework have been brought forward and will be analysed in this article.

First, on 30th March 2022, the Commission brought forward a package of proposals in the ‘sustainable industry’ domain to implement the Circular Economy Action Plan, one of the main building blocks of the EGD. Besides measures applying to all products, a set of measures for the textile industry, in particular, will be discussed. 

Second, on 23rd February 2022, the Commission adopted a directive on Corporate sustainability due diligence after the European Parliament and the Council called upon it to do so in 2020.

Towards sustainable products becoming the norm in the EU? 

Essentially, the measures brought forward in the ‘sustainable industry’ package include rules to make physical goods as energy efficient as possible, considering the design, daily use, repurposing, and the goods’ end-of-life. They relate to climate action as they will contribute to resource independence and less pollution. Furthermore, job creation in remanufacturing, maintenance, recycling and repair is expected. 

Let’s turn firstly to product design: the proposal for a Regulation on Ecodesign for Sustainable Products addresses the crucial design phase which determines up to 80% of a product's life cycle environmental impact. According to the Commission, the new framework could lead to 132 megatons of primary energy savings by 2030, a saving which, in terms of natural gas, would be almost equivalent to the EU's import of Russian gas. 

The proposal extends the already existing Ecodesign rules (Directive 2009/125/EC) which have saved consumers €120 billion in 2021 in two ways. First, the eco-design rules will apply to more products; and second, the scope of requirements is diversified, criteria are not limited to energy efficiency but include circularity and an overall reduction of the environmental and climate footprint. 

For each product or category of products, the Commission will progressively set out the ecodesign requirements. It must be noted that the update from the former directive to a regulation leaves less room for the implementation to the Member States, such that incorrect transposition into national law or incorrect enforcement is less likely.

Moving on, once products are designed and come to the market, product-specific information requirements on the sustainability of products will ensure that consumers are better-informed and thereby support consumer awareness of the environmental impacts of their purchases. Currently, about 30 Energy-related products (‘ErP’) are regulated through some 50 measures under the current Energy Labelling Framework Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2017/1369). About half of the EU's total energy use is consumed in products already falling under the scope of this legislation. But the framework provides for two-yearly working plans in order to update and increase the ambition for already regulated products until a new regulation enters into force. 

The Ecodesign and Energy Labelling Working Plan 2022-2024 was thus adopted to extend the energy-related products falling under the Regulation. It now includes consumer electronics (smartphones, tablets, solar panels), the fastest growing waste stream. 

Further measures introduced in the package, but that are yet to be concretised and will not be elaborated upon further in this article include digital product passports to help track substances of concern during recycling, an extension of green public procurement, and other, to be determined incentives for sustainable products. 

Textile, an industry with a high environmental impact

Concrete measures were also adopted to reduce the carbon footprint of particular product groups with significant ecological impact: construction products and textiles. 

Construction products have a significant ecological impact because they determine the energy efficiency of buildings, which are responsible for about a third of the EU’s energy consumption, as well as a third of energy-related greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. A revision of the Construction Products Regulation thus aims to make construction products more circular, in order to deliver on GHG objections. This article will however focus on measures to make the textile industry sustainable. 

European textile consumption has the fourth-highest environmental and climate change impact after food, housing and mobility. It also has the third-highest water and land use consumption, and the fifth-highest use of primary raw materials. In terms of GHG emissions, in 2015 the textile industry totalled more CO2 than all international flights and maritime shipping combined. It thus is an industry with high global warming impact which requires reform in order to attain climate goals. 

Essentially, the EU Strategy for Sustainable and Circular Textiles will ensure that textiles on the EU market are more long-lived and recyclable, made of recycled fibres as possible, free of hazardous substances, and produced in respect of social rights and the environment.

Credit: Tom Finsk. One garbage truck of textiles is landfilled or incinerated every second.

The EU Strategy for Sustainable and Circular Textiles up close

Firstly, the Strategy for Sustainable and Circular Textiles will introduce mandatory Ecodesign requirements such as fibre-to-fibre recyclability and mandatory recycled fibre content. Most of our clothes are made of blended fibres (e.g. the prevalent addition of elastane). This hampers recycling due to the low availability of technologies separating textile waste by fibre, such that very few clothes, if at all, are recycled - most end up in landfills in developing countries, which pollutes the ecosystems, or incinerated, releasing a lot of CO2 in the process.

In factories, 25-40% of all fabric used is leftover or thrown away, and only around 20% of collected used textiles in Europe are downcycled as industry wipes or other applications. The significant destruction of unsold or returned textiles is to be strongly minimised and eventually stopped given the important GHG release.

As a disincentive for this practice, under the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation, the Commission proposes a transparency obligation requiring large companies to publicly disclose the number of products they discard and destroy, including textiles.

Companies may rethink their business model and dealings with unsold, but undamaged clothes if consumers become aware of their practices, since revelations of practices in stark contrast to green claims - statements that products are sustainable - may drive consumers away if they turn out to be greenwashing - false or misleading claims about ecological commitments of the company. 

Second, microplastic pollution will be tackled as well. Fibres in clothing are predominantly and increasingly synthetic. They release microplastics with each wash, amounting to up to 40,000 tonnes of synthetic fibres every year, which eventually enter our food chain. This can partly be remedied through mandatory design requirements under the Ecodesign Regulation. In the second half of 2022, the Commission will introduce a set of microplastic prevention and reduction measures including ecodesign requirements (to reduce the usage of synthetic fibres). Because the highest amount of microplastics is released during 5-10 first washes, target prewashing at industrial manufacturing plants and microplastic-capturing washing machine filters may also be encouraged or rendered mandatory. 

Third, green claims will be verified to avoid greenwashing and allow consumers to pick truly sustainable textiles. Consumers willing to purchase more sustainable products are often discouraged from buying them by the unreliability of claims (greenwashing), as studies show that 39% of green claims could be false or deceptive. To protect consumers against greenwashing, the initiative on Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition proposes to amend the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and the Consumer Rights Directive to only allow substantiated and verified general environmental claims such as ‘green’ or ‘eco-friendly’, notably based on EU Ecolabels. The Commission will present in the second half of 2022 a set of minimum criteria for all types of environmental claims in the context of the Green Claims Initiative.

Fourth, besides banning the combustion of unused textile, Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) requirements will boost the reuse and recycling of textile waste. ERPs essentially make producers responsible for the waste that their products create, which is crucial to decouple textile waste generation from the growth of the textile sector. EPR requirements have proven effective in improving waste management in line with the waste hierarchy: as producers become responsible for their waste, EPR can incentivise product design that promotes textile circularity avoiding waste in the first place, and several EU Member States have already enacted or considered the introduction of EPR requirements for textiles, in line with the obligation under EU waste legislation to establish a separate collection of textile waste by 1 January 2025. The Commission will propose harmonised EU extended producer responsibility rules for textiles with eco-modulation of fees, as part of the forthcoming revision of the Waste Framework Directive in 2023. 

Fifth, for textiles, information requirements and digital product passports will be introduced.

The textile industry of tomorrow: Driving fast Fashion out of Fashion

Looking forward, the EU aims to create enabling conditions for a more sustainable industry through a forthcoming Transition Pathway for the Textiles Ecosystem. This collaborative tool is currently being co-created with stakeholders. The Transition Pathway will, as the name indicates, allow for a transition to reverse the overproduction and overconsumption of clothing - companies are notably called on to reduce the number of collections per year. The Industrial Strategy of the EU will also be updated with measures aiming to drive fast fashion out of fashion, in favour of clothes of quality that are made to last, and circular.

Innovation and investments in sustainable clothing and the development of skills needed for the green and digital transitions will also be supported. 

Finally, the EU aims to introduce sustainable textiles value chains globally. The focus lies on addressing the challenges arising from the export of textile waste, and on establishing due diligence for environmental and social fairness. The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive is part of that, and crucially in light of the scandal of brands having allegedly made use of forced Uyghur labour, the Commission is preparing a legislative initiative to effectively prohibit the placing on the EU market of products made by forced labour.

The Sustainable Corporate Due Diligence legislative proposal - Towards sustainable businesses becoming the norm in the EU? 

The Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Proposal comprises rules for companies to respect human rights and the environment in global value chains. Concretely, companies must:

• integrate due diligence into policies;

• identify actual or potential adverse human rights and environmental impacts;

• prevent or mitigate potential impacts;

• bring to an end or minimise actual impacts;

• establish and maintain a complaints procedure;

• monitor the effectiveness of the due diligence policy and measures;

• and publicly communicate on due diligence.

The proposal applies to the company's own operations, but also their subsidiaries and their value chains, i.e. direct and indirect business relationships. 

Companies will be obliged to take ‘appropriate’ measures to mitigate adverse impacts, the appropriateness of which will depend on the severity and likelihood of different impacts, the measures available to the company in the specific circumstances, and the need to set priorities (‘obligation of means').

Crucially, a supervision mechanism will be in place at the national level: national administrative authorities will guard the application of the due diligence and rules and have the discretion to impose fines in case of non-compliance or give orders to cease the conduct.

National authorities will also be required to set up rules governing the civil liability of companies for damages arising from a failure to carry out adequate due diligence, allowing victims who suffered damages that could have been avoided with appropriate due diligence measures to take legal action. 

The rules apply to 2 groups: 

• Group 1: all EU limited liability companies of substantial size and economic power (with over 500 employees and over EUR 150 million in net turnover worldwide). Group 1 companies furthermore must adopt a plan to ensure that their business strategy is compatible with limiting global warming to 1.5 °C in line with the Paris Agreement.

• Group 2: Other limited liability companies operating in defined high impact sectors, which do not meet both Group 1 thresholds, but have more than 250 employees and a net turnover of EUR 40 million worldwide and more. 

The scheme applies to any company active in the EU with turnover thresholds aligned with the criteria generated in the EU, thus both EU and non-EU companies. 

Where companies' directors enjoy variable remuneration, directors will be incentivised to implement due diligence.

A drop in the Ocean? 

The Sustainable Corporate Due Diligence proposal is yet to be adopted by the European Parliament and Council but it has received important criticism. The World Wildlife Fund notably regrets that since it excludes Small and Medium Enterprises, it will apply to a tiny fraction of EU companies only, in fact only 0.02% of EU businesses. Indeed, the Directive’s name changed from Sustainable Corporate Governance to Sustainable Corporate Due Diligence following strong lobbying, reflecting a reduction in scope. 

Furthermore, SMEs in high-risk sectors are not included despite their substantial environmental impact, inconsistent with the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive, and the list of high-risk sectors for group 2 is extremely narrow to begin with: sectors like high-carbon power production (coal, gas-fired power plants), high-carbon transport (aviation), high-carbon industry (steel, cement, chemicals) are excluded from high-risk sectors.

Furthermore, unlike in earlier, leaked versions of the proposal, the variable remuneration of directors being linked to their due diligence is discretionary and not mandatory anymore. 

Finally, for group 2 companies the measures will apply two years later than for group 1, despite climate urgency. 

To conclude, the Due Diligence Proposal is a step forward but excludes 99.8% of businesses in the EU. 

Climate measures: the State of Affairs

As a take-away message, the latest IPCC report showed that ambitious carbon emissions cuts are much needed but not being made. The Commission released a package of new European Green Deal measures concentrating on high impact sectors, i.e. textiles, construction products, and products in general, as well as a Due Diligence Directive whose scope is however tremendously restricted as it will apply to only 0.02% of businesses. The EGD framework must be used to its full potential to move away from a fossil-fuel addicted society toward sustainable, and also more independent consumerism. The IPCC report urges governments and businesses alike to rethink their policies and business models ambitiously in order to cut emissions in order for GHG emissions to peak by 2025, and measures such as the EU Strategy for Sustainable and Circular Textiles do indeed incentivise companies to do better and contribute to climate goals. There is no better time to act than now - A shift towards a circular model would also boost Europe's overall resource independence, and our dependence on authoritarian supporting hydrocarbons is excruciatingly reminded these days. 

This article would not be complete without mentioning POP Boutique Maastricht, a local student-founded and student-driven online second-hand shop. It advocates against fast fashion and donates 100% of its profits to Samos Volunteers, an NGO providing basic needs for refugees and asylum seekers arriving on Samos island, Greece. Second-hand clothes shops contribute to making the textile industry more circular by giving a new life to clothes that would otherwise be incinerated or end up in landfills. You can find POP boutique on Instagram and Vinted.’ 

Students & the EU - what rights do we have?

source: Debating Europe

by Jeanne Gallien, 7 minutes

 Since 1992, the Maastricht Treaty has established the free movement of goods, services, capital, and persons. Travelling to the territory of another Member State is a great opportunity for young people to develop themselves, boost their future professional opportunities, learn from others, make contacts, and complement their culture. In an ever-changing world, the need to adapt and be mobile is even more relevant for today's youth. However, as a French student studying in the Netherlands, I realized that many students, including myself, were not aware of their rights under EU law. We are all aware of our national citizenship, but few know much about their European citizenship, which was introduced in 1992 and is now codified in Art. 20 (1) TFEU that reads:

Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.

This article aims to inform young people about their rights given by European citizenship in higher education, which may encourage them to consider a period of study abroad. For this reason, it will solely focus on EU nationals and not on third-country nationals. 

To provide guidance and make these complex terms more understandable, an example of a German student named Alix, wishing to start her bachelor's degree in European Studies in Maastricht, starting in September 2022 will be used.

 Right to free movement

Article 18 TFEU states that “any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.” It means that everyone should be treated the same, irrespective of their nationality and that any direct or indirect discrimination, is forbidden. Direct discrimination occurs when people are discriminated against because of their nationality, that is, when a national and a foreign student are treated differently in law and fact. Indirect discrimination occurs when, nationals and foreign students are treated equally in law but in fact, the foreign person must deal with an extra burden. In the case law Commission v Austria C-147/03, students had to provide evidence of a diploma and show that they would have satisfied entrance to their home-country university. The court ruled that this requirement is likely to affect nationals of other Member States more than nationals of the Member State concerned so that the difference in treatment established by that national rule entails indirect discrimination contrary to the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality contained in Article 18 TFEU. 

However, this type of discrimination can sometimes be justified by justification laid down in cases Bressol C-73/08 and Commission v Austria C-147/03, as long as the measure is proportionate. It must be suitable to achieve the aim, meaning that there is no less restrictive measure able to do it.

In the case where Alix would like to study in another Member State in the EU (the Netherlands), she should not face obstacles that run counter to the principle of equal treatment. She must not be refused access to university purely based on her nationality; she must be subject to the same acceptance criteria to which all nationals are entitled.

Source: Debating Europe

Residence rights of students

Let us assume that Alix has been accepted into her university in the Netherlands and, she is looking for housing. She is wondering whether she has the right to reside in the Netherlands, or if she should apply for a visa.

Articles 20 and, more specifically, 21 TFEU highlight that any citizen of the Union shall enjoy the right of free movement. Article 21(1) TFEU reads:

“Every citizen of the Union shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States”.

This provision is further elaborated in Directive 2004/38/EC which expands the treaty provisions and lays down specific conditions and limitations. To take advantage of the benefits of the Directive, Alix must satisfy its personal and material scope. The personal scope corresponds to the beneficiaries of the Directive. Article 3(1) states that “This Directive shall apply to all Union citizens who move to or reside in a Member State other than that of which they are a national, and to their family members as defined in point 2 of Article 2 who accompany or join them.” Alix is an EU citizen moving from Germany to the Netherlands, thus the personal scope is fulfilled. Moving on, the material scope is what the Directive covers substantively. It provides for the conditions of lawful residence. The Directive does not cover wholly internal situations but only when there is a cross-border element. This is also fulfilled, as Alix wishes to cross the German-Dutch border in to study in the Netherlands, a country which is not the Member State of her nationality. Therefore, as an EU citizen wishing to study in another Member State, she can rely on this Directive.

If a student wants to stay in another Member State for three months, article 6(1) states that a Union citizen shall enjoy the right of residence on the territory of another Member State for the period of three months without conditions other than a valid identity document.

If a student wants to stay in another Member State between three months and 5 years, which is the most common situation for the students, they can rely on article 7(1)(c) of the directive. They need to fulfil certain conditions:

• Be enrolled in a private or public establishment, accredited, or financed by the host Member State;

• Have comprehensive sickness insurance cover in the host Member State and must inform the relevant national authorities in line with the national rule, and

• Have enough resources not to become a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State.

If a student wants to stay in another Member state for more than 5 years, article 16 applies. A student who has registered legally for a continuous period of 5 years in the host Member State can acquire the right to live there permanently and be treated the same way as a national.

Source: Maastricht University

Eligibility for benefits

Assuming that Alix is enrolled at a university and knows that she can legally reside in the Netherlands, she is wondering if she is eligible for any study benefits.

The financial benefit from the home Member State 

Many Member States provide loans or grants to help their own students with their living costs when studying. Under the current law, the choice to grant such aid lies with the Member States. If they decide to do so, they must not restrict or discourage a student from exercising their right to free movement within the European Union (Thiele Menes C-220/12).

The financial aid from the host Member State 

The issue of financial aid from the host Member State (the State to which a student moves) is explained in Directive 2004/38/EC. This Directive explicitly excludes maintenance grants and loans from the principle of equal treatment. Article 24 states that host Member States are not obliged to extend social assistance, to grant maintenance aid for studies, including vocational training constituting student grants or student loans to students prior to the acquisition of the right of permanent residence, equivalent to 5 years residence.

Conclusion 

Summing up the above considerations and applying them to the case of Alix, she is now aware of her rights under EU law. She knows that she has as much chance as nationals to be accepted in a school in another EU country. She can also reside lawfully in that Member State where she is studying. However, most likely she will not receive financial aid from the host country, the Netherlands. She will have to ask her home Member State Germany if she is eligible for benefits.

This article was inspired by the EU Law II course given in the second year of the European Studies bachelor programme at Maastricht University, coordinated by Dr Andrea Broderick.

The AI Act as a Shield for the EU Cyberspace

by Federico Durante, 7 minutes

The war in Ukraine has sparked global attention because of the physical harm that affected Ukrainian civilians and cities. European media focused on the impact of tanks, ballistic missiles, military convoys, drones, and fighter jets that the Russian Federation deployed on Ukrainian territory.  Nevertheless, if Europe believes these to be the overarching menaces to European security, we might have missed a much wider scope of threats that are already affecting us directly. Along with what it called a “special military operation”, Russia launched a range of Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS) attacks on Ukraine, which are cyberattacks that disrupt the normal functioning of a server or network. DDOS aimed at introducing malware into Ukraine’s banking system, government-related websites, civilian infrastructure, and spreading disinformation. NATO and EU Member States sent dozens of teams of experts in cybersecurity to help respond to such non-conventional attacks by Russian hackers. Moreover, some 300,000 volunteers from all over the world have joined Ukraine’s IT Army, sponsored by the Ukrainian defence ministry. Unfortunately, these efforts might not be enough if you consider the quantity of data available in cyberspace. 

A key term that increasingly appears in the debate about cybersecurity is ‘granularity’ – the level, or scale, of precision and detail of a given data structure. At first glance, data does not provide any strategically valuable insight, however, if combined with other data structures it can reveal very sensitive information. For example, in the U.S. some police officers were able to find out in a few minutes who were the individuals attacking Capitol Hill on January 6 last year or to identify those who participated in riots after George Floyd was killed. It was done by aggregating facial recognition from billions of pictures, allowing them to identify and track the individuals they were looking for. Alternatively, in 2017, an Australian hacker decided to amuse himself by posting information on social media that revealed the activities of secret U.S. military bases in Afghanistan. The same person released personal data of individuals working in a French base in Niger, and an Italian one in Djibouti. 

This aggregation of relevant data structures is explained by the ‘mosaic theory’. It establishes that when apparently meaningless parcels of data are selectively merged, a single coherent piece of information can be derived from it. This data is readily collected not only through our phones and computers, but also from smart-watches, -refrigerators, -showers, -cars, -bikes, -lamps, -toilets, -speakers, etc. The Internet of Things (IoT) is an awesome tool as it enables physical objects with sensors and processing ability to exchange data with each other on the Internet, thus enhancing the ability of those products to mutually help each other in order to better satisfy our needs. But the IoT still allows our geopolitical rivals, such as Russia, to be aware of where we are, how we are behaving, and for how long. If Russians would manage to merge huge amounts of EU citizens’ personal data, they could draw very precise conclusions about us, Europeans. They are already observing our social media contents, our search engine tendencies, our pictures, and our apps. By combining all this information into a single mosaic, they are going to improve their ability to design strategies to harm us with DDoS and disinformation campaigns.

Now, this is no longer possible since the European Parliament and Council found a consensus on the Artificial Intelligence Act. This piece of legislation, which is the first-ever regulatory framework for AI technologies, is primarily related to data protection and harmonisation of the AI market between the Member States. Firstly, it establishes what kind of personal (granular) data can be collected from consumers, how and where it can be processed, and with whom and for what purposes it can be shared. Secondly, it harmonises the regulatory framework concerning the use of algorithms, previously decided by the Member States, in products that include AI technology. What needs to be stressed with this long introduction to cybersecurity, however, is that the AI Act completely avoids addressing AI’s importance in cybersecurity. The legal basis that was used by the Commission to propose the AI Act is Art. 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU). This Treaty provision is the most widely used legal basis since it relates to the functioning of the internal market, which prevents market-oriented legislation from being interpreted in light of the current geopolitical situation. 

No matter how market-oriented this legislation might be, the AI Act inevitably and unintentionally assumes a geopolitical value. It limits foreign actors’ ability to access EU citizens’ data, which restrains their success in carrying out DDoS and disinformation campaigns. The comparative advantage in cyber warfare is represented by the amount of data available to one actor relative to the amount available to all other actors: the more parcels you have, the better you can be at obtaining a ‘mosaic’ that gives you a strategic advantage over the others. If hackers can architect their attacks on a smaller amount of data, the impact of their actions will be lessened, since they will be able to target individuals, firms and governments less precisely and on less relevant fronts. Therefore, by limiting the amount of data that stems from products that involve AI technology (especially in the IoT), the AI Act protects us from being attacked in an effective manner, ultimately preventing the EU’s Internet infrastructure from suffering major disruptions. 

Summing up, the lessons that can be derived from the impact of the AI Act on geopolitics and on European cybersecurity are twofold:

1. Privacy is not just individual liberty and a right that EU citizens enjoy in the form of a legal principle, but is also a tool to be used to prevent foreign actors from acquiring precise ‘mosaics’ about EU citizens’ behaviour. Data protection must be relevant not only in an economic and commercial context, where firms are prevented from using data to extensively target customers, engage in unfair competition, and use algorithms in a discriminatory and unethical manner. It is also a security tool to prevent our geopolitical rivals from acquiring too much strategic advantage over the EU itself. The AI Act will make things much harder for Russian hackers to attack our IoT network and algorithms (through DDoS), or to use our data entailed in it in order to obtain clearer mosaics about us.

2. Art. 114 TFEU is a legal basis that can be used for purposes related to the functioning of the internal market, such as competition, regulation, and safety, but it can be intelligently used in order to pass legislation that would have geopolitical significance, as the AI Act turned out to do. The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) tend to be shortcomings in relation to the EU’s security needs, and are often adopting the lowest common denominators of all Member States: such policy areas are strictly intergovernmental and anyone can veto EU action. Both the EU and NATO have been cohesive in responding to Russia’s aggression on Ukraine, but is this likely to last forever? Some geopolitical issues, such as cybersecurity, can be solved by regulating relevant parts of the market. Therefore, it is better to avoid the legal framework of CFSP and CDSP, and to bring legislation under the scope of consumer protection and the internal market (Art. 114 TFEU); where the bargaining power is more distributed, negotiations are smoother, and legislation is more likely to be adopted. 

The EU has the largest market in the world, which gives it immense regulatory power. Decisions related to products and services taken by the EU are likely to have repercussions in many other jurisdictions because they import our regulatory standards through market forces. Even if the EU seems reluctant and divided when it comes to geopolitics, it does not mean that it is unable to affect geopolitics and the global security architecture through its market power. The AI Act shows how the EU, by simply regulating its internal market, can (in some sectors) affect the distribution of power in international geopolitical conflicts, and defend itself from actors that want to disrupt our European sovereignty.  

How does the European Union protect human rights?

Source: Debating Europe

by Lucrezia Nicosia, 7 minutes

The protection of human rights represents one of the main values of the European Union, as laid down in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

The main provision outlining the concept is Article 2 TEU, which states:

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

Furthermore, according to the wording of Article 3(5) TEU:

[The EU] shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.

For what concerns the area of common foreign and security policy, and according to Article 21 TEU (later confirmed in Article 205 TFEU):

The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.

Two specific legal instruments play an important role when discussing the topic of human rights protection within the European Union: the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter). While being closely connected to each other, they have been issued by two different entities: the Council of Europe and the European Union respectively. 

This article aims at explaining how the European Union guarantees the protection of the human rights of its citizens/residents. This will be done by explaining the scope and content of the EU Charter, its similarities with the ECHR, and the main bodies involved. 

What is the European Convention on Human Rights?

Source: Council of Europe

The ECHR is a regional instrument drafted on the 4th November 1950 and to which all Contracting Parties that belong to the Council of Europe (CoE) are parties. The CoE is an international organization primarily concerned with developing and spreading awareness on human rights around Europe and which must not be confused with the European Council or the Council of the European Union. Indeed, while these institutions are part of the EU, the CoE is an independent organization that comprises 47 States, including all 27 EU Member States. 

The ECHR forms part of the general principles common to all the Member States now in Article 6(3) TEU: 

Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR] and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law.

This way, within the framework of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), an international court of the CoE which interprets and applies the provisions of the ECHR, the EU Member States hold a so-called “presumption of equivalent protection”. The latter was elaborated in the Bosphorus case and it has been used by the ECtHR in order to balance the Contracting States’ obligations under the ECHR and EU law: when a case against an EU Member State is brought before the ECtHR, and the alleged violation concerns the application of EU law, the Court will presume that there has been equivalent protection of the ECHR. However, such presumption may be rebutted if there are signs of manifest deficiency.

What is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was initially proposed by the European Council in 1999 and it was solemnly proclaimed on 7 December 2000 by the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the European Commission. Nevertheless, it was initially not legally binding, but taken into consideration as soft law. The EU Charter gained full legal effects on EU Member States when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in December 2009. Currently, the EU Charter is considered, together with the TEU and the TFEU, as part of EU primary law.

The EU Charter is divided into six chapters, which divide the different categories of rights:

1. Dignity (e.g. human dignity, right to life, right to integrity of the person, prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment);

2. Freedoms (e.g. right to liberty and security, respect for private life and family life, freedom of thought, conscience and religion);

3. Equality (e.g. equality before the law, non-discrimination)

4. Solidarity (e.g. workers’ right to information and consultation, fair and just working conditions)

5. Citizen’s rights (e.g. right to vote, right to good administration, right of access to documents held by any EU institutions)

6. Justice (e.g. right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial, presumption of innocence and right of defence)

As laid down in Article 51 EU Charter:

The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law.

Therefore, Member States are bound by EU human rights standards at the moment that they implement EU law, when national legislation falls into the scope of EU law, and when they derogate from fundamental freedoms. 

Member States technically have the possibility to opt out from legislation or treaties of the European Union, meaning they do not have to participate in certain policy areas. This seems to have happened to the United Kingdom and Poland according to Protocol no. 30 EU Charter. However, this cannot be considered an actual opt-out, but better as a “clarification” since the Protocol cannot exempt the UK and Poland from human rights standards already recognized by EU case law and that belong to the general principles of law under Article 6(3) TEU. Indeed, EU Member States are always bound, when acting within the scope of EU law, by the human rights standards already recognized by EU case law and that belong to the general principles of law under Article 6(3) TEU.

To review the progress in implementing and respecting human rights standards, the European Commission draws up annual reports prepared in close collaboration with all institutions and relevant stakeholders on the application of the EU Charter by the Member States. 

Furthermore, the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) covers an important role in this field. On the one hand, it gives independent advice to EU institutions and the Member States on the rights set out in the Charter; on the other hand, it conducts legal and social research to better improve the level of protection of human rights in the EU and to align them to international standards. 

What are the main differences between ECHR and EU Charter?

1. The ECHR was drafted by the Council of Europe, an international organization that includes 47 Contracting Parties. On the other hand, the EU Charter is an instrument of the European Union, applicable only to EU member states. 

2. Contracting Parties to the ECHR are bound by it in all actions or omissions within their jurisdiction, while Member States are bound to the EU Charter only when acting within the scope of EU law.

3. The EU Charter enshrines some rights that are not guaranteed in the ECHR, as for example the right to asylum or the right to data protection. Although the latter is not expressly governed in the ECHR, there is a lot of ECtHR case-law on the matter on the basis of Article 8 ECHR.

4. Within the framework of the ECHR, there is a specific court that checks on the observance of the Convention. Indeed, individuals whose rights have been violated can take the case to the European Court of Human Rights. On the contrary, within the system of the EU Charter, there is no court to which individuals can apply directly. This can be done only indirectly through the work of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 

That being said, the system of the European Union and of the Council of Europe are intertwined because the provisions laid down in the ECHR have been used as a basis for the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Furthermore, all 27 EU Member States are also members of the Council of Europe and therefore bound by its human rights standards. 

The Multiannual Financial Framework - policy up close

by Erik Schmidt-Bergemann, 5 minutes

Every seven years the member states of the European Union come together and decide on the new multiannual financial framework or the budget of the European Union (EU). The last budget ran out at the end of 2020, in the middle of the Covid-19 pandemic, and member states had to come together and negotiate the new framework for the 2021-2027 budget period. This article will cover the new budget in detail and will offer a short explanation of the budget in general. 

What is the multiannual financial framework? 

The so-called multiannual financial framework (or short MFF) has been used in the EU since 1988. The MFF usually runs for seven years (the required minimum is five years) and touches upon basically every aspect of the EU. For example, programs such as Erasmus or Horizon Europe are funded by the MFF. The MFF sets a yearly limit on commitments and payments that the EU can make. However, in the case of unforeseen circumstances, such as a sudden crisis, the EU has several financial instruments at its disposal to address these sufficiently. 

But who makes the initial proposal of the budget and who are the key players in the decision-making process? The Commission starts the process of passing the budget by presenting an initial proposal. This initial proposal will then move on to the Council which may change the proposal by the Commission. Thus, the member states play a central role in the budget decision-making process and can influence the budget. After the Council is done with changing the proposal from the Commission, the budget moves on to the European Parliament. However, it cannot make any official changes to the proposal at this stage since it is not a co-legislator but rather is only asked for consent since the MFF is following the consent procedure. Thus, the Parliament needs to inofficially influence the budget while the EU member states are negotiating it in the Council. After the European Parliament has given its consent to the budget, the Council needs to adopt the budget through a unanimous vote. The legal basis for this is article 312 in the TFEU. 

The new budget 2021-2027

Figure 1: European Commission The 2021-2027 MFF

In 2020 the member states had to pass the new budget for the period of 2021-2027. The new budget will encompass €1.211 trillion which are combined with €806.9 billion in the recovery package. The recovery package is what makes this MFF particularly interesting. Due to the unprecedented Covid-19 crisis and its impact on the European economy, the member states have decided to set up a recovery package to limit the negative effects of the Covid-19 crisis on European economies and help the states that have been hit the hardest by the pandemic. The influence of the pandemic on the MFF will be covered in detail below.

The MFF has seen some changes since the first budget was adopted in 1988. Whereas the first three decades had seen a focus on the Common Agricultural Policy and Cohesion Policy, the new budget will shift its focus to new priorities. These new priorities include investments into research and innovation, combating climate change, the transition to the new digital era and the recovery from the Covid-19 pandemic. This exemplifies the new focus on the budget and Figure 2 shows that these new priorities are receiving the largest share in the 2021-2027 MFF. If you want to dive into the details of the new MFF, this brochure by the EU is a good starting point. 

Figure 2: European Commission 

Another new addition to the 2021-2027 MFF is the so-called “conditionality regulation”. This new regulation has been introduced to address rule of law breaches by member states. An example of a rule of law breach would be if a certain member state does not implement rulings by the Court of Justice. However, this conditionality only applies if “a given member state threaten the EU financial interests” (Source: European Commission). Thus, rule of law breaches that do not threaten the EU’s financial interests are not affected by the new conditionality regulation. 

Yet, if a member state should threaten the financial interests of the EU, the Commission is responsible for proposing appropriate measures to the Council to address the breaches by the member state in question. After the Commission has proposed measures to the Council, the Council will make a final decision on the proposal. 

The Covid recovery package

Due to the Covid-19 crisis and its huge economic impact on the European economy, the EU has decided to include a recovery package in combination with the new MFF. The main aims of this recovery package are to limit the negative effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and to transform Europe into a digital and sustainable continent. The funds that are allocated under the Recovery and Resilience Facility are directly paid to the member states after the member states have submitted a Recovery and Resilience plan. These plans need to address several challenges including climate change and digitalisation. Once a member state has submitted its plan the Commission will assess it and the European Council will approve it. Once the plan has been approved by the European Council, the member state will receive its allocated funds. 

As aforementioned, most of the funds will be used to increase Europe’s digital capabilities and to make European economies ‘green’ and sustainable. Figure 3 showcases several areas that will receive funding under the Recovery and Resilience Facility such as improving digitalisation in public administration or investing in renewable technologies such as solar energy. 

Figure 3: European Commission