Who’s Really Not Ready? The EU’s Enlargement Blind Spot.

Author: Lana Simončič

Reading time: 7 mins

For twenty years the Western Balkans have been asked to prove they’re ready for the EU. It’s time to ask whether the EU is ready for them to join.

Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on her Western Balkan tour in September 2026. Source picture: © European Union, 2026, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons

The last EU enlargement happened in 2013, almost 14 years ago, when the second former Yugoslav country, Croatia, joined the EU. Since then, multiple Western Balkan countries, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Serbia, and finally Montenegro, which is currently the candidate closest to accession, have been in the process of joining the Union. What’s striking here is that some of these candidates have applied for EU membership more than a decade ago, for example North Macedonia who applied in 2004. 

Many people believe that the Candidates have been in the waiting room for too long, but why has the accession process of the Western Balkans countries taken so long, despite the fact that they follow a special enlargement process of stabilization and association (SAP)? Is it because the candidates are not ready, or could it be because the Union has not adapted to be able to function with 35+ Member States? The current enlargement debate focuses extensively on candidates’ readiness. However, is it perhaps time to switch the focus to the Union's readiness to answer the question: “Who is really responsible for the enlargement deadlock?”

The EU candidate countries Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, and potential candidate Kosovo. Source picture: Kolja21, CC0, via Wikimedia Commons

When it comes to EU enlargement, there is an ongoing debate between the necessity of enlargement and its risk for the Union. Enlargement is definitely a strategic investment in peace, security, stability and prosperity of the European continent. Some even argue that enlargement cannot be viewed as an optional tool, but rather a cornerstone of Europe’s capacity to adapt and effectively respond to crises, and furthermore strengthen its influence on the global stage. Therefore, failure to pursue enlargement could diminish the EU’s geopolitical influence, weaken its strategic autonomy, and prolong instability along its borders. 

On the other hand, enlargement can endanger the Union which is already difficult to govern. As Sandro Gozi warned, without a prior internal reform, it could risk EU paralysis, lead to institutional constraints, and make the EU vulnerable to internal political leverage. Ultimately, the challenge is not to choose between enlargement or institutional stability, but to ensure that the EU undertakes the necessary institutional reforms to accommodate much needed enlargement without undermining its ability to function effectively. The candidates know exactly what they must do to be ready, however, does the same apply to the Union?

Traditional understanding of enlargement as a one-way process in which only the candidates must adapt to accede to the Union is flawed. Enlargement needs to be viewed as a two-sided readiness test, where candidates’ readiness, and equally important, the Union’s readiness are two sides of the same coin. Only by examining enlargement through this “dual lens”, can it be successful and sustainable long term, fulfilling its original purpose of pursuing stability and prosperity. 

Thus, firstly, are the Western Balkans ready for accession? Art. 49 TEU stipulates that for accession state needs to respect values in Art. 2 TEU (EU’s fundamental values), be a European state and comply with Copenhagen criteria. Those include political and economic requirements, namely democracy, rule of law, functioning market economy and implementation of the acquis communautaire, that countries need to meet, if they wish to accede to the Union. Apart from the Copenhagen criteria, there are some additional regional cooperation requirements that apply to the Western Balkans. If candidates comply with the established criteria (Commission has monopoly on assessing the compliance), and Member States, in the Council of the EU, unanimously agree, the candidate can finally be able to accede, subject to the conclusion and ratification (in all Member States) of the accession treaty. While some candidates, such as Montenegro, are closer to accession than others, it should be emphasized that accession is not automatic upon fulfilment of the requirements, as it also depends on EU’s capacity to integrate the new members effectively, which means being institutionally, and not only geopolitically ready for the enlargement.

Picture source: Cancillería Ecuador, CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Secondly, is the EU ready for enlargement? Can it continue to function effectively after welcoming the new members? There are three main constitutional challenges that require solutions for the Union to be institutionally ready to function with 35+ members. These are: preserving decision-making capacity, upholding respect for fundamental values, and addressing more heterogeneity by adapting existing mechanisms of institutional flexibility. There is a risk of a bigger EU being unable to adopt decisions quickly and efficiently, or to adopt decisions at all. This especially applies to the areas that currently require unanimity, such as the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU budget and even enlargement. Moreover, in practice, the Council operates by consensus, even in areas where unanimity is not formally required. When the Union consisted of just six members, reaching consensus was simpler, and even logical. 

However, is it realistic in a union of 35+ Member States? That is highly unlikely. Requiring unanimity could practically “handicap” the Union, as 35+ Member States hold divergent interests and priorities. Even when a decision is reasonable and beneficial to the Union as a whole, some Members would leverage their veto power to accomplish something in their national political interest that could otherwise not be achieved. A clear example of this is  Hungary threatening to block Ukraine’s integration with the EU because of its frozen cohesion funds. With further enlargement, the risk of such vetoes, political deadlock, and institutional paralysis could increase, which could make it more difficult for the EU to function effectively. 

That is why a switch from unanimity to qualified majority decision-making is needed. Such a switch can be realized in two ways; either by revising the treaty rules on decision-making (this is unlikely to happen in the near future, as the treaty revision is difficult due to the “double veto” system), or using the existing mechanism provided for in the treaties - passerelle clauses, which allow decision-making in the council to be changed from unanimity to qualified majority, in areas where the council decides so unanimously. 

The next needed institutional reform is a robust system of protection of fundamental values, applicable to all Member States, not just candidates. How can the EU credibly demand democratic standards from candidates, if it struggles to enforce those same standards among existing members? The Union’s existing mechanism for the fundamental values protection have largely proved to be inefficient. For example, Art. 7 TEU procedure is powerful in theory, as it leads to the suspension of voting rights in the Council, but is in reality, ineffective and difficult to deploy, due to requiring unanimity and further high voting threshold. 

Next, infringement proceedings may be a good solution to individual violations of EU law obligations, however, they cannot adequately address the systemic deterioration of values. Moreover, they are quite slow and dependent on the Commission’s discretion. Lastly, the conditionality mechanisms, for instance, the Conditionality regulation  protects values only where breaches of them affect the EU budget, which largely restrains its use. Inefficiency of this value-protection mechanism has allowed certain Member States, for example Poland and Hungary to avoid tangible consequences for their violations of the fundamental values of the EU. This can create a double standard dilemma, with candidates, on one side, facing strict scrutiny for compliance with Art. 2 values, and Member States, on the other, being treated more leniently when it comes to (non)compliance with these same values. If the Union does not have the capacity to ensure respect for its foundational values, even after accession, then principle of non-regression is just a dead letter.

Until the Union can show it can function with 35+ members, “readiness” of candidates is the wrong question. For a successful enlargement to happen two conditions must be fulfilled cumulatively; the candidates must be ready, and so does the Union. If a candidate meets every accession condition but the EU has not yet adapted to take in new members, two possible scenarios can follow. Either the candidate waits on standby until the Union is ready, or accession goes ahead before the Union has adapted. Even though such accession could be detrimental for the union as a whole, it might be pursued for strategic geopolitical reasons.

The Western Balkans sit at the edge of the EU but not inside it, and that in-between status matters. When accession has no clear end date, governments look for other partners, and Russia and China are ready to offer them. China is looking for opportunities to invest in this area, while Russia strives to strategically weaken the EU’s role in that area. Their tools include political ties, loans and infrastructure contracts, energy supply, media influence, etc. Not all of this is hostile, since states are free to trade with whomever they like. But, for example, Chinese investment comes without the stringent reform conditions that the EU attaches to its financial incentives, which can weaken the motivation to meet EU standards, and that is where the trouble starts. Leaving the candidates in the EU’s “waiting room” too long slowly undermines the credibility of the “EU promise” and consequently political and societal support for EU-oriented reforms.

It looks like the EU needs to strike a balance between being institutionally reformed before enlargement can happen, which could potentially lead to leaving prepared candidates in the waiting room for too long, and so called “premature enlargement” that risks the EU order losing coherence and becoming difficult to govern. Is what the EU risks losing, if it prioritizes internal readiness, greater than that the possible side-effects of premature enlargement?

The question is not only whether the Western Balkans are ready for the EU. It is also whether the EU is ready for enlargement. Until the Union reforms its decision-making and its protection of its fundamental values, the main obstacle to enlargement is not in the Western Balkans. It is in the EU itself.

The 28th Regime - The next big step for the European Single Market

By: Lavinia Tacke

Reading time: 4 minutes

European Parliament in Brussels; source: private picture by the author.

We have a Single Market in the European Economic Area, so starting an Europe-wide business should be very easy, should it not? 

Well, it can be argued that since every Member State has their own legal framework for building a business, this is not yet quite true. However, the EU is now aiming to reform this very aspect with an EU-wide corporate legal framework, known as EU Inc. This would constitute another option to build a business in the EU alongside the currently existing national legal frameworks in all 27 Member States.

Wait, what is meant by the corporate legal framework? 

A corporate legal framework represents a set of laws, regulations, and rules governing how businesses are managed and formed. Currently, each member state has its own corporate legal framework, meaning the rules to set up a business differ from member state to member state. 

The Commission has proposed a regulation establishing the 28th Regime on 18 March 2026, which means now it is the Parliament's, and more specifically the Committee on Legal Affairs', turn to decide on the proposal.

The hopes amongst EU enthusiasts are high, as this proposal is sought to be a major step towards an even more integrated single market. Under the new EU Inc. framework, startups can be set up much more easily, since the rules and procedures are designed to be more accessible for founders. The mission is clear: The 28th framework is designed to strengthen the European single market and the EU’s competitiveness. 

According to the current proposal, EU Inc. companies could be founded within 48 hours for €100 and without minimum share capital requirements. This would entail a blanket removal of in-person formalities, as the procedures would be conducted digitally. Another benefit of an EU Inc. company would be that it can operate freely in any EU Member State, without the pile of administrative burden. Stakeholder groups such as the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie [Federal Association of the German Industrie] voice their support for the initiative, and "particularly welcome[...] digital company formation”.

While it sounds almost too good to be true, some concerns persist regarding the 28th Regime. Firstly, among many MEPs there is the concern that this concept would lead to some countries, where taxes are lower, becoming hubs for businesses. Safeguarding the economic well-being of all Member States will therefore be a hot topic in the Committee meetings. Secondly, there are concerns around national employment and social laws as they differ from Member State to Member State. How will safeguarding these rights be ensured in pan-European companies like EU Inc? 

Consequently, this question has led to recent controversies and Union protests in front of the EU Parliament in Brussels. The protesters and other observers fear that the new EU Inc design could undermine national labour laws by making moving to other member states with lower national labour rights standards considerably easier. Especially in Germany, this concern was widespread as the German national legal framework imposes an obligation on companies of a certain size to put forward a supervisory board [Aufsichtsrat] which would serve as a consultative and discussion function between stakeholders, employees, and the company board. Therefore, this supervisory board acts as a democratic controlling body within companies that shall ensure a high level of workers’ rights. The German Union ver.di fears that through EU Inc.’s companies might find a loophole to avoid having such supervisory boards which, as ver.di argues, would undermine employees’ participation and ultimately workers’ rights.

Lastly, the removal of administrative burden sounds pleasant at first, but critics remain hesitant that this might diminish safeguards against money laundering and abuse. The German Federal Chamber of Notaries argues that the proposal is too heavily influenced by Anglo-American role models and fails to acknowledge institutional differences between the Anglo-American world and the EU.

With the establishment of the 28th Regime, the EU is therefore faced with the difficult task of balancing workers’ rights, administrative safeguards, and tax concerns with the EU’s competitiveness. A decision by the Council and the Parliament is hoped to be agreed upon “by the end of 2026”; therefore, we’ll have to stay tuned for the final legislation and its impacts on European entrepreneurs.

Two rights, one impossible law: Chat control and child protection in the EU

By: Antonio Manuel Torres García

Reading time: 5 minutes

Image by Tumisu via Pixabay

Imagine every message you send being read by someone else. Would you accept that if it meant combating the spread of child sexual abuse material (CSAM)? This question, at the centre of a crossroads between child protection and your own privacy, has become increasingly relevant during July 2026. While this is not necessarily breaking news (given its long trajectory), the debate has been fiercely reignited for those who care about either cause and closely follow EU legislative developments. And not in vain.

On 9 July 2026, the European Parliament failed to reject, at second reading, a Council text commonly known as Chat Control 1.0. The Council has since given its final approval, confirming the text on 23 July 2026. In a nutshell, this means that until 3 April 2028, certain providers of number-independent interpersonal communication services (think webmail, messaging platforms, some apps) will be able to voluntarily scan content and traffic data in search of CSAM with the purpose of reporting it. This article will help you understand the context behind the law and the conundrum this question poses.

Chat Control, broken down

The first thing to keep in mind is that, as the name suggests, the series does not involve a single law, but two. These are widely known as Chat Control 1.0 and Chat Control 2.0.

For its part, Chat Control 1.0 lays down a temporary derogation from the ePrivacy Directive, more precisely from its Articles 5(1) and 6(1), which protect the confidentiality of communications and traffic data. This carve-out lets providers of number-independent interpersonal communication services (NI-ICS) voluntarily scan content and traffic data to detect and report CSAM to the relevant authorities without this breaching ePrivacy rules. For clarification, NI-ICS is the technical term for messaging or calling services that don’t rely on the traditional phone number system to connect people, like WhatsApp, Gmail, or Skype, as opposed to a regular phone call or SMS. Effectively, the derogation removes a legal barrier that would otherwise render such scanning illegal.

However, this is not a new phenomenon. Regulation (EU) 2021/1232 was the original piece of legislation introducing the derogation, later extended until April 2026 by Regulation (EU) 2024/1307. After it expired, and given disagreement between Parliament and Council on a second extension, the law was revived via an expedited procedure by the Council (11261/1/26, adopted 2 July 2026). Technically, this made it a "new" regulation, though its content was identical to the expired one. The Parliament was set to vote on rejecting it on 9 July 2026, but failed to gather the majority necessary to do so. As a result, the law was approved in second reading, with a new expiry date of 3 April 2028. The Council gave its final confirmation on 23 July 2026.

Chat Control 2.0, on the other hand, takes the same idea as Chat Control 1.0 but pushes it further, making it permanent (hence its formal name, the CSA Regulation). The Commission proposed it in May 2022, and as of the time of writing it remains stuck in trilogue negotiations. The two main points are whether scanning becomes mandatory, rather than voluntary, with sanctions for non-compliance, and whether it extends to end-to-end encrypted services (WhatsApp, Messenger, Telegram, etc.), which Chat Control 1.0 does not touch. Remarkably, the Council Legal Service was already flagging, in 2023, that this can amount to general and indiscriminate scanning that may seriously interfere with the rights to privacy and protection of personal data under Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In practice, this means that no message would be presumptively private. The possibility of automated scanning could apply to any conversation, regardless of whether there is any suspicion of wrongdoing.

Chat Control 1.0’s approval

Rejecting a Council position at second reading under the ordinary legislative procedure requires an absolute majority of Parliament's component members, which currently is 360 MEPs, rather than a simple majority of those voting. In practice, this means that MEPs who are absent or abstain count in favour of the Council’s text, since only a “yes” vote to reject can stop it.

On 9 July 2026, a first rejection attempt got 314 votes in favour, 276 against, and 17 abstentions, short of the 360 threshold. A second rejection attempt, after Renew Europe’s end-to-end encryption carve-out amendment was included, got 276 in favour, 286 against, and 30 abstentions; not even a majority of votes cast. Thus, Parliament’s silence is treated as acceptance of the Council’s text, and the regulation is deemed adopted. It is worth noting that this mechanism is a long-standing feature of the ordinary legislative procedure (Article 294 TFEU, Rule 68 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure). Still, it allows a law to pass even though more MEPs who voted opposed it than supported it. Strikingly, MEP Birgit Sippel, as rapporteur leading the file, voted against it.

On 23 July 2026, the Council confirmed the text via written procedure, a simplified process normally reserved for non-controversial files that lets member states register their vote without holding a formal meeting. The file was confirmed adopted with 25 member states in favour, one against, and one abstention. Chat Control 1.0’s revival is now fully law.

Some thoughts on the law

Chat Control 1.0 is a particularly divisive piece of legislation. This is, among other things, because it requires the balancing of two weighty rights. Both the protection from child sexual abuse (a serious, irreversible harm to a child) and the right to confidentiality of communications (a fundamental right, Art. 7 Charter) are deemed as carrying utmost importance in different legal traditions. Hence, it represents a “harm vs. harm” situation, unlike other privacy debates, which weigh rights against convenience. Think targeted advertising, which requires more data, but provides a more personalised online experience where no one’s particular safety is at stake.

Supporters of the measure point to the scale of the problem it addresses. Voluntary scanning under Chat Control 1.0 has led providers such as Microsoft and Google to flag thousands of detections of suspected CSAM in EU-linked content in a single year. Europol’s executive director, Catherine De Bolle, called this detection work “vital for the protection of children”.

However, and notably, the very efficacy of the measure is contested. There is disagreement on whether mass scanning is even the right tool: the Commission’s own implementation report acknowledges that data limitations make it impossible to establish a clear link between specific reports and convictions (though the report itself concludes there is no indication the measure is disproportionate), and, according to figures cited by former Commissioner Johansson, around 75% of flagged chats turn out not to be actionable, often resulting in suspended accounts or referrals potentially before a human reviews the case. As Patrick Breyer, a digital rights activist and former MEP, put it, mass surveillance carried out by Big Tech companies resembles, if anything, "the illusion of security.”

There is, also, the matter of precedent. Once scanning infrastructure exists and is normalised for one purpose, it becomes easier to extend it to others. A system designed to detect CSAM could, in principle, be repurposed, or required by a future law, to detect other categories of content, whether this be other crimes or copyrighted material, in the EU or in jurisdictions with weaker safeguards. The potential dual use of these technologies raises the stakes and presages potential expansion in the future.

On the privacy side, this can be regarded as generalised surveillance without suspicion. Rather than targeting specific individuals on the basis of a warrant, the derogation permits scanning the communications of every user, guilty or not. The picture is stark: companies without oversight prying, without a warrant, on an uncountable number of conversations. As MEP Ignazio Marino put it, “any scanning of the content of private communications must be limited to specific suspects.”

In general, all that is left is a controversial and divisive law that a majority of voting MEPs rejected and that was pushed through on a procedural technicality. In these circumstances, Chat Control 1.0 deserves scrutiny regardless of which side of the debate you're on. All things considered, if it were on your hands, do you value your privacy and fear for misuse, or would you relinquish part of it for the sake of protecting children?

Space Law : As Unexplored as Space Itself?

By: Anneke Pelzer

Reading time: 5 minutes

Space surrounds us constantly. It is what we look up to when wishing on a shooting star, what has guided generations of sailors, and what is likely to become a battleground for global powers in the upcoming century. Contrary to expectations, few regulations and agreements exist to guide states’ actions in space. 

The disagreements begin with the very definition of space. To decide where space starts, one must first point out where the world ends. Generally, two different points are considered to define the end of our atmosphere, as different actors refer to the thermosphere or the exosphere. NASA and the US Army define space to begin 80 kilometres above Earth, where the thermosphere ends. However, other actors and scientists, such as the Federation Aeronautique Internationale (FAI) or the United Nations, consider the exosphere at 100 kilometres above Earth to be the starting point of space. 

NASA, Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons

Space as a playground for the curious

Against this backdrop, such disagreements leave a vacuum that increasingly gets explored by multiple public and private actors. Headlines like “Katy Perry sang ‘What A Wonderful World’ while in space, and no, this isn’t satire” perfectly underline the shift the world is currently experiencing. While cosmic expeditions used to be a substantial part of the Cold War during the Race to Space, more and more non-state actors are exploring their commercial possibilities above our sky. This will substantially change the way space looks today. 

The world’s richest man, Elon Musk, already holds a lot of power in space due to his ownership of SpaceX. The company operates around 14 000 active satellites in space already, and the number can be expected to drastically grow in the upcoming years. This also allocates expanding political power to private companies like SpaceX, whose technology, for example, is already in use to support Ukraine’s defence systems. This increases the dependency of states on private actors. 

After the Cold War, the US interest in space fell, and some states strive to fill the vacuum left behind. China is currently drastically expanding its space programme, planning a busy 2026 with two manned missions and a resupply flight to Tiangong space station. This year will also be an important one for India’s space program with plans to test the human-rated safety of its Gaganyaan spacecraft. Next to that, countries like South Korea and the United Arab Emirates are actively working towards establishing their own space programmes as well.

No boss, no rules?

However, this comes with a catch: the more satellites, the harder it is to coordinate all the different vehicles operating. Anarchy greatly challenges cooperation on this issue. Therefore, the risks deriving from the fast development of the space industry urgently call for an international agreement on what rules should apply.

According to the European Union, more than 50 000 additional satellites can be expected to launch in the next ten years. From all the material uncontrollably floating through space after missions end, the amount of debris will increase as well. The EU calculated that around one million pieces of debris larger than one cm could orbit our Earth. This raises the question of how a collision between an outlasted satellite and the International Space Station would be prevented. The current laws in place do not regulate dangers like this. The vacuum left open by international law’s neglect of space holds the potential of becoming a security threat. 

Currently, most treaties regulating state’s actions in space were drafted during Cold War times. The United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs has set up five important treaties setting “principles on space-related activities”. However, these were all signed more than 40 years ago, ranging from 1967 to 1984. The insufficient character of present regulations and agreements gets underlined when considering that, based on current international law, the question of how to prosecute crimes committed by astronauts in space depends on their nationality, whether they are on board the International Space Station (ISS) or still in a rocket on their way up. 

The EU is reaching for the stars

The international system must come to an agreement on how to make shared use of space and clarify responsibilities for debris. From a liberalist perspective, the challenge posed by the state of anarchy in outer space could potentially be explored by international organizations, targeting closer cooperation and striving towards a working legal groundwork. 

One organization recognizing and striving to close the governance gaps left open is the European Union, which has identified a potential EU Space Act as a key priority for the Union’s future security and competitiveness. In 2025, the Commission introduced a legislative proposal aiming at setting a harmonizing framework for space activities across the EU. It is currently under review by the European Parliament and the Council under the Ordinary Legislative Procedure.

Based on the Commission’s proposal, it will be made up of three pillars. To ensure safety, rules for tracking space objects and mitigating space debris shall be introduced to secure Europe’s access to space. As cybersecurity becomes increasingly important, the second pillar strives to strengthen Europe’s space infrastructure and commercial resilience. Lastly, in line with the Union’s narrative of being a global leader in climate protection, the EU aims at ensuring sustainability for future space enterprises by pointing actors towards innovative technologies reducing the environmental impact. 

Providing a common framework for joint action can also be a way of strengthening ties within the Union, in contrast to a fragmented international system. The legal act still has to be finalized, and only then can its effectiveness be evaluated. However, the EU Space Act will only harmonize actions within the EU, and the inherently anarchic problem of how to split up space between countries will persist. One thing is certain: any step the EU takes towards a clear legal framework, is one in the right direction.

Simplification and Environment: a brief review of the Environmental Omnibus package

By: Antonio Manuel Torres García

Reading time: 5 minutes and 30 seconds

Photo by Tom Fisk on Pexels, Industrial Landscape with Wind Turbine and Water

Everybody remembers the Draghi Report. After all, it sparked a serious debate over the EU’s competitive capacity vis-à-vis the wider world, and the ripple waves it generated are still very much omnipresent in the EU institutions, notably through the European Commission’s subsequent simplification agenda. While one could flag the Commission’s action as “incomplete”, that alone does not render the expansive effects of the renewed simplification efforts insufficient. And, in fact, it is anything but simple. In particular, areas where the EU is considered a trailblazer, such as in environmental (and the many collateral) legislation, these Omnibus packages, which breathe life into Draghi’s ideas, may hide what has been labelled as “deregulation”.

In this article, you will learn, first, about the Omnibus Packages and the legislation simplification efforts. Then, the Environmental Omnibus Package will be presented. In closing, a reflection of its effects will be provided. 

Let’s start at the beginning: what is an “Omnibus Package”?

That the EU is facing mounting challenges is hardly a mystery, from demographic strains and rising energy costs, to global competition and weak productivity. With this in mind, the Commission tasked Mario Draghi in 2023, former Prime Minister of Italy and European Central Bank president, with drafting a report on the future of European competitiveness. The results? A difficult pill to swallow: Draghi singled out a growth model that is stalling, massive need for investments, internal fragmentation, an underdeveloped industrial policy plan, and slow governance. Among the issues raised by Draghi, some have resonated deeply within the institutions: complex bureaucracy, fragmented rules, overlapping reporting obligations, and regulatory uncertainty.

In comes the so-called “Omnibus packages”. The Competitiveness Compass communication, a general strategy, identified three necessities: closing the innovation gap, decarbonising our economy, and reducing dependencies. Capitalising on their renewed term and building from the Competitiveness Compass, the von der Leyen Commission has made it its goal to boost EU competitiveness, and has put forward numerous proposals with this in mind. One such component of these proposals, envisaged in the Commission work programme 2025, and arguably the largest one, aims at reducing regulatory burdens for all businesses, catering particularly to SMEs (25% reduction in administrative burdens for all businesses, and at least 35% for SMEs). The goal is to cut administrative costs by €37.5 billion by the end of their term in 2029. These very proposals take the form of single legislative instruments (the Omnibus) that, by policy areas which are often mashed together, amend several legal acts at once.

This practice has been used before, namely in consumer law, rural law, and financial law, having a rather technical character. Therefore, it is decidedly not an innovation per se. Nonetheless, its sheer scale, relative speediness, and altered modus operandi, pose a number of important questions on their democratic input and the actual content of the simplifications, which, upon a closer look, may raise deregulation worries.

The Environmental Omnibus package

The Environmental legislation package (Omnibus VIII) forms part of the ten Omnibus packages proposed so far. According to the Commission, it “aims at simplifying environmental legislation in the area of industrial emissions, circular economy, environmental assessments and geospatial data”, and targets €1 billion in cost savings.

Presented on December 10th (2025), it encompasses amendments to the Batteries Regulation, the Industrial Emissions Portal Regulation, the Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR, related to the Waste Framework Directive, with specific rules embedded in other legal acts), and Environmental Assessments (applicable to several legal acts, such as the Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive). This non-exhaustive list represents a few of the most notable legal acts which will be subject to these simplification efforts.

What’s notable about this particular Omnibus instance is that it pursues targeted amendments while not relinquishing the high standards of environmental protection currently held in the EU. According to the Commission, the respect of EU’s goals and objectives is applicable to all legislation subject to simplification. In general, the Environmental Omnibus aims at streamlining reporting requirements, removing duplicated or outdated obligations, digitalising compliance processes, simplifying permitting for projects and industrial installations, and improving coherence among overlapping legal regimes. Thus, it touches upon several key legal acts covering different policy areas of environmental importance.

What are the implications?

There are a few thoughts to share about simplification of environmental legislation. The environmental acquis (that is, the accumulated body of environmental EU law) of the EU is inherently complex. This stems primarily from the fact that environmental challenges are transboundary and interconnected, which often leads to legal solutions considered difficult to understand, to comply with and, on occasions, with overlapping legal duties. It is mandatory in this aspect to consider if simplification is necessarily “bad”. In the case of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the simplification effort is paired with a strengthening one. If devised correctly, and properly complied with, this could be good news for the level playing field it aims to establish as regards competition among EU and third-country companies.

One cannot but wonder, nevertheless, if this process is actually simple. A look at the proposals suffices to see that they are highly complex, which stands in the way of making legislation easier to understand and, hence, to comply with. Awaiting a final decision on these proposals, it seems that simplification may not really simplify the landscape drastically.

Moreover, it is mandatory to pay close attention to how these decisions are being made. In this sense, several NGOs filed a complaint to the European Ombudswoman raising concerns about the lack of the usual procedural requirements for EU legislation. The findings of the Ombudswoman, while not binding recommendations, raise significant doubts about the decision-making process for the Omnibus I (Sustainability), especially regarding the notion of “urgency” in the provisions of the Better Regulation Guidelines, a non-binding document setting out the principles the Commission follows when preparing initiatives and proposals, but also regarding lack of assessments and inter-service consultations.

The potential deregulation aspects are equally as worrisome. After the lessons learned from the Sustainability Omnibus, which considerably narrowed the scope of application of the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CS3D), the Commission’s intention to upkeep its targets and commitments in environmental legislation can at the very least be questioned. From a legal standpoint, there may be some safeguards particular to environmental legislation against any deregulation effort. The EU environmental acquis is governed by the principles enshrined in Title XX of the TFEU, found in Article 191(2). Among them sits the “high level of environmental protection” principle, which mandates not the highest standard of protection, but a high standard nonetheless. In this sense, it can serve as a limitation to collateral deregulation coming from simplification. The 8th Environment Action Plan, a legally binding agenda guiding environmental policy and running until 2030, can serve as an additional safety net. A still incipient and not widely recognised principle of non-regression could, in these cases, act as a safeguard against potential deregulation efforts.

A last perspective to take relates more to the actual burden of these simplification efforts. Are the proposals really making procedures easier for operators, or are they shifting the pressure to already overburdened national administrations? For instance, simplified reporting requirements for operators in the context of the Industrial Emissions Directive, while perfectly desirable, may not be as efficient and simple as it appears if, at the end of the day, it is left to the EU Member States to fill that reporting gap. Compliance in this sense affects both operators and national authorities: shifting the pressure to national administrations will not necessarily simplify procedures and improve compliance.

All in all, this renewed practice of Omnibus and simplification poses significant risks not present in the usual law-making procedures, and risks undermining the effectiveness and ambition of the environmental acquis in the EU. Impromptu, it seems as if the simplification struggles may not bring about as many benefits as it does downsides. Given the variety of critical issues raised by Draghi’s report, simplification should be taken as a component of a more comprehensive strategy, as opposed to a standalone and dubious new policy direction. As students, it is our job to learn from it and analyse its implications once it enters into force. In the meantime, enhanced attention should be paid to existing legal safeguards against any potential deregulation efforts in such a policy domain the EU spearheads globally.

ECA Interview with Bram Akkermans: Sustainability and Private Law

By: Gabriel Panza, Read time: 6 min 

Prof Dr Bram Akkermans

With the growing threat of global warming, sustainability and the protection of Earth’s environment remain central not only to the EU but also to the whole world. The law adopts an interesting position in this conflict. Specifically, the law must balance economic efficiency with sustainable practices. For instance, in the field of private law, sustainability has been increasingly gaining attention. To offer perspective on this topic, Bram Akkermans, a professor at Maastricht University and an expert in Sustainable Property law, shared his expertise with us.  

Sustainability and Private Law in Practice

Bram suggests that the field of Sustainability and Private law be seen in the context of “how can private law contribute to achieving a sustainable society,” which “depends on how you define sustainability” and on the areas of private law you focus on. In company law, for instance, sustainability is framed as addressing “corporate social responsibility” and responsibility in global value chains. Conversely, “in tort law this is about corrective and environmental justice”, especially with “litigation on behalf of citizens against states but also on behalf of citizens, against private companies”. The Shell and Environmental Defence Force case in the Netherlands serves as an example of this. This climate case against Shell aimed to legally ban the company from creating new oil fields and to impose concrete reduction targets. The intention of Milieu Defence is to force Shell to align with the Paris Climate Agreement and to precede the progression of climate change.

 Contract law and Property law also concern sustainability. Contract law focuses on contractual remedies that may “prioritize repair over damages and replacement”. The EU has implemented the Right to Repair Directive, which imposes duties on sellers to make products repairable and promote sustainable consumption. Bram brings up an interesting point, stating that the law’s support for sustainability depends on “how you define sustainability,” and remarks that “if it’s just Ecosustainability, it’s easier.”

 However, if you adopt “a wider definition of sustainability”, it expands private law’s role to also include issues like “governance,” “democracy, “" equality, and values under the UN sustainable development goals. This approach is widely supported, as embracing pluralism in understanding sustainability will enable us to develop new ways of thinking about finance, consumption, and social justice.

How does Climate Change influence property law in the coming years?

Property law links more clearly with sustainability, as the key focus here is on “how do we use the land, and do you only have rights in private law, or do you also have obligations” to sustainable use? While property law seemingly allows owners to do as they please, we are finding out this “rights-based framework” is becoming “unsustainable in the sense that it is unmanageable”. Naturally, this leads to increased regulation, in which the state determines not only what owners “can do” but also what they “must do”.  In certain jurisdictions, this is seen in apartment owners’ obligations to “climate-proof their buildings”. Although these obligations don’t generally apply to homeowners. Bram states that he “thinks it’s unrealistic” to adopt these eco-friendly obligations to homeowners, as “resistance to change in property law is real”. Despite this, embracing climate-proof obligations is likely where climate change may influence property law, not only by granting rights but also by enforcing ecological responsibilities. This perspective reframes property law by having “administrative law of public frameworks” and private law to “come together a little bit”.  

Source: by Singkham on Pexels.

Currently, climate change is driving property law to evolve, with ownership and contractual structures supporting more sustainable construction, especially when building components are designed for reuse rather than for one-time use. This may lead to fundamental questioning of property law principles, such as accession, condominium law, and certain property rights.

The Energy Performance of Buildings Directive

Speaking of embracing climate-proof obligations, the EU is currently implementing the Energy Performance Directive, which aims to achieve a fully decarbonized building stock by 2050. It does so by adopting the Energy Performance Certificates (EPCs) scheme, which assesses the energy efficiency of buildings in a transparent and standardized manner. Bram argues the EPCs are “a great way to regulate building sustainability”, comparing them to “emission trading rights as they gradually tighten standards with time instead of forcing owners to take specific measures. Essentially, instead of telling owners that “you must invest… in solar panels and double glazing”, the system requires that buildings meet a minimum certificate level of “C or higher, for example” if they want to sell or rent.

This primarily targets “commercial buildings” as “low-hanging fruit,” but to make real progress, it requires collective investment, with the government helping fund the shift to a “sustainable future”. For buildings in Flanders, Belgium, with a floor area of less than 500 square meters, a C-level EPC is required when selling or leasing the property. This standard will lead to behavioral change by prompting property owners to upgrade as market access becomes more regulated. Bram suggests that “from a property law perspective, this is problematic”, so it must be balanced with tax incentives so that owners can afford such. Transactions.  

 How can students engage in sustainability and private law outside the class?

 Adopting more sustainable behaviour regarding private law as students requires a “brutally abstract” critical thinking. Students must “first and foremost” gain a “grasp and a very good understanding of what we mean by sustainability and sustainable developments” before they can apply it to real life. Perhaps students should reflect on what kind of society they want to live in. After this, students should question, “What does that mean for the things that I own”? For instance, students can ask, “Do you really need to buy a new iPhone every year?” or, perhaps, “Do you buy something secondhand?”  Doing this allows students to consider the environmental implications of their actions.

Overall, the fields of sustainability and private law remain increasingly important as the threat of climate change intensifies. Legal instruments such as EPCs demonstrate a shift towards nudging property owners to adopt sustainable practices without mandating specific technologies. In the future, integrating sustainability in all these areas of private law is crucial to creating a society that balances environmental responsibility and social rights

Small State, Global Capital: The Legal Foundations of Luxembourg’s €7.5 Trillion Fund Industry

By: Dori Felber, Read time: 4 min 

By GilPe - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0

Luxembourg has firmly established itself as the leading investment fund domicile in Europe and one of the largest in the world, attracting global asset managers and investors. Its continued expansion highlights the interaction between commercial strategy, EU law, and regulatory implementation, making this sector legally and commercially significant for lawyers practising in corporate, finance, and regulatory fields.

Scale and Global Importance

Luxembourg’s investment fund industry manages a large pool of assets relative to its population and economy. According to the latest figures from the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF), the total net assets of regulated Luxembourg funds (including UCIs, specialised investment funds, and SICARs) exceeded €5.7 trillion as of 30 June 2025, reflecting both market growth and ongoing capital inflows.

Broader industry statistics also show that Luxembourg’s fund market, when including regulated, unregulated, and non-domiciled funds managed from Luxembourg, can total over €7.5 trillion in assets, underlining its global reach.

Luxembourg is regarded as the largest investment fund centre in Europe and the second largest globally, behind only the United States, and a major centre for cross-border distribution of funds.

Historical and Structural Foundations

Luxembourg’s prominence dates back to its proactive implementation of EU investment fund legislation. It was the first country to implement the Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) Directive in 1988, providing funds domiciled in Luxembourg access to the EU cross-border “passport” for distribution across the single market.

This early mover advantage helped build a sophisticated legal and regulatory ecosystem tailored to cross-border investment fund structures, including UCITS for retail investors and 

Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs) for institutional and professional investors.

Luxembourg funds are distributed widely across Europe and beyond, making Luxembourg a core hub for international investors and fund promoters.

Regulatory and Legal Developments

Carried Interest Tax Reform

In 2026, Luxembourg adopted a modernised carried interest regime, which is a tax framework designed to attract private equity and alternative investment professionals. Under this regime, contractual carried interest may be taxed at a reduced personal rate (around 11.45 %), and participation-linked carried interest may qualify for tax exemption if specific conditions are met.

This reform expands the scope of beneficiaries and aligns taxation with common market practices, which is commercially important for fund managers considering where to base operations and compensation structures.

ESG Regulation and Enforcement Pressure

Sustainable finance regulation is a key legal driver in the investment funds sector. The Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) requires fund managers to disclose how they integrate sustainability risks and to ensure that marketing and prospectus claims are accurate and compliant with defined standards.

In 2024, the CSSF issued its first administrative sanction under SFDR, imposing a €56,500 fine on a fund manager for failures related to ESG disclosures — notably where pre-contractual disclosures did not match actual investment practices for several sub-funds.

This sanction is commercially and legally significant: while the amount was not large in absolute terms, its issuance signals that the CSSF is prepared to enforce SFDR compliance, and that ESG disclosures in fund documentation and marketing materials must be robust and legally defensible.

The CSSF’s regulatory powers in this area derive from laws implementing SFDR and related EU regulations, giving it supervisory and sanctioning authority over fund managers and financial market participants.

Operational & Governance Legal Implications

A key legal focus in Luxembourg’s fund industry is governance and risk management frameworks. As regulatory scrutiny increases, fund entities and managers must maintain comprehensive administrative procedures, conflict-of-interest frameworks, and internal controls to meet CSSF expectations and avoid enforcement actions.

For corporate lawyers advising fund sponsors or managers, this raises complex issues involving:

• Drafting prospectuses and marketing documents that comply with regulatory disclosures

• Ensuring board and management governance frameworks meet the standards expected by the CSSF

• Structuring delegation arrangements with service providers under AIFMD and UCITS rules

• Mitigating liability for misstatements or disclosure failures under EU law.

These areas demand precise legal drafting and a deep understanding of both EU regulatory regimes and Luxembourg supervision practices.

Competitive Dynamics and Cross-Border Distribution

Despite its dominance in Europe, Luxembourg faces competition, particularly from Ireland, especially in new areas such as exchange-traded funds (ETFs). ETF domiciliation trends show Ireland growing its market share in that segment, although Luxembourg remains a key player for retail and institutional cross-border funds.

However, Luxembourg continues to capture a large share of cross-border fund registrations, accounting for over 50 % of global cross-border investment fund registrations in recent years, showing its ongoing role as a gateway for funds marketed internationally.

This cross-border footprint underscores the legal and commercial complexity of fund servicing and distribution, areas where corporate and financial lawyers play crucial roles in structuring fund vehicles, advising on passporting rights, and managing compliance with multiple jurisdictions’ marketing rules.

Legal and Commercial Significance

For lawyers aspiring to practice commercial and corporate law in Luxembourg, particularly within finance, investment funds, or regulatory practice, the investment fund sector offers intellectually complex and commercially significant work.

Key legal themes in this sector include:

• EU regulatory implementation (e.g., AIFMD/UCITS, SFDR);

• Tax and compensation frameworks (e.g., carried interest reforms);

• Cross-border distribution and passporting rights;

• Governance, compliance, and enforcement expectations;

• Drafting fund documentation with legal precision.

Understanding how regulatory structures intersect with fund strategy is not only commercially relevant but also demonstrates to interviewers that you appreciate how legal frameworks influence business decisions and investor outcomes, a key trait for a successful commercial lawyer in Luxembourg.

Reforming EU Consumer Dispute Resolution for the Digital Age

By: Dori Felber, Read time: 3min 

The European Union faces growing pressure to ensure that consumers can resolve disputes fairly and efficiently in an increasingly digital and borderless marketplace. The proliferation of digital services, online transactions, and cross-border purchases has made it difficult for traditional redress methods to keep up with economic and technological advancements. Once hailed as a practical link between consumers and justice, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is currently at a turning point. The EU's upcoming ADR framework reform is an ambitious attempt to adjust to a data-driven, global economy while also acknowledging past errors. In light of this, the European Commission's legislative push is part of a larger attempt to restore consumer confidence and regulatory relevance in the digital era, rather than merely updating existing policies.

The European Union is preparing to overhaul its system of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), marking a crucial step toward modernising consumer protection for the digital era. A 2025 briefing from the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) on Directive 2013/11/EU highlights the Commission’s proposal to adapt ADR to contemporary market dynamics, cross-border e-commerce, digital content, and global platform economies.

When first introduced in 2013, the ADR Directive was celebrated as a cornerstone of accessible justice, offering consumers an alternative to lengthy and costly court procedures. Yet more than a decade later, its promise remains largely unfulfilled. Only about 5% of consumers who encounter problems turn to ADR because limited awareness, uneven trader participation, and procedural complexity have undermined the system’s credibility. The framework also predates the explosion of digital trade, leaving unresolved how consumers can seek redress for disputes involving digital services or non-EU traders.

Source: Data collection study: Data for 3 Member States only covered some of the years: BE (based on 2018-2021 data), FR (based on 2019 and 2020 data), and RO (based on 2018-2020 data), Report on the application of Directive 2013/11/EU on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes, European Commission, 2023.

The Commission’s 2023 legislative proposal tackles these deficiencies through a sweeping reform. It amends four key directives, on ADR, package travel, consumer enforcement, and representative actions, while repealing the ineffective Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) Regulation. The reform’s aims are clear: make ADR fit for digital markets, boost engagement by consumers and traders, and streamline cross-border resolution procedures.

Expanding Scope and Digitalising Access

The proposal’s most striking feature is its expanded scope. ADR will no longer be confined to contractual disputes but will also cover pre-contractual and non-contractual issues, such as misleading advertising or defective digital products. Moreover, it extends EU consumer protection to transactions involving non-EU traders, asserting the Union’s regulatory reach beyond its borders.

Digitalisation lies at the heart of the reform. New online tools, translation services, and shared data interfaces aim to make ADR faster and more interoperable across Member States. Where automated decision-making is used, consumers must be informed and retain the right to human review, reflecting the EU’s commitment to fairness and transparency in AI-driven systems.

A Test of the EU’s Regulatory Credibility

If successfully implemented, the reform could significantly reduce litigation, improve access to justice, and strengthen trust in the single market. However, its effectiveness will depend on trader participation, enforcement mechanisms for non-EU operators, and sustained consumer awareness.

More than a technical revision, the ADR reform reflects the EU’s ambition to modernise governance through technology without compromising rights. By embedding transparency and digital safeguards into dispute resolution, the Union seeks to transform ADR from a peripheral tool into a central pillar of fair and efficient market regulation.

The reform of the EU’s Alternative Dispute Resolution framework stands as a defining test of the Union’s ability to reconcile technological progress with consumer rights. By extending protection to digital and cross-border transactions, the proposal recognises how profoundly commerce has evolved since 2013 and how urgently policy must evolve with it. Yet the success of this reform will not rest solely on legislative precision but on public trust. Consumers must know that ADR works, and traders must see value in participating. If these conditions are met, the new system could become a cornerstone of accessible justice in the digital age, reinforcing the EU’s credibility as a global standard-setter for fair, transparent, and technology-enabled market regulation.

Part II: From the EU to the world: a journey through the legal bases, historical developments and the current state of EU external action and strategies

By: Antonio Manuel Torres García, Reading time: 10 min

Photo by Lukas S on Unsplash, free to use under Unsplash License.

The European Union (EU) is oftentimes viewed as an entity that works for the betterment of its members, and while this is largely true, taking into consideration its objectives, values, competences, and means of action, it is nonetheless a narrow view of the wider action the EU undertakes in a more general scene. The position the EU takes when engaging with foreign agents varies according to mutual interests, feasibility, likelihood, and overall net benefit on both sides. But while trade agreements and economic partnership agreements (EPAs) fall within the external action competences the EU enjoys and tend to take the spotlight, they are not the only scenarios in which the EU engages with other states. Separate from the nascent state of a common European defence policy, which represents another facet of the EU action with external effects, European strategies like the Global Gateway mount up to projects comprising initiatives with the aim of tackling the world’s most pressing global challenges; a project that unavoidably carries an explicit “global” approach.

This entry represents the second part of the full article. In the first part, which you can easily find on the web under the same title, we dove into the legal basis that allows the EU to carry out specific external actions, in order to understand their relevance. This section carries a different purpose, encompassing firstly a revision of the historical development of EU external actions and overall strategies and, secondly, a consideration of the most recent initiatives, with a view on the shifts they may represent in the grander scheme of things.

The EU external action through the years

The post-colonial birth of EU development cooperation (1957-1975)

  The EU’s precursor (the European Economic Community, or EEC) had its first external relations shaped by the colonial ties of several Member States. It is relevant to consider that, even early in its conception, the Treaty of Rome  (in its Part IV) covered the association with Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs), which is still a field of action today. It also covered the creation of the European Development Fund (EDF), which is the predecessor of the modern development instruments, and some early association conventions (Yaoundé Conventions I and II), very relevant in the relations of the EEC with third countries. This first model, however, is one tied to former colonies, not yet global.

The Lomé Conventions (1975-2000)

The most notable examples of the following period are the Lomé Conventions, which introduced a unique and highly ambitious framework with states in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP) characterised by non-reciprocal trade preferences, a decisive factor in aiding economic development. These Conventions also encompassed a major expansion of EDF volumes, institutionalised political dialogue, and stabilisation schemes (STABEX, SYSMIN). In general, and even before the formal legal bases of development cooperation became explicit in the Treaties, the EU started to behave like a development actor. It can be argued that these conventions influenced the later Article 208 TFEU in substance, and they were relevant in the sense that it now included more countries (46 ACP countries for the first, and 58 in the second iteration) in comparison to the Yaoundé Conventions.

However, it isn’t until the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) that these matters are finally inserted into the Treaties as an explicit EU competence with the predecessors to Articles 208-211 TFEU. It established the primary objective of poverty reduction and the requirement that EU and Member State policies complement each other, representing the beginnings of coherence obligations (anticipating Art. 21 TEU).

The Cotonou Agreement (2000-2020)

  Cotonou updates the Lomé model and becomes the legal backbone for development action for two decades. It represented a shift from pure partnership to political conditionality (democracy, rule of law, human rights). We also see the introduction of EPAs and broader and more flexible use of EDF resources, of which it serves as its basis. The Cotonou Agreement, therefore, provided guidance for what would later become Article 21 TEU, while also shaping not only funding but values and conditionality, central to Articles 3(5) and 21 TEU.

Lisbon Treaty (2009)

Picking up where we left off in the legal basis section, there are a few important elements to mention. Firstly, the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS); secondly, the High Representative’s dual role (Council/Commission); and thirdly, the legal personality for the Union (Article 47 TEU). The CFSP remains intergovernmental, as devised in Maastricht, but development cooperation becomes more coherent. Relevant to consider regarding Lisbon is that it brings together diplomacy and development under one roof, and provides a stronger consistency requirement between internal/external policies. This sets the stage for contemporary external action.

Present’s direct predecessors (2014-2020)

The period encompassing 2014-2020 is one of fragmentation and crisis reaction. Multiple instruments saw the light of day (the Development Cooperation Instrument, the European Neighbourhood Instrument, just to mention a few), contributing to the increased complexity of the EU’s external action, which had been straightforward in comparison. It is also notable that the rise of “crisis-driven” tools, such as the EU Trust Funds (for Syria, Africa, Central African Republic), the creation of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey, and the first European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) is taking place. These situations prompted a growing security-development reciprocal relation that anticipates to an extent the next section: today’s Global Europe.

The 2021 Reform: NDICI-Global Europe and the turn to geopolitics

In the present decade, we have witnessed the consolidation of all the main instruments for external action into the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument - Global Europe (NDICI - Global Europe), which aims to contribute to the attainment of the objectives agreed upon by the Union, such as the 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals, and the Paris Agreement. It is worth noting as well the integration of the EDF into the EU budget and the creation of European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus (EFSD+), a massive investment arm. These steps included a move towards “Team Europe”, and a more strategic, geopolitical framing. In parallel, we see the rise of the European Peace Facility, off-budget and CFSP-related.

The NDICI - Global Europe, established by Regulation (EU) 2021/947, is the central EU funding instrument for relations with third countries in a context of development aid. Framed in the Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF 2021-2027, which sets the overall ceilings for external spending, it includes geographic programs covering Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Pacific, the Americas and the Caribbean, and countries in the Neighbourhood area, following thematic programs such as human rights and democracy, civil society, peace, stability and conflict prevention, and global challenges (health, climate, education). The NDICI replaces the myriad of instruments previously established in the period from 2014-2020, unifying external action by covering all relevant fields of action and geographical areas under the umbrella of the EU’s values and objectives, which are oftentimes given expression through non-binding instruments like the European Consensus on Development (2017), the EU Global Strategy (2016), and the European Green Deal (2021).

Other non-binding acts, such as the EU Humanitarian Aid Consensus (2007), guide the area of humanitarian aid. This is put into practice by the Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96 (as amended), which breathes life into the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), alongside the previously mentioned EPF (Council Decision (CFSP) 2021/509), which funds military assistance and peace support operations in third countries.

Another important part of the recent EU’s shift towards a more unified, expansive, and conditionality-riddled external action is the international agreements governing funding. These also have the force of law and guide EU development funding relationships. In this context, the post-Cotonou agreement (2021) serves as a good example. Successor to the previous Cotonou Agreement, it governs relations with the ACP states more detailedly and binds political, economic, and development cooperation.

So, what can we make up of all this?

Barely a week ago, the EU and the African Union (AU) celebrated their annual summit, this time commemorating the 25th anniversary of their partnership, and signifying the most recent iteration of EU external action. And it’s been quite the ride: the EU first underwent a transformation from post-colonial legacy to self-aware global actor. The EU did not start as a global actor; it became one. Similarly, it went from a partnership rhetoric to conditionality and governance export, shifting from a preferential trade-based partnership model to one marked by political conditionality and the projection of internal commitments. Values once understood as guiding principles internally have gradually become operational instruments externally.

Furthermore, it went from fragmented instruments to consolidation and geopolitics. The creation of the NDICI - Global Europe and EFSD+ is not merely administrative simplification, it represents the EU’s attempt to act with geopolitical coherence in a competitive international environment. The NDICI is more than a budgetary decision. And this is important: the boundary between development cooperation and foreign policy has become increasingly difficult to separate. Once conceived as solidarity, it is now mixed with economic influence, migration management, security concerns, and strategic investments: development, trade, diplomacy, and security now operate in a shared ecosystem.

The EU’s journey in external action also reflects a rebalancing between Member State-driven action and Union-level action. While CFSP retains its intergovernmental character, development cooperation, humanitarian aid, and investment have become increasingly “EU-owned”. Whether this represents genuine transformation or a rebranding of long-standing approaches remains open to interpretation.

All in all, we can say that the evolution of the EU’s external action is marked by a tension between the Union’s commitment to its foundational values and the pragmatic demands of international politics. It is in managing this coexistence of values and interests that the EU cements its international presence and articulates its actions.

Part I: From the EU to the world: a journey through the legal bases, historical developments and the current state of EU external action and strategies

By: Antonio Manuel Torres García, Reading time: 10 min

Photo by Lukas S on Unsplash, free to use under Unsplash License.

The European Union (EU) is oftentimes viewed as an entity that works for the betterment of its members, and while this is largely true, taking into consideration its objectives, values, competences, and means of action, it is nonetheless a narrow view of the wider action the EU undertakes in a more general scene. The position the EU takes when engaging with foreign agents varies according to mutual interests, feasibility, likelihood, and overall net benefit on both sides. But while trade agreements and economic partnership agreements (EPAs) fall within the external action competences the EU enjoys and tend to take the spotlight, they are not the only scenarios in which the EU engages with other states. Separate from the nascent state of a common European defence policy, which represents another facet of the EU action with external effects, European strategies like the Global Gateway mount up to projects comprising initiatives with the aim of tackling the world’s most pressing global challenges; a project that unavoidably carries an explicit “global” approach.

In this first part of the article, we will dive into the legal basis allowing the EU to carry out specific external actions, in order to understand their relevance. In the second part of the article, which will be published soon, we will revisit the historical development of these actions and, finally, consider the most recent initiatives, with a view to the shifts they may represent in the broader context.

The EU: an integrated actor in the international scene by default

The fact that the EU is a product of international cooperation is undebatable. However, what once started with more of an inward-looking approach, such as security and economic integration of its members, quickly widened its scope and areas of action, updating its means and competences in tune with contemporary challenges and opportunities. It is in this context of expansion and development that the EU is conferred larger powers and solidifies its presence in the international arena. The EU has legal personality (Art. 47 TEU) and areas of competence in which to engage in cooperation with other international organisations or states. To this end,several provisions in its founding Treaties regulate these matters.

One of these notable provisions is Art. 3(5) TEU, which establishes the general approach the EU must take in its relations with the wider world, whose objectives can be identified as the contribution to peace, security, sustainable development, solidarity, and mutual respect among peoples globally. This provision represents the general picture in which other operative elements must abide by.

Under Title V of the TEU we can find the general principles and objectives of the EU’s external action, forming the core foundation for EU policies in relation to third countries and other legal entities. In this sense, Art. 21 TEU further deepens the previously mentioned article by fleshing out more specifically the objectives, principles, and values the EU must respect and abide by in its external action. Among these, we can find the consolidation of democracy, rule of law and human rights, sustainable economic, social, and environmental development, and poverty eradication, alongside others. It must be noted that it requires the consistency of external actions with internal policies, setting an order for coherence and rationality.

Art. 22 TEU further outlines the creation of strategies for external action and defines the pivotal role the European Council (EuCo) represents as a guiding force. Articles from 24 to 46 TEU comprise the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) provisions, collecting the specific means, areas of action and the roles of the relevant actors, such as the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the Council of the EU, the Member States and, as mentioned, the EuCo. It is relevant to mention the exclusion of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) jurisdiction specifically in CFSP matters, and the role that the Council of the EU plays as the institution of utmost importance in this context, a legacy architecture stemming from the pre-Lisbon system of pillars whose main trait was its intergovernmental nature.

These provisions are further complemented by the more specific nature of the relevant articles found in the TFEU. It is in this text that we may find the more practical approach of what the TEU puts forward. In this spirit, Articles 208-211 TFEU group the development and cooperation provisions, whose main objective is the reduction and eradication of poverty. It specifies that the EU development policy must be complementary to Member States’, and it allows the EU to sign agreements with countries that may benefit from cooperation in the field of development.

In the same light, Article 212 TFEU relates to economic, financial, and technical cooperation, enabling wider cooperation beyond traditional development aid, and Article 213 TFEU, which allows for emergency financial assistance to third countries. In the field of humanitarian aid, Article 214 TFEU grants ad hoc assistance following the principles of neutrality, impartiality and non-discrimination to third countries in need. Finally, Article 215 TFEU provides for restrictive measures, serving as the basis for sanctions and certain crisis-response funding mechanisms.

It is worth mentioning that the EU’s external action underlying architecture refers back to Art. 2 TEU, which contains the foundational values of the Union and, in this context, works as the guiding concepts that every initiative must strive towards. Despite not being the topic of the present article, it must be noted that the general structure of the EU’s external action may represent current-times neocolonialism, by exporting values that may not be common outside the Union.

Taking the aforementioned into account, it is undeniable that the EU enjoys a fair margin of operation when it comes to external action. With time, it has become the depository of determined competences to undergo projects and schemes, be it in a more independent manner or in a closer cooperation with its Member States, with third countries.

In the second part of the article, we will zoom in on past experiences and strategies, without which the present landscape can’t be properly understood, and assess contemporary approaches.

Climate Change in Times of Rearmament - How Green Can Defense Really Be?

By: Anneke Pelzer, Reading time: 4 min

www.esercito.difesa.it, CC BY 2.5 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.5>, via Wikimedia Commons

When Greta Thunberg stood up at the podium at the UN Climate Action Summit in 2018 and spoke her famous words „How dare you?“  over and over again, she was trying to get the world’s political elite to take action against mankind’s greatest threat, climate change. Today, in 2025, frustratingly little progress has been made. Instead, it seems like other problems and crises have always been more important. The covid pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have both challenged European economies unexpectedly, which has led to the postponing of efficient measures to lower the European Union’s (EU) greenhouse gas emissions. Existing goals like the EU becoming climate-neutral by 2050 or the 2015 Paris Treaty limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees celsius get increasingly unreachable as more time without action passes. In the present day, European member states’ worries mostly revolve around protection of Europes’ borders, which has caused military spending to have reached a new high in the EU. With rearmament’s new importance, the question arises as to how the EU wants to include its new focus on military advances in its climate goals. 

Dirty militaries 

Before Russia’s invasion and Europe’s wake from its pre-crisis hibernation, all military sectors of Europe combined produced around 25 million tonnes of CO2 in 2019. Internationally, the military sector is responsible for an astonishing 5,5 percent of all greenhouse gas emissions. Europe will not reach its goals written down in the European Green Deal and neither will the world meet their limit of stopping global warming at 1,5 degrees Celsius if military and defense measures are not taken into account. This lack of measures to prevent military-related emissions is illustrated by the fact that the European Climate Law, which sets the goal of climate-neutrality by 2050, does not apply to military. In the 2015 Paris Climate Treaty, military emissions that are produced abroad are excluded as well. Additionally, EU-NATO members have reported collective emissions of 6,9 million tonnes in 2021, but according to the Conflict and Environment Observatory, a much bigger reporting gap has to be expected. These findings entail that military greenhouse gas emissions remain largely unreported and therefore opaque. 

New Challenges

Global warming being the greatest threat to mankind, it is time it gets recognized for what it is: a phenomenon as dangerous as military threats from other countries. Europe needs to be able to also defend itself against global warming, which makes change inevitable. Militaries need to begin ensuring that they will also be able to operate in catastrophic weather events that will occur more often and how they can adapt to function under new environmental challenges. Aside from that, emissions caused by militaries need to be included in agreements like the European Green Deal to start to get countries thinking about how they can use new green technologies for defense purposes. At the moment, too little renewable resources are being used in defense. Militaries still greatly rely on fossil fuels, such as gas and oil. Not only is the usage of those energy sources preventing the EU from meeting its climate goals, but it also makes Europe’s armies dependent on powers like Russia. Relying on fossil fuels will also only get more expensive over the next decades as those resources will get less available. 

Setting off towards a greener future

On the way to more sustainable European armies, one of the key factors will be the efficient use of energy and natural resources. In March 2022, the EU launched a Climate Change and Defense Roadmap. It recognizes the instability climate change will cause and the military risks it will bring. Furthermore, it states that the „armed forces need to invest in greener technologies throughout their inventory and infrastructure“, which is to be implemented in the Common Security and Defense Policy. 133 million euros were made available in the European Defense Fund Work Programme to develop solutions for sustainable and efficient use of energy, reduce energy consumption, and make military mobility more sustainable. With help of instruments like PESCO, where member states collaborate on improving defense, and the European Defense Fund, the EU sets out to „boost technological innovation to make military equipment more efficient and less reliant on fossil fuels“.

The European states are desperate for solutions; otherwise, they will risk their competitiveness in the future. Current crises might hold a potential for getting Europe on the right path. With record investments, it would also be possible to put a greater focus on greener inventions and steer Europe's armies in a more sustainable direction. The question that remains is whether the EU recognizes this potential, and if it continues to be willing to accept higher spending on green defense and the training that comes along with the new technologies.

Boardrooms in Balance: Why Gender Diversity is Now a Governance Must

By: Dori Felber, reading time: 4 minutes, 58 seconds

Ensuring balanced representation on corporate boards has moved from a mere social objective to a legal and governance priority across the EU. On 17 October 2022, the Council adopted its final text on gender balance in the corporate boards of listed companies (Directive 2022/238). How did this Directive impact corporate governance? In order to answer such a question, it is first necessary to outline what the Directive entails: its objectives, policy background and scope. Only then can we meaningfully assess its legal and practical implications for corporate governance across Member States. 

All about Directive 2022/238

Equality of treatment and opportunities between women and men is among the principles set out in the Treaties of the EU, and after the harrowing figures published in 2022, revealing that only 32.2% of board members and a mere 8% of board chairs were women, underscored the persistent gender imbalance in corporate leadership. These statistics have made it evident that concrete steps must be taken in order to “help [to] remove the obstacles women often face in their careers”. Thus, the primary objective of Directive 2022/238 is to achieve a more balanced representation of women and men among directors in listed companies by increasing transparency and accountability, as well as by imposing binding quantitative gender‐representation targets for boards. The Directive will apply to listed companies with registered offices in EU Member States, requiring them to have at least 40% of their non-executive director positions or 33% of their non-executive and executive director positions held by women by 2026. 

How does this link to corporate governance?

The growing emphasis on board diversity extends beyond the pursuit of social equality. Corporate governance also closely interconnects with board diversity, with three main logics shaping how the two interact. Regulators and policymakers now treat board composition as a risk-management and oversight issue.  According to the OECD, female directors bring more independent views into the boardroom and strengthen its monitoring function by counteracting groupthink. More diverse boards promote a wider range of perspectives, thereby reducing groupthink and improving the monitoring of management and risk oversight, ultimately enhancing corporate governance overall. Both the OECD and the Commission cite evidence that quotas, disclosures, transparency and other measures substantially increase the representation of women on corporate boards, as well as their effectiveness. 

Continually, investors and financial markets have increasingly viewed gender-balanced boards as a core element of good corporate governance, rather than a mere social issue. Large investors and investment advisors such as BlackRock, as well as ESG frameworks, have continuously pushed for better board composition as part of the fiduciary assessment of long-term value and governance quality. This means that boards that ignore diversity risk negative votes, reputational damage, or even tougher scrutiny during capital raises. 

The third governance logic behind board diversity is business performance, although debated, it still remains relevant in governance circles. Major empirical reviews reveal a favourable relationship between diverse leadership teams and financial outperformance for many organisations, and policymakers cite these findings to argue that board diversity promotes long-term corporate performance. That economic framing pushes diversity into board agendas as a criterion of effective governance, rather than just justice. There remains ongoing academic debate regarding the causation and robustness of these findings; nonetheless, McKiney represents the mainstream practitioner position, whilst the OECD provides a broader policy synthesis. 

The EU Directive 2022/2381 marks a defining moment in the evolution of European corporate governance. What began as an equality measure has evolved into a governance reform that incorporates diversity into the core values of board responsibility, openness, and strategic oversight. The Directive's ultimate impact, however, will be determined by how companies internalise these obligations: whether they view gender balance as a compliance checkbox or an opportunity to transform decision-making culture and long-term resilience.

THE EXCESSIVE FLEXIBILITY OF THE WORKING TIME DIRECTIVE AND ITS INADEQUACY IN PROTECTING WORKERS AFTER THE GREEK REFORM

By Aurora Dagnino, reading time: 5 minutes and 45 seconds

Workers rights  Free of Charge Creative Commons workers rights Image - Legal 6

Greece's parliament approved a few weeks ago a contested labour bill that would allow 13-hour workdays, despite strong opposition from labour unions, opposition lawmakers, and civil society groups, all of whom argued that the measure undermines worker protections. Two nationwide strikes were held in the space of two weeks from early October, paralyzing the country.  In both Athens and Thessaloniki, transportation networks were shut down, while hospital staff, teachers and other civil servants stopped working.

Workers’ protest, BBC: Greece passes labour law allowing 13-hour workdays in some cases

Under the new law, workers in certain sectors, such as  manufacturing, retail, agriculture, and hospitality, could work for up to 13 hours per day, but only for a limited number of days each year:  37. Employees will remain bound by an overall cap of 48 working hours per week, calculated on a four-month average, with the general 40-hour workweek continuing as the standard. The total annual overtime permitted continues to be 150 hours, and workers performing overtime will receive an additional 40 percent on top of their regular wages. The government has highlighted that participation in the 13-hour schedule will be strictly voluntary and subject to the employee’s consent.

This new law comes with no surprise, and it seems to reflect a trend that goes in the opposite direction with the rest of Europe, where an increasing number of countries are reducing the working week. In 2024, Greece introduced a six-day working week for certain industries to try to boost economic growth.

The legislation, which came into effect at the start of July, allows employees to work up to 48 hours in a week as opposed to 40. It must be said that it only applies to businesses which operate on a 24-hour basis and is optional for workers, who get paid an extra 40% for the overtime they do.

In 2024, the average working week at EU level lasted 36.0 hours. This varied across the EU, from 32.1 actual hours of work in the Netherlands to 39.8 in Greece, showing the Greek contradictory trend.

But what does EU law say about this? Is there any limit on the maximum duration of a  working day?

The relevant piece of legislation here is the Directive 2003/88, hereinafter called “working time directive”. The aforementioned does not explicitly establish how long a working day could be, but it could be derived implicitly.  Let’s take a look at the relevant articles:

• Article 3 defines daily rest and establishes that every worker is entitled to a minimum daily rest period of 11 consecutive hours per 24-hour period.

• Article 4 disciplines breaks, entitling workers to a rest break after 6 hours of work.

• Article 5 regulates the weekly rest period, granting workers a minimum uninterrupted rest period of 24 hours plus the 11 hours' daily rest referred to in Article 3.

• Article 6 is also relevant, which limits average weekly working time (including overtime) to 48 hours. This limit is calculated over a reference period (usually 4 months)

From this we can determine that the maximum duration of a working day is 13 hours (24h - 11h rest); therefore, legally speaking, the Greek government has not breached any EU law.

Moreover, under Article 17, derogations from the daily rest period (Article 3) and breaks (Article 4) can be implemented in activities involving the need for continuity of service or production. Thus, by applying the 13 hours only to certain sectors, Greece acted fully within the boundaries of the working time Directive.

But is a 13 hour day really doable?  Where is the respect for social and private life? Is it beneficial for the productivity of the worker? It goes without saying that working for 13 hours is hardly tenable, both from a physical and psychological point of view.

Furthermore, the argument that there is no obligation on the worker and that participation is voluntary is not realistically applicable in the labour scenario, where we have an asymmetry of power between the employee and the employer.

As if this wasn’t enough, Article 22 of the Directive, allows Member States not to apply the standard maximum limit on weekly working time. Through this opt-out mechanism, EU Member States can require workers to agree to work more than 48 hours over a seven-day period.

It is for these reasons that the Directive should explicitly put a ceiling on the duration of the working day, avoiding granting so much flexibility to employers, both in terms of the duration of the working day but also the duration of the breaks.

Another point of criticism of the Directive is that it does not specify whether the working time limit should apply per worker (covering all jobs held by an individual) or per contract (applying limits separately to each job). If the primary goal is protecting the health and safety of workers, it should apply per worker; however, many Member States applied it per contract.

The Directive has been additionally attacked because it does not adequately define how on-call duty should be treated, meaning  periods when a worker is required to be available for work, but not necessarily working the entire time. An example is a doctor who must stay at the hospital overnight in case of emergencies or a firefighter who must be ready to respond immediately, even if resting at the station.

The issue here are the vague definitions in article 2 of "working time" and "rest period": working time is defined as "any period during which the worker is working, at the employer's disposal, and carrying out his activity or duties"; while rest period is defined simply as "any period which is not working time".

Ergo, the Directive failed to address the time spent on-call, which often involves long periods of inactivity combined with the requirement to be available. While the legislation is uncertain on this merits, the CJEU has already clarified the point, but legislative attempts to amend the Directive to counter these rulings have failed.

In the SIMAP Case (C‑303/98, 2000) the CJEU consistently ruled that inactive time spent on-call at the workplace must be counted as working time in its entirety. Despite the clear CJEU ruling,  compliance and interpretation across Member States remain problematic: in some Member States, only active on-call duty at the workplace is counted as working time (e.g., Poland and Slovenia). Similarly, in Slovakia, on-call duty at the workplace does not fully count as working time for certain groups.

More than 20 years after its entry into force, the Directive is clearly unfitted to regulate nowadays working dynamics and suffers from being too vague and flexible. It leaves important, basic issues unaddressed, which has led to persistent legal confusion and fragmented practice among Member States. Moreover, its full application can be avoided through opt-outs and derogations, putting at risk the health and safety of workers, which should be the primary aim of the Directive, but which in practice is often not achieved. 

How the EU does(n’t) fight gender-based violence

By Anna-Magdalena Glockzin, 5 minutes.

In July 2019, an 18-year-old British woman went to the Cypriot police, and told them, that she had been raped by a group of 12 Israeli men in Ayia Nap. The Cypriot authorities questioned her for hours without legal assistance, which subsequently led her to withdraw these allegations. The woman later stated that she was pressured to comply and had to sign a waiver, which was drafted by Cypriot detectives. In the following proceedings, the Cypriot authorities found her guilty of lying about the gang rape attack, convicted her of causing public mischief, and issued a suspended sentence of four months. With the help of the human rights group Justice Abroad, the woman appealed to the Court of final instance, the Supreme Court of Cyprus, which overturned the verdict. It found that the woman did not receive a fair trial. The authorities, however, never admitted to any wrongdoings. This case caused outrage among women’s rights activists, who argued that the woman was treated as the offender rather than the victim.

The European Court of Human Rights intervenes

To answer this public outrage and following the Cypriot attorney general’s decline to reopen the investigations, the case got referred to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). On the 27th of February 2025, the ECtHR concluded that the Cypriot authorities mishandled the case. The Court held that the authorities “failed in their obligation to effectively investigate the applicant’s complaint of rape and to adopt a victim-sensitive approach when doing so.” In particular, it stated that the Cypriot authorities breached article 3 (lack of effective investigation) and article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

Moreover, the ruling highlighted that “neither the chief investigator nor the counsel for the Attorney General […] engaged in any meaningful examination of the evidence which could signify a lack of consent.” Hence, this case unveils how deeply embedded prejudices against rape victims are in the (Cypriot) law enforcement system. Significantly, this discrimination is rooted in the dominant presence of patriarchal structures and practices, like victim-blaming. Furthermore, it demonstrates the importance of procedural protection for victims of gender-based violence. Shifting the focus to the level of the European Union (EU), this raises the following questions: How does EU legislation aim to protect women, girls and other marginalized groups from sexual violence? And where does it fall short?

Protest to end violence against women

By Fmtechgirl - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=46937216

Legislation concerning gender-based violence in the European Union

To tackle the problem of gender-based violence in the EU, the European Commission proposed a Directive in March 2022. Based on this initiative, the European Parliament approved the EU Directive 2024/1385 on combating violence against women and domestic violence, which was adopted by the Council in May 2024. Member States are bound to fully implement the Directive by June 2027. Its articles define different forms of violence (online and offline) against women as crimes. These include female genital mutilation and forced marriage, non-consensual sharing of intimate pictures, cyber stalking, cyber harassment and incitement to hatred, and violence on the ground of gender. Furthermore, the Directive lays out specific measures to protect and support victims of gender-based violence as well as providing and enhancing access to justice. Lastly, it obliges Member States to set forth preventive measures, particularly those which aim to prevent rape and emphasize consent in sexual relationships.

Furthermore, in 2017, the Union joined the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, also known as the Istanbul Convention, which went into force in 2023. It obliges members to implement laws, policies and support services to fight violence against women and girls. Moreover, the Commission’s Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, prioritizes combating gender-based violence, which Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reiterated in her letter to the new Commissioner for Equality for a gender equality strategy post-2025. Lastly, the EU dedicated the 25th November as the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, on which the European Commission and the EU High Representative of Foreign Affairs hold a speech together.

There is still room for improvement

However, several hurdles in the EU’s fight against gender-based violence persist to this day. For instance, the collection of statistical data does not cover all 27 Member States. The EU survey on gender-based violence collects only data from 18 EU countries. For the remaining countries, the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) coordinate the data collection. In November 2024, Eurostat, EIGE and FRA published a report together for the first time, combining the data and providing an overview of women’s experiences with regards to violence in the whole of the EU. Nonetheless, the non-cohesiveness of the data continues to be a problem as well as the limited scope of the EU survey.

Furthermore, neither the Directive mentioned above nor any other EU document establishes an EU-wide (consent-based) definition of “rape” and “sexual assault”, exacerbating problems of discriminatory treatment in judicial processes and impunity of perpetrators. While the different criminal codes of the Member States do not provide a common definition of these crimes, it should and must not serve as an excuse for failing to establish respective legal definitions at the EU level. Gisèle Pelicot’s deeply shocking case in France and the case of the British woman in Cyprus, among many others, reveal that the fight against gender-based violence is far from over. This underscores the urgent need to induce fundamental and lasting change in society, policymaking, legislation and judicial processes, ensuring the protection and equality of women and girls.

EU drops AI Liability Directive: What it means for regulation and innovation

By Anni Rissanen. Read: 1 min 54 s

The European Commission has decided to withdraw a key proposal that would have made it easier to hold companies accountable for AI-related harm. Some say it is a win for innovation, while others warn it creates a legal mess. What happens next for AI regulation in Europe?

The European Commission has decided to withdraw its proposed AI Liability Directive, triggering  strong reactions across the political spectrum. This Directive was expected to create a clearer framework for holding companies accountable for AI-related harm. However, its withdrawal raises key questions about how AI liability will be regulated in Europe, namely who will be responsible when AI causes harm, how victims can seek compensation, and whether existing national laws are sufficient to address emerging AI risks.

Mixed reactions in the Parliament

Many in the European Parliament have criticized the decision. Axel Voss (EPP), who led work on the Directive, warned that scrapping it creates ‘legal uncertainty’ because without a common EU-wide framework, AI-related liability will be handled differently in each of the 27 Member States. This means companies and individuals will have to navigate a patchwork of national laws, making it harder to seek compensation for AI-related harm and potentially discouraging smaller businesses from developing AI technologies. Others, including Aura Salla (EPP, Finland), welcomed the decision, arguing that the Directive was flawed and unnecessary. The Socialists & Democrats (S&D) and Greens also voiced concerns, stressing the need for strong AI accountability mechanisms. 

Support from governments and the tech industry

The withdrawal, however, was met with approval from EU member states and tech industry groups. Poland and France backed the decision, favoring deregulation over added liability rules. CCIA Europe, which represents major tech firms, praised the move as a win for innovation, arguing that excessive regulation could stifle progress. 

The reason behind the withdrawal of the Directive

The Commission cited a lack of political consensus as the main reason for shelving the Directive. Trade Commissioner, Maroš Šefcovic, acknowledged that negotiations had stalled but hinted that a revised approach to AI liability could emerge later in the future. Notably, the European Parliament’s legislative portal remains open for amendments, suggesting that the debate is not entirely over. 

What is next for AI regulation?

With this AI Liability Directive off the table, the focus now shifts to how AI liability will be handled across Europe. Will existing regulations, like the AI Act, be enough to ensure accountability? Or will new proposals emerge to bridge the gaps?

For now, the Commission appears to be prioritizing competitiveness and innovation, potentially signaling a shift toward a more flexible regulatory approach. Whether this fosters progress or leaves critical gaps in consumer protection remains to be seen. 

Why the Gisele Pelicot case calls for a redefinition of rape in France

By Dori Felber, Read: 3 minutes 42 seconds

Time to redefine the outdated definition of rape in France? As the horrific testimony of Gisele Pélicot unfolds, many have argued for a redefinition of rape in France. This specifically followed after lawyer Guillaume de Palma, who is defending 6 of the accused, argued that “In France proof of intent is required” in order for it to qualify as rape. 

Gisele Pélicot is a survivor of a series of rape, orchestrated by her husband Dominique Pélicot. Over a period of 9 years (July 2011 to October 2020) Gisele Pélicot was repeatedly raped by her husband and individuals who he would invite, whilst she was drugged and unconscious. In total, Gisele Pélicot was raped 92 times by 72 men, as her husband filmed the abuse. These horrific acts came to light when Dominique Pélicot was arrested by the police for taking upskirt photographs of women in supermarkets. The police discovered thousands of images and videos that Pélicot had taken of the rapes and stored on his computing equipment. Pélicot is further accused of training Jean-Pierre Maréchal on how to drug and rape his own wife.

It is the State’s responsibility to prosecute sexual assault offences as a grave and systematic violation of human rights, and in order to do so, a comparison and evaluation must be made between the laws that are in place for rape in France (who has ratified the Convention) against the criteria set out in the Istanbul Convention. The above-mentioned Convention is the first instrument in Europe that sets out legally binding standards for the laws and procedures that are in place for such crimes, created with the intention to protect the victims and adequately punish the perpetrators.

The definition of rape is detailed in Article 36 (a) (c) of the Istanbul Convention as the following:

a. Non-consensual vaginal, anal or oral penetration of a sexual nature of the body of another person with any bodily part or object;

c.  Causing another person to engage in non-consensual acts of a sexual nature with a third person.

It further states that consent must be given voluntarily, which will be assessed according to the circumstances of the case (Article 36 (2)), and that this offence includes former or current partners and spouses (which are recognised by national law) (Article 36 (3)). Thus, the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator does not matter (Article 43). Lastly, Article 46 explains that, if applicable, additional aggravating conditions must be applied. This includes offence committed against a current spouse or committed against a person made vulnerable due to specific circumstances. 

Article 222-23 of Code Pénal Français details that rape is any act of sexual penetration, of whatever nature, or any oral-genital act committed on the person of another or on the person of the perpetrator by violence, constraint, threat or surprise. Upon comparison, it is immediately visible that the above-mentioned definition does not include the word ‘non-consensual’. The definition detailed above gives room for argument as to whether the offence constituted rape. The Istanbul Convention details that definitions of sexual assault offences must protect the victims to the fullest extent. The missing element of consent in the definition of rape lacks such a protection. Furthermore, stating that ‘rape is any act of sexual penetration committed by violence, constraint, threat or surprise’ conveys the idea that there needs to be intention. All of the above-mentioned acts necessitate pre-meditated intention. In order to threaten someone, one must know what they are threatening the victim for. This is equally true for constraint, violence and surprise. Consequently, the Article 222-23 necessitates pre-meditated intention for rape. Consequently, such a definition leaves room for lawyers such as Guillaume de Palma to argue that if there is no intention, there is no rape. From this, it is visible that the inclusion of consent in the definition of rape makes the protection of victims unequivocal. Lack of consent, for whatever reason, equals rape. 

In conclusion, when evaluating the definition of rape in France against the legal standard provided for by the Istanbul Convention, it is clear that France must redefine their definition of said offence in order to provide adequate protection for the victims and to sufficiently prosecute and punish the perpetrators. 

The new European Commission’s Environmental Crime Directive (ECD).

On the 27th of February 2024 the European Parliament adopted a number of revolutionary environmental measures enshrined in the Environmental Crimes Directive that penalized environmental crimes much more stringently compared to the past. The Greens/EFA Group from the European Parliament called for the establishment of a serious criminal liability in the case of destruction or widespread and substantial damage which is long-lasting or irreversible to an ecosystem, a habitat or the quality of air, soil or water. More specifically, the MEP of the Greens/EFA Group stated that:

‘This new directive is a victory for the environment (...). The outdated 2008 directive needed to be revised as a matter of urgency. With this new text, the EU is adopting one of the world's most ambitious pieces of legislation to combat environmental crime. It will allow for a  more effective and better protection of individuals who suffer as a result of such damage. The perpetrators of these crimes will therefore be prosecuted and punished more severely in the case of ‘qualified offences’, which encompass conduct comparable to ecocide. We also welcome the increase in the level of penalties and the introduction of significant additional sanctions (...).’

The global increase in environmental crime, ranging from 5% to 7% annually, is causing enduring harm to ecosystems, wildlife, human health, and the finances of both governments and businesses. As per estimates from UNEP and Interpol released in June 2016, the yearly financial impact of environmental crime is estimated to be between $91 billion and $258 billion. Despite this, the number of convictions for environmental crimes has not increased substantially.

The new directive clarifies to the Member States the definition of environmental offences and the punishment the offenders would suffer as a result. The new directive categorizes breaches of environmental obligations like illegal trade, handling of chemicals or mercury, and illegal ship recycling as criminal offences. The severity of punishment for offences related to illegal waste collection, transport, treatment, or the unauthorized sale of timber or timber products derived from illicitly harvested wood will not significantly vary between legal entities and individuals. Consequently, such actions could result in a imprisonment between 3 and 10 years in Member States. Additionally, companies engaging in such criminal offences would face fines equal to at least 5% of their global turnover or an amount equivalent to €24 or €40 million. In comparison to the 2008 directive, it raises the number of environmental crimes from 8 to 20 and establishes minimum requirements, allowing Member States to be more stringent.

Furthermore, the ECD elaborates under which category the commitment of serious environmental crimes would fall. That is within the term ‘aggravated offence’ that would lead to more severe sanctions. Furthermore, national legislators are to contemplate the inclusion of aggravating factors and supplementary sanctions and measures (in addition to monetary penalties) to enable a customized response to individual offences. Consequently, persons who cooperate with the enforcement authorities in identifying the offenders of such serious environmental crimes will benefit from the supporting measures in such criminal proceedings.

The identification of such crimes, the enforcement of criminal law, and the punishment of the offenders in environmental crimes would require the work of criminal law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and courts. This would presuppose a strong criminal law response that would lead to effective criminal law enforcement. Special training, the sufficiency of resources, and the efficiency of criminal law tools will be developed for the criminal law professionals to gain the needed qualifications and skills when combating environmental crimes. Considering the global nature and the cross-border element of environmental issues the new directive requires cooperation and coordination between the Member States.

In regards to this, the Commissioner of Justice Didier Reynders shared her hopes regarding the new directive on the 16th of November 2023 saying that:

‘This political agreement between the European Parliament and the Council is a major step forward in combatting environmental crime, a growing concern. This shows that the EU takes decisive action against environmental damage: the new rules set EU-wide standards to ensure environmental protection while providing for effective and dissuasive sanctions for offenders.’ The Commissioner for Environment, Oceans and Fisheries, Virginijus Sinkevičius, added that ‘Environmental crime causes devastating damage to our environment, harms our health as well as our economy. For too long criminals have profited from weak sanctions and lack of enforcement. With this strengthened law the EU steps up its action. It will better ensure that the most severe breaches of environmental rules are considered as crimes, that enforcers are more effective on the ground, and that environmental defenders are more protected and acknowledged.’

Moreover, the European Crime Directive criminalises the so-called ‘ecocide’, according to those who want to make it the fifth international crime prosecuted by the International Criminal Court. The directive refers to ‘cases comparable to ecocide’ in its preamble, but does not use the word in the directive explicitly. Ecocide is defined as ‘unlawful or wanton acts committed knowing that those acts have a substantial likelihood of causing severe and either long-term or widespread damage to the environment.’ The term was developed in 2021 by twelve international solicitors and made public by Stop Ecocide International. Thus, the European Parliament suggested enshrining the term in European law last year.

In conclusion, the European Crime Directive showcases the new priorities of the Union revolving around the growing environmental problems. To what extent will the new European Crime Directive be implemented by the Member States and what effect it is going to exert on the ongoing environmental crisis remains to be seen.

Europe’s Carbon Curtain

By Terk Felix Kraft, 5 minutes

Global warming forces Europe to rethink its industrial production and sets national decision-makers before a legislative paradox. Meanwhile, Brussels has come up with a controversial solution that has the potential to either harmonise or rip apart the world’s entire supply chain network.

In order to tackle climate change and species extinction, the European Green Deal prescribes to the European Union (EU), its countries, population, and decision-makers, a number of environmental targets to meet. One of these targets is climate neutrality by 2050 and meeting that aim is going to have an enormous impact on just about any aspect of our economy. In other words: Our elected officials will have to guide sectors 1 and 2 of our economy (agriculture and industry) towards largely climate-neutral means of production. However, once regulators start toughening environmental standards for goods produced in their country, they run into a paradox.

Backfiring Legislation

Let’s play a game: Imagine you’re a lawmaker and your aim is to raise environmental production standards, for example regarding CO2 pollution. You might do so by directly regulating business or through an Emissions Trading System (ETS), bringing to market a limited number of certificates that allow their owner to pollute. Whatever your precise formula, it inevitably increases production costs and disadvantages your country’s companies amongst their competitors from across the globe.

But is that bad, if it helps the environment?, you may ask. If only it did! By raising production costs, you have just incentivized firms from your country to move production abroad to places that might have even fewer and lower emission standards than those you had in the first place. Since all of us live on the same planet under the same atmosphere breathing the same air, you have effectively worsened the environmental situation for your constituents.

In addition, you’ve just wrecked a whole industrial sector, eliminated a range of specialised jobs, weakened your country’s position in global supply chains, undermined its Strategic Autonomy, and quite possibly shifted its trade balance. You’re essentially living an elected official’s perfect nightmare, one that is so prominent it got its own official title: Carbon Leakage.

Europe’s Patch on the Carbon Leak

Solving the paradox of practically increasing carbon emissions by toughening emissions standards might be one of the biggest riddles of our time - and the EU has taken it on to solve it! Just recently, on May 10th this year, the European Commission, Parliament, and Council signed the corresponding regulation, establishing a legislative monstrosity under its rather catchy name Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism or, in short, CBAM.

The EU’s CBAM designates a price to the carbon emitted during the production of carbon-intensive goods (aluminium, cement, fertiliser, electricity, hydrogen, iron and steel) outside the EU, upon entering its Single Market. As the EU itself raises its own climate ambitions, this protectionist measure is deemed necessary in order to prevent Carbon Leakage. The measure objectives are twofold: For one, it aims at protecting domestic production as it decarbonises.

Secondly, and this may be of even greater significance, it incentivizes producers abroad to adopt European environmental production standards in order not to have their products be slashed with what is effectively a carbon toll upon entering Europe’s rich, about 450 million-strong consumer market. Starting from October 1st, 2023, the gradual introduction of the CBAM shall take place in sync with phasing out the allocation of free allowances under the EU’s ETS.

Once fully implemented, CBAM will equalise the carbon price of imports with that of domestically produced goods of the same category. And whereas the EU claims its CBAM to be compatible with the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the exact set of rules and requirements for the reporting of emissions under CBAM shall be specified further within an implementing act. The WTO’s final verdict upon the EU’s CBAM, thus, is yet to come.

Ursula’s Climate Club

But the venture’s ultimate aim is not merely climate-neutral production in Europe, far from it. Utilising its sizable consumer market as leverage, the EU aims to convince producers (and, by extent, their legislators) outside the bloc of its high environmental production standards. In this way, the EU’s plans foresee consolidating the world’s major developed economies to form a kind of carbon free-trade area, a Climate Club. However, whereas countries like Canada and the United Kingdom have signalled interest, Washington, usually setting the tone on free trade, does not yet seem convinced.
At a later point, emerging economies such as Turkey and trade blocs such as MERCOSUR are supposed to find access to that same free-trade area - by climate-neutralising their agricultural and industrial production. The EU hopes its legislative endeavour will eventually cause a spill-over effect that reaches every corner of the globe, sets new climate-friendly production standards and, notably, establishes the EU as a global regulatory power in economic affairs. Ambitious? Certainly. Megalomaniac? Maybe.

Like the Sword of Damocles, the WTO’s final judgement on CBAM looms over the heads of busy Eurocrats elaborating product emissions tables. Meanwhile, Germany’s chancellor Olaf Scholz appears unimpressed. While refraining from elucidating the CBAM’s technicalities on camera, Scholz joyfully propagates the EU’s vision of a Climate Club to any global leader sparing an ear.

Legislative Gravity

But is this strong enough of an effort, grand enough of a pitch, to save the planet? Some MEPs, especially of the Greens/EFA Group, are not yet convinced. According to Rasmus Andresen, a German MEP for the Green Party, CBAM is going to contribute its part to global emissions reduction. He questions, however, whether CBAM “will be able to promote the establishment of a Climate Club in the sense of the Commission's legislative proposal within the required timeframe.” In other words: The tabled legislative act might lack the gravity to have a timely impact. Concretely, the MEP laments for the organic chemicals and plastics industries not being covered by CBAM as well as the time scope of the scheme’s time launch, which he describes as “very hesitant” and “a giant fly in the ointment”.

At the same time, Andresen considers it a success that, from 2030, all industrial products for which there is imminent Carbon Leakage risk (i.e. which can relatively easily relocate their production site) shall automatically become subject to CBAM. In this way, the scheme may - if belated - sharpen its accuracy.

Résumé

In the past, the EU has repeatedly proven its actorness in regulatory politics. Taking on major digital players in fields such as privacy and competition, it has been described as somewhat of a Regulatory Superpower. Publishing its legal text in a range of languages, Brussels is well aware of the spill-over effects its legislation has on states that might struggle to affirm the rule of law against foreign or corporate interests. Only time will tell, whether the EU will manage to transfer its regulatory abilities onto other, even more competitive policy fields or whether its ambitions end up hemmed in by more powerful global players.

To learn more about the topic, take a look at the EU’s climate ambitions:
European Green Deal:

https://www.commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal_en

https://ecamaastricht.org/blueandyellow-knowyourunion/europeangreendeal

European CBAM:

https://www.taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en

European ETS:

www.climate.ec.europa.eu/eu-action/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets_en

Did You Know That a Water Agenda for The Mediterranean Exist?Here Is Why We Should Care About It

Source: UfM official website

By Ilaria Settembrini, 9 minutes

I bet you did not know it. Fair enough. Still, the warming of the Mediterranean Sea is one of the fastest in the world and requires fruitful engagement by the EU. As an essential and historically contentious resource, water can offer Brussels new pathways for intergovernmental cooperation with the southern shores.

We came a long way together… 

2023 will mark 15 years since the establishment of a clear commitment of the EU towards ensuring water access in the Mediterranean region through a Water Agenda of the Mediterranean. The drafting of a water agenda was envisioned in December 2008 when, at the UfM Ministerial Conference on Water held in Jordan, the Euro-Mediterranean ministers promoted the establishment of a Water Expert Group (WEG). This group was set to provide a space in which states could gather information to develop shared goals for the future Agenda. Finally, it was in 2017 that the Malta Declaration mandated the finalization of the Agenda’s financial plan. 

On this matter, the Agenda and its financial plan represent the culmination of a progressive rapprochement between the shores after the first Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Water held in 1990 in Algiers. However, the establishment of such an Agenda enabled a more equalitarian partnership with the southern Mediterranean countries: the EU first promoted it but later ideated it in the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) intergovernmental framework. 

… for the Water Policy framework for Actions 2030.

Adopted in late 2018 with the mentioned financial plan, the 2030 Agenda recognizes, in particular, the intersectionality that such a water provision intervention brings with regard to other fields, such as climate change or migration. For this reason, the water agenda-related policy framework revolves around 4 multi-level pillars that embed different types of actions, from training to multi-partnerships, vis-a-vis the interlinkage of factors: 

Water-Energy-Food-Ecosystem (WEFE) Nexus: it recognizes the cross-sectoral integration between food poverty and hydric access problems and their repercussions on the ecosystems. In the framework of the Agenda, the EU Commission and the EIB (European Investment Bank) will support the Desalinization in the Gaza Strip. The envisioned project will allow the 2 million Palestinian inhabiting the land strip to have drinking water, which nowadays accounts for less than 3% of the hydric resources at disposal. At the same time, the intervention will also allow for a reduction of East Mediterranean pollution.  

• Water-Employment-Migration (WEM) Nexus: this pillar is set to change the regional dynamics regarding the dependency that local economies and market labor have built on water. WEM-related projects want to create more efficient economies to produce equilibrating changes in the socio-economic systems and face the ultimate Mediterranean challenge: migration. The EU’s commitment to the water agenda becomes a tool to fight against the root causes of migration. 

•  Water Supply, Sanitation, and Hygiene (WASH) Nexus: under these lenses, future cooperation aims at reinforcing the institutional capacity of local governments and municipalities to offer sanitary services. 

• Water and Climate Change Adaptation (WCCA) Nexus: last but not least, this pillar revolves around the fight against the interdependence between water allocation and climate change. In the background, each project will try to work for a reinforcement of the autonomy and governance of the Mediterranean countries in terms of water management. 

Taking action becomes imperative:

The international community generally agrees that the Mediterranean region is warming 20% faster than the rest of the world. Such a picture is exceptionally critical for a region that is already fragile and whose ecosystems are already affected by drought and food insecurity. The following data about the Mediterranean set the record straight: 

1. The expected rise of temperature by 2.2° in 2040 is set to reduce precipitations by 10-15%. 

2. In light of the hydric resources reduction, the water demand is expected to double, if not triple, due to the uncontrollable population growth in the Mediterranean. 

3. Results? By 2040 more than 250 million people will be water poor in the Mediterranean Basin: half of the current population in the region. 

When putting aside the negative effects of global warming, today's disparities over clean water in the region are already a constant. This is caused first of all by geological reasons: the water productivity of the area, in general, is almost half of the world average. Especially in North Africa, the region is threatened by floods and drought with a certain regularity. Such disparities exacerbate when we focus on the gap between urban and rural areas. Data gathered from the east to the western Mediterranean express this regional vulnerability. Already in 2019, 70 percent of Lebanon's population faced water shortages, while in 2022, Morocco experienced the worst droughts in 4 decades.  

On top of this, the political component of water plays a relevant role. Hydric resources have always been a divisive element. They commonly threatened political stability and social security, from the Middle East Peace Process in Palestine to the tensions that historically have developed between Egypt and Sudan/ Ethiopia over the Nile Basin. 

However, cynically, what should Europe's stance be on this? Pollution of the Mediterranean, migration, and last but not least, climate change touch upon the northern shores of the Mediterranean and require a common challenge approach by the EU on the base of this interdependence between the shores. Such water availability rollbacks do involve, for example, the European coasts. The 80-177 m3 of water per capita reserved annually for the MENA Region are similar to the 120 m3 per person at the disposal of Malta.

Do positive prospects open up? 

Climate change is recognized as one of the ground-breaking priorities of the von der Leyen Commission and its Green Deal. This also applies to the EUs' external actions. In that sense, the Agenda becomes an essential tool to fight climate change, given the intersectionality of the Mediterranean issues. 

On the one hand, the Union for the Mediterranean’s framework becomes an essential tool to reinforce Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in terms of water management. The Agenda and its financial strategy have been prepared in consultation with local stakeholders and private sectors, enabling effective communication between the shores of the Mediterranean. At the same time, sharing best practices for establishing a common and accessible Water Knowledge Platform can facilitate harmonization efforts. Cooperation strategies can build upon existing EUROMED information-sharing projects for hydric development (PRIMA Project 2018-2028). Also, at the sub-regional level, the Agenda provides space for policymaking to pass through dialogue roundtables.  For the EU, it means integrating the water strategy in the arenas furnished by intergovernmental forums associated with the UfM, such as the Western Mediterranean 5+5 Dialogue. 

On the other hand, considering the already mentioned polarization that water management causes, the cooperation framework by the Agenda can intensify cooperation within MENA Partners themselves. A strengthened collaboration could translate into new intra-regional horizons to share best practices in the South Mediterranean. In summary, the Agenda could have positive decentralizing effects since it can reinforce an already intricated South-South Cooperation. The promotion of common approaches and technology transfers could pass through the experiences that Tunisia and Morocco, as the southern partners who have developed their own 2050 Vision in the past two years, can share with the region. In summary, the Agenda becomes a vital aid for increasing Southern Neighbourhood’s ownership of the policy process on the line of CLIMA-MED (2018-2020). This EU-funded project engaged southern Mediterranean partners in shaping the strategies and proper technical assistance to elaborate sustainable and tailored national systems. 

In conclusion, since water scarcity is a warning alert for both shores of the Mediterranean, the UfM Agenda becomes a vital tool for damage control. However, aside from an emergency approach by the EU, the fragility of the Mediterranean should push for substantive changes not only because it is a necessary step but because it can create positive spill-over effects for international cooperation. 

Food products are healthier in the European Union!

Beatriz Santos Mayo, 6 minutes

Did you know that eating fast food products inside the EU is healthier than eating them elsewhere? Did you know some food additives have been restricted in the EU due to potential health risks? The European Food Safety Authority seeks to protect the food chain from the farm to the table and banned everything that may imply a risk to European Citizens. 
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) is an independent agency that advises and communicates to the European Union the existing and emerging risk associated with the food chain. The EFSA is a European agency with legal basis. It collaborates with the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the member states to provide the best service to European citizens.

The EFSA was created by Regulation (CE) Nº178/2002 after the alimentary crisis in the 1990s. The objective was to protect the customers and re-establish and maintain their trust in European alimentary products. 

Before the EFSA - Alimentary Crisis

The first crisis was in 1996. Flour and cattle feed were produced from the meat of sheep that had died from the "Scaprie" strain of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy. The current food crisis started when sick cattle were utilized to create more flour for animal feed. People who ate the meat from these cattle developed the human form of the disease known as Creutzfeldt-Jakob, with symptoms strikingly identical to those of the affected animals, like Blurred vision or blindness, Insomnia, Incoordination, difficulty speaking, and difficulty swallowing. The second one was in 1999, when  Belgium removed all of its chickens and eggs from meat production, issuing a sanitary alert preventing food from these farms from entering the Community. Farms in France and Germany were also impacted. The distribution of recycled fats and oils contaminated with dioxins for animal feed was the cause of the existence of these harmful substances. In this instance, food fraud, including using toxic industrial fats in the food chain, is to blame for the crisis. Finally, in 2002 due to the discovery of dioxin in feed intended for these animals, Belgium, Holland, and Germany shut down 700 poultry and agribusiness farms in February 2002. Although the meat from these animals could reach the food chain, the contamination levels were not alarming. These organic toxins in the pollution influence the mind. Using harmful fats as ingredients, a breach in the food safety system, was the root of the contamination.

Values of EFSA

Excellence: The EFSA conducts rigorous and reliable risk assessments based on the latest scientific advances. Independence: The Scientific advice of EFSA is impartial. Its staff is free from conflict of interest, analyses the data, and objectively applies the methods.  Openness: EFSA evaluations of the alimentary risks are accessible and understandable for all interested authors in the different nutritious matters. Responsibility: EFSA works to improve alimentary security using responsible, sustainable, and practical resources. 

How does it work? - Aged Meet Case

The scientists at EFSA examined current procedures and pinpointed the pathogens and spoilage germs that might emerge and persist during aging and pose a risk to human health. These include enterotoxigenic Yersinia spp., Campylobacter spp., Clostridium spp., Salmonella spp., Staphylococcus aureus, Listeria monocytogenes, and E. coli (STEC) (particularly in beef).

They explained the criteria that would produce dry and wet meat with the same level of safety as fresh meat, expressed as combinations of time and temperature during the aging process. The EFSA experts recommended that the surface temperature of dry-aged beef not rise above 3°C while it is being aged.

Finally, EFSA scientists concluded that the precondition programs and Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point (HACCP) systems used to verify the safety of fresh meat equally apply to aged meat.

2027- Strategic Objectives

The launch of the new Transparency Regulation and the implementation of EFSA's Strategy 2027 occur simultaneously. Through better transparency and communication, this Regulation intends to boost stakeholders and the public's trust in EFSA while improving the accuracy of its risk assessments and the sustainability of its business model. This Plan includes implementation activities for the numerous demands made on EFSA under the Transparency Regulation. These are a natural continuation of the goals and actions outlined in EFSA's Strategy 2020 in many ways. Strategy 2027 also contains fresh actions resulting from previously unveiled, long-term EU policy reforms (e.g., F2F strategy). Three Strategic Goals serve as the strategy's focal points.

Three separate Strategic Goals that form the agency's main goal are anticipated to be accomplished according to the EFSA 2027 Strategy. These Strategic Objectives will direct EFSA in carrying out its mission in light of the opportunities and challenges mentioned above, aiming to boost stakeholder trust in its scientific advice and increase customer satisfaction, all without compromising the agency's core principles or the caliber of its work. Strategy Goal 1: The first strategic objective is to provide reliable scientific guidance and risk communication from farm to fork. Strategy Goal 2: Assure readiness for upcoming requirements for risk analysis Strategy Goal 3: Promote employee empowerment and organizational agility By policy and risk management choices backed by EFSA's work, one can anticipate seeing the following effects should EFSA effectively accomplish these strategic objectives: a guarantee of public health that takes into account environmental factors, animal welfare, and plant health and the maintenance of confidence in a system of food safety that offers a high level of protection for consumer interests and human health.