Putin’s War on Ukraine: What can the EU actually do?
by Leonie Klüver, 9 minutes
Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 drastically changed the - until-then - peaceful liberal democratic interaction and existence of European states. Putin’s ongoing inhumane war against Ukraine forced the EU to implement four mounting economic sanction packages to weaken the Russian economy and ultimately curtail Russia's ability to wage war. To show solidarity with Ukraine, the EU has further provided billions of euros in funds to EU member states and Ukraine to prevent a humanitarian crisis and provide basic human needs to the fleeing Ukrainians.
Additionally, various EU member states have provided military support to Ukraine by sending weapons and equipment. Until the war in Ukraine, the EU was reluctant to provide any military equipment to another state for the use of force. Considerably, the EU member states have been unwilling to commit to pooling sovereignty and developing military capabilities, which have prevented any form of military support to a third country. However, following a meeting with EU foreign affairs ministers on February 27 2022, EU High Representative (HR) Josep Borrell and President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen announced that the EU would provide 500 million euros in arms and aid to Ukraine’s military. Ursula von der Leyen went as far as to describe this funding as a “watershed moment” in European history.
The EU’s decision to not only provide humanitarian funding and implement a sanction regime as it has done in previous conflicts, such as the 2014 annexation of Crimea but also military support is a fundamental step in further European integration. The foreign affairs, security, military, and defence competencies still lie at the states’ level rather than at the EU. Although the EU has been pushing toward further military cooperation through its treaty reforms that resulted in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), the intergovernmental bargaining process continues to restrict the effectiveness of a united response.
EU’s approach to Common Policies in Security and Defence
The CFSP, first implemented in the Maastricht Treaty and later adapted in the Lisbon Treaty, aims to provide foreign and security policies that are supported by all 27 EU member states. These rather vaguely formulated policies seek to preserve peace, reinforce international security, and promote international cooperation, rule of law, human rights, and fundamental freedoms. The CSDP is similar to uniting EU member states on a common policy response, however as the name suggests it provides a framework for the EU to conduct operational missions that aim for peacekeeping and strengthening the international community. Within the CSDP framework, the Lisbon Treaty established a military unit, the so-called EU battle group (EU BG) to increase its international actorness. The EUBG has several 1500 personnel strong multinational units that form the EU’s quick reaction force. However, within the 15 years of full military response capability, the EU BG has not once been activated by the EU Council.
Though there are various mechanisms and frameworks in place that theoretically allow the EU to act united in practice the EU’s military actorness is highly inefficient. The shifting world order, the unstable Southern and Eastern European neighbourhood, the consequences of climate change, and the strengthening of autocratic leaders increasingly threaten the EU’s security. After Brexit and the election of President Trump, the EU’s assumed security network began to crumble and as a reaction, the EU identified the need to establish military capabilities to defend and ensure its existence. Hence, the publication of the EU Global Strategy (EUGS) in 2016 intensified the political debate further. The strategic document calls for a pragmatic use of force thereby distancing the EU from its so far widely declared normative actorness. Further, it promotes the establishment of strategic autonomy, a term implying that the EU is capable of identifying its security and defence goals and also acting upon them autonomously. To note, EU member states have been unequally outspoken on supporting strategic autonomy. France which is currently holding the Presidency of the Council has been strongly advocating for stronger EU military capabilities and has also co-initiated the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and European Intervention Initiative (EI2). Similarly, the Strategic Compass, the most recent strategy document of the EU, continues the pragmatic and autonomy-oriented tone. The Compass clearly outlines the EU’s need to develop military capabilities to be able to defend its interests and promote its values internationally.
Military integration due to the war in Ukraine?
The war in Ukraine has accelerated the debate on further military integration. Nonetheless, the political will of EU member states to pool their military sovereignty continues to lack. Consequently, the EU can only be as militarily powerful and autonomous as the EU member states allow it to be. The aforementioned announcement by Josep Borrell underlines this since he refers to financing the purchase of military weapons by EU member states rather than the EU sending weapons to Ukraine (which is not possible as the EU does not have military weapons). Another important factor within this military dynamic between the EU and its member states is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and ultimately also the United States (US). Most EU member states are also NATO member states and therefore have military commitments within this alliance. This defence alliance has the crucial article 5 which states that an attack against one is an attack against all. Due to the sheer territorial size, and economic as well as political power, none of NATO’s member states has been attacked.
The implications of these tightly interlinked security and defence frameworks are clearly visible in the case of the war against Ukraine. Firstly, at a national level, all EU member states have their distinct so-called strategic culture, which is their attitudes towards the use of force as well as their national interests in this war. The states’ intergovernmental bargaining at an EU level and due to different interests and cultures partially agree or disagree. Although the EU tries to mediate this bargaining process and produce a CSDP this is again restrained in the unanimity voting as well as in the implementation at a member state level. The EU is in a dilemma as it has little military actorness, yet a strong interest in this conflict and also a need to adequately respond to ensure credibility.
The NATO member states, specifically the US and large EU member states, have been very outspoken regarding Putin’s war on Ukraine and have provided Ukraine with weapons. However, they have been hesitant to station troops on Ukraine territory as this would be regarded by Putin as a direct confrontation and would risk an escalation of the war into NATO territory. If this would happen, considering NATO article 5, the entire European continent and North America would face a next war which European politicians aim to avoid at any cost. Therefore, the EU finds itself in the middle of a Realpolitik power play without the capabilities to act but with a normative goal to achieve.
Ultimately, the military support of the EU in the ongoing war is rather complex and one must note that the article has only scratched the surface of the entirety of this conflict and EU military capabilities. To answer the initial question of what the EU can do in the Russia-Ukraine war, it can do very little militarily and its financial and political responses are limited in their effectiveness. The EU is not a military actor despite its goal to achieve strategic autonomy. The EU member states have been providing military equipment to Ukraine to show solidarity, yet, they have restrained from more direct support to prevent further military escalation on the European continent. As the war in Ukraine drags on, it is likely that EU member states further diverge from their initial united reaction due to their differing national interests as can be seen by Victor Orban who described Ukraine President Zelensky as a “political opponent”. Thereby, undermining the EU’s actorness in this conflict and due to the unanimity decision-making nature of the CFSP and CSDP limiting the EU’s military responsiveness.
