EU-China Relations Amid the War in Ukraine – A Dialogue of the Deaf
by Federico Durante, 12 minutes
Disclaimer: This article reflects the views of the author, not of the blue&yellow blog or ECA Maastricht.
On the 1st of April 2022, the 23rd EU-China summit was held via videoconference, in which the EU and the People’s Republic of China were supposed to take stock of their bilateral relations and the current status of international politics. The EU was represented by both the European Council President Charles Michel and the Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, as well as by the High Representative (HR) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell. On the Chinese side, the meeting was attended by China’s Prime Minister Li Keqiang, who was later joined by President and General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Xi Jinping. According to subsequent official declarations and various media reports, the EU-China summit turned out to be unsuccessful. At a European Parliament hearing, HR Borrell described the meeting as a “dialogue of the deaf”, an expression used to describe a discussion in which each side is unresponsive to what the other says, thus resulting in an inconclusive conversation.
This difficulty in communicating seemed surprising given that both sides had numerous topics to be discussed, however, it quickly became obvious that the priorities of each side were very different. On the one hand, the EU wanted to discuss the situation in Ukraine, and express its concerns over the Chinese “no-limit partnership” with Russia, to persuade Beijing to distance itself from Moscow and back the West’s sanctions against it. The EU wanted to convince China to adopt a stronger tone with Russian President Vladimir Putin to induce him to end this brutal aggression. On the other hand, China did not want to talk mainly (or even at all) about Ukraine, but instead discuss other global and bilateral issues such as climate change, trade, and mutual investment, thus continuing its policy of neutrality and coldness towards the Russo-Ukrainian war. To understand the Chinese position towards Ukraine, it is necessary to explain this discord in the dialogue between the EU and China.
Broader EU-China Relations
The EU-China relationship is multifaceted as cooperation, but also disagreements shape the discourse. In May 2019, the EU adopted the EU-China Strategic Outlook which outlines the EU perspective on the main areas of cooperation with China, as well as the challenges that Chinese assertiveness poses to EU interests and values.
Prior to the war in Ukraine, cooperation on climate change and the green transition was on top of the EU’s political agenda. As China represents 28% of global greenhouse gas emissions and is the world’s largest producer of solar panels and windmills (key technologies to produce carbon-neutral energy), it is imperative to work with it if the EU wants to effectively implement the Paris Agreement and keep global warming-induced increases in temperatures below 1.5°C.
Secondly, the EU, and the West (which in this article it consists of Europe, North America, Oceania, and Japan) more broadly, are concerned by China’s human rights approach, not only towards the brutal ‘reeducation practises’ against Uyghurs in the Xinjiang, but also regarding freedom of speech, activists protection in HongKong, civil society participation in political decision-making, and academic freedom. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been very vocal in defending its approach to human rights, by refusing to alter its policies.
Thirdly, the EU-China relationship is heavily dependent on trade, given that they are the two world’s largest trading partners. Bilateral trade reaches €1.9 billion a day, although the trade balance is deeply in China’s favour, since the EU’s exports in goods to China amount to €223 billion, while imports from China are €472 billion annually. In regards to trade, the EU is concerned by the protectionist posture of the Chinese market, which has apparently low tariffs, but it uses non-tariff measures (such as technical requirements), tax exemptions, and subsidies to radically favour domestic (especially state-owned) firms at the expense of foreign ones. Given the size of the Chinese economy among WTO members (2nd largest after the U.S.), the EU wants China to hold a role and responsibility in the global economy which is commensurate with its economic relevance. In December 2020, the EU and China signed the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) which enhances the competitive edge of European firms in the Chinese 1.4 billion consumer market. The CAI removes rules against the forced transfer of technologies from European firms to Chinese ones (you can read more about this here). Specifically, in relation to trade, the EU is very concerned about industrial espionage and the cyber-theft of intellectual property from the Chinese mainland, which is the practice of Chinese hackers stealing secrets that include designs, formulas, processes, patterns, or solutions owned by European firms that have a certain economic value. The CCP effectively enables the cyber-theft of such industrial secrets, thus having complete disregard for intellectual property.
In sum, the EU-China Strategic Outlook delineates the main points of cooperation and contention in the dialogue between the two, namely climate change and technologies relevant to the green transition, human rights, and trade. At the last EU-China summit on the 1st of April, China expected to talk about these issues and maintain the same kind of dialogue, however, the EU did not want to have a business as usual conversation, and fundamentally shifted the focus toward the war against Ukraine, by expressing its concerns about China’s position and “no-limit partnership” with Russia. This disjunction between what the two sides aspired to talk about created what HR Borrell called a ‘dialogue of the deaf’, thus with the EU voicing its concerns about China’s attitude towards the war, and China dismissing such concerns because it would have altered the regular flow of their bilateral relationship.
China’s Stance on Ukraine
But why does China prefer not to speak about the war in Ukraine? Why do they not condemn Russia’s invasion? What is their position towards the outbreak of the conflict? The answer is straightforward: they do not want to be in Russia’s shoes in the future.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many central and eastern European countries which were previously part of the Warsaw Pact, the Russian-led military alliance, became NATO members. Russia was very clear in voicing its dissent against such expansion and even invaded Georgia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014 as a “warning”, before launching a full-scale war on the Ukrainian territory in February 2022. Indeed, given the rules-based nature of the international order, Ukraine should have the right to join NATO. But, unfortunately, this liberal view is not how Russian foreign and defence policy perceives the world, and NATO should have learned that. As Vladimir Putin stated in 2016 at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum “international relations are like mathematics, there is nothing personal about it”, which explains his geopolitics of aggression and logic of ‘might makes right’. NATO should have taken those declarations seriously and prevented this war by clearly refusing Ukraine’s membership application. As the political scientist John Mearsheimer argued, the West holds some responsibility for imposing suffering on the Ukrainian people, by imprudently expanding NATO’s borders and triggering Russia’s hysterical reaction.
China, like Russia, is opposed to NATO expansion and U.S. influence and refrains from condemning Russia’s invasion because it does not want the U.S. and its allies to come as close to its borders as NATO did. Before the war in Ukraine, the U.S.'s goal was to shift its focus from Europe to Asia, and pivot its resources from Russia to China, since the Chinese inevitably became the main military force there. In response to China’s improved military capabilities, the U.S. hurried to form several military alliances in the Indo-Pacific, combined with hostile rhetoric towards China and portrayed it as a threat to the rules-based international order. Most notably, the U.S. formed the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) together with Australia, India, and Japan, as well as AUKUS with Australia and the United Kingdom, which were all alliances formed to counter the rise of China militarily. The U.S. has conducted several joint military exercises with these countries in the Indo-Pacific, often within what is considered to be China’s geopolitical backyard, which would anger any great power. Similarly, China is preoccupied with U.S. navy warships navigating in the Taiwan Strait. As the Financial Times reported, China said that “U.S.-led alliances are as much a threat to Beijing as they are to Moscow”.
The situation in the Indo-Pacific is analogous to the one in eastern Europe: both Russia and China do not want to be pushed into the corner by Western military alliances. It is true that, at first glance, these alliances enhance the West’s security, but at the same time they diminish the security of Russia and China who, inevitably, will take military countermeasures. As Chinese diplomats repeatedly said in the last weeks, a state’s security must not come at the expense of another’s, since all countries' security is indivisible. Consequently, it is impossible to maximise the West’s security, because other actors, such as Russia and China, would backfire as they feel threatened, enclosed, and encircled by these Western military alliances.
However, China should also be more self-conscious of its own actions and recognise that some sort of U.S. pivot to Asia is inevitable for several reasons. First, Chinese military spending has more than quadrupled over the last 20 years, which raises some questions about what are its ambitions. Second, China has clearly expanded its territory in the South-China Sea, well beyond its internationally recognised borders, by militarising islets and coercing neighbours that also claimed sovereignty over those waters. Thirdly, it is clear that China is determined to hold its grip on Taiwan, and stated several times it is ready to take it back with force, which could occur even more imminently given the war in Ukraine. Taiwan should have the right to self-government and remain democratic. Ultimately, despite these security concerns about China’s increased military capabilities and assertiveness, the threat that it poses should not be exaggerated. Even though its military has improved, it is still incomparable to the U.S.’, and lacks the ability to fight wars far away from its borders. In fact, it does not have so-called ‘power projection platforms’, which are army installations that can sustain forces beyond its own region. For example, China has only three military bases around the world (the U.S. 800 in more than 70 countries), it does not have long-distance submarines that can operate independently in the long run, and owns only two aircraft carriers (the U.S. has eleven). Therefore, it is understandable for the West to increase its military presence in the Indo-Pacific, however, it is important to not overreact and to recognise that while the “Chinese military has strong arms, it also has relatively weak legs”, as China expert Michael Beckley stated.
How to Improve EU-China Relations
In order to have a constructive relationship between the EU and China, and not a dialogue of the deaf, the EU should recognise China’s position towards the Russo-Ukrainian war as legitimate, justifiable, and consistent with its foreign policy even prior to the war in Ukraine. China has been lamenting NATO’s expansion in Eastern Europe and the US pivot to the Indo-Pacific by portraying it as a counterproductive military strategy that does not enhance anyone’s security. China teams up with Russia, not because of ideological affinities or economic benefits, but because they are both facing a common military threat, and are unhappy with how international institutions favour Western influence. The EU should not confuse a Sino-Russian friendship with a Sino-Russian partnership. China and Russia are partners because the distribution of power and configuration of interests in the international system induces them to do so but, given their fundamental differences, they are not friends. Perhaps what they call a “no-limit partnership” has actually some limits that are yet to be seen.
For its part, just like the EU has to adjust its vision of China, also the latter has to requalify its position towards the EU. The Chinese have accused European states of being U.S. satellites, since they failed to misalign themselves with economic sanctions and condemnation of Russian actions, and said that the EU should act more autonomously from U.S. foreign policy. However, with these claims, China fails to understand that the Russian threat to Europe is very real and that the EU cannot just do business as usual with Russia when four of its member states share a common border with Ukraine. For Europe, the strengthening of NATO vis-à-vis Russia is a necessity. Russia is committing war crimes in Ukraine, producing millions of refugees, and affecting Europe’s energy security. These are dangers that the EU must address, and which China should not underestimate. Moreover, China should realise that future NATO enlargement in Europe seems inevitable. NATO is not looking for new members, as it was in the past, but new members are looking for NATO (e.g. Sweden and Finland). Even though the security concerns Russia voiced following NATO enlargement up to its border might be legitimate, the scale and atrocity of the brutal war that Russia has launched are completely unjustifiable. Lastly, China should refrain from acquiring islets and building naval bases in the South China Sea, otherwise, this practice would further justify a stronger U.S. presence in the region, and be detrimental to global security.
A Real Conversation
Therefore, the EU and China should not look at each other with resentment and suspicion, instead, they should consider each other as partners for conflict-resolution in a slowly de-globalising and bipolar world. On the one hand, the EU could mediate the U.S. and China rivalry, from which it would benefit by boosting its credibility in international politics and in front of its citizens, and it could emerge as a third away in a bipolar international system. On the other hand, China should immediately pursue more proactive neutrality over the war in Ukraine and mediate between the West and Russia, thus trying to solve the war in a peaceful and diplomatic manner, even by trying to coerce the Russians if that would be necessary. Mediation and peace are in China’s interest: it could obtain some kind of assurance from the U.S. that it will not further enhance its military presence in the Indo-Pacific, and deepen everyone’s insecurity. Moreover, it would be an occasion for China to clarify its newly proposed Global Security Initiative.
There is no need for us, Europeans, to look at China as a threat or as an enemy. As explained in the first section of this article, the EU-China Strategic Outlook shows how our ties with China are deep and beneficial; we need the Chinese as much as they need us. Ultimately, EU-China relations are not as bad as U.S.-China relations, we are not in the same boat as the U.S. vis-à-vis China. However, in the future, our ties with the People’s Republic should not be looked at only under the lens of the war in Ukraine, or in light of its partnership with Russia. In the EU-China summits that will follow, bilateral relations should be decoupled from the Chinese position towards Ukraine and Russia. China is unhappy with how the international system works and has a strategy to change it; allying with Russia is temporarily part of that strategy. The Chinese have benefited from the U.S.-led world order, particularly from free trade and globalisation, therefore they are not seeking a revolution, but a simple reform of global governance. The EU labelled China as a systemic rival but, at the same time, it has not engaged in talks with the Chinese Communist Party on how to restructure that system. Our approach should not have a narrow framing of ‘democracy vs. autocracy’, it should be more open-minded and pragmatic. It is time to start a real conversation with China, not a dialogue of the deaf.
