Keeping an Eye on The Balkans:3 Reasons Why the Normalization Process of Kosovo and Serbia Relations is Vital for the EU Neighbourhood Policy
Ilaria Settembrini, 8 minutes
After over a decade of talks and agreements, Kosovo and Serbia are back into the game with a new diplomatic plan drafted with the EU. Still, tensions have constantly increased in the past month. Vis-a-vis an uncertain future, the EU's involvement in the normalization process is trickier and more pressuring than ever.
It was March 18th when, after twelve hours of negotiations in Ohrid, North Macedonia, the EU High Representative Josep Borrell announced that Serbia and Kosovo had reached an agreement over the implementation of the EU-backed normalization plan to which both parties had consented the month before in Brussels. The Agreement between the two states sets the pace for a mutual recognition plan between Kosovo and Serbia, under the UN Charter dispositions over the equal sovereignty of states.
The pact represents the new milestone for a Peace Process which has been lasting for over a decade. Set up in 2011, the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue came as an EU-led solution to the tensions that exploded in 2008 when Kosovo, an ex-Serbian Province, declared its independence from Belgrade, secession that up until today has not been recognized.
Throughout the past 12 years, there have been many agreement attempts. One of the most incisive was the Brussels Agreement in 2013, which explicitly provided a discussion forum between the contestant governments for the first time. Now, ten years later, this new pact - initially drafted by Germany and France in the autumn of 2022 - could be a game changer. Substantially, the Annex to the Agreement sets out the roadmap for the normalisation of relations according to clear conditions. As the first step of the path, Serbia and Kosovo will engage in a fruitful collaboration through a Joint Monitoring Committee for the preservation of the Serbian communities living within Kosovo Borders and will start working for the recognition of the missing persons from the Kosovo war that ravished the province in 1998-1999. On the chart, this preliminary step to normalize relations will set up the legitimate conditions to start pre-accession processes to the EU and the reception of further financial aid from Brussels.
Nonetheless, in the past 2 months, feelings about the progress/ way the process is going have been mixed. If official talks have been productive, to the point that at the beginning of May the parties have met, as established by the annex, this Agreement is de facto one-sided since Serbia did not sign it in the first place. On this matter, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic introduced at the end of April the possibility of a popular referendum over the future of the EU-led deal.
Considering the Belgrade Nationalist Protests that erupted in March to the cry of “Kosovo is not on sale,” pushing the legitimacy of the diplomatic path through the popular vote could be a risky move from Belgrade that could worsen the already intricated EU-backed dialogue. On its part, Brussels sees the deal as a crucial pressuring and complementary tool to the EU accession weapon, which is why it is interested in seeking its implementation for three main reasons: 3 are the main reasons:
The Balkans as a Powder Keg:
First, the EU strives to normalise relations between the Balkan countries to create a Safe Neighbourhood.
Historically, ethnic tensions in the region have existed prior to the official 2008 separation, leading the international community toward security and humanitarian concerns. Already in 1999, in the context of the Kosovo war, the expulsion by Serbian Forces of Albanian communities in Kosovo has been considered the main cause leading to the historically contested NATO bombing of Belgrade.
On this matter, the latest developments of 2022 have reinforced the common perception in Brussels of the Balkans, to use a historical label for the Balkans since WWI, as the century-old European Powder Keg. In July, the long-discussed and momentarily put-on-hold car plate law in Kosovo - which would oblige Serbian ethnicities in the northern part of Kosovo to obtain new car plates issued from Pristina and not Belgrade - became a scapegoat for the escalation of armed tensions at the borders. The Hot Balkan Summer culminated in the official decision by Serbs Groups to leave North Kosovo institutions in November 2022.
Such an escalation, vis-à-vis an Eastern Neighbourhood that in the past year warned Europe on how prolonged low-intensity conflicts can suddenly become open wars, naturally pushes Brussels to alarmingly advocate for a normalisation of the relationship between Belgrade and Pristina. As a safe, legal cushion for Brussels, Article 6 of the current plan pushes indeed toward new binding agreements between the two parties.
Serbian Pre-Accession as a Tool against Russia’s Influence:
The EU is interested in working on a peace deal between the two countries as the first step to reinforcing the legitimacy of its Neighbourhood Policy framework (ENP) in Serbia. Since Belgrade was granted the candidate pre-accession status in 2012, it has received significant assistance flows. Parallelly, in a counterbalancing action to gain geopolitical leverage, its historic relations with Moscow have gradually reinforced in the past decade, to the point that Serbia refused to join international sanctions in the aftermath of the Ukrainian war.
A new pact would reinforce the weak ENP, vis-à-vis Moscow's determination to strike for its influence in the Balkans to the detriment of Brussels. For example, during the Balkan escalations in 2022, Russia's stated its assertiveness by playing the distraction game. When in December, tensions between Belgrade and Pristina rose again to the point that Serbs media denounced an imminent attack on Serbs in North Kosovo, and military forces established alarming "levels of combat readiness," Russian statements of support did not wait to arrive. The Kremlin speaker soon talked about a Russian monitor action over the respect of Serbs’ rights by Kosovo in the region.
Aside from the intervening position of Russia, the EU's relations with Belgrade have recently been victim of a shortfall. Faced with the EU's support for Kosovo elections in March, an electoral turnout that, as previously mentioned, did not see the participation of the Serb-ethnicity community, Belgrade quickly criticised the European position. Overall, aside from institutional frictions, popular dissent in Serbia against Europe is loud. In 2022, for the first time, official polls traced how Serbs are more against than in favour of a possible EU Accession.
In summary, pushing for a peace dialogue towards legally binding resolutions in the medium term would enable the EU to enhance pre-accession leverage against Serbia, which on its side, enjoys an advantageous political position derived not only from the diplomatic relations it entertains Russia but also from the power dynamics originating from migratory issues.Considering how the Western Balkan Route is the most trafficked migratory route toward Europe's borders, a positive Serbian response to the Normalisation Pact would strengthen the financial ties with the EU and the subsequent containment of migratory fluxes which have often been labelled as a Serbian weapon toward Europe. On this matter, the EU's interests are more than pressuring when looking at the recent fluxes: UNHCR data talk about 130.000 migrants that transited through Serbia in 2022, "with first quarter of 2023 registering the highest number of arrivals since 2017."
A Normative Europe in an Unstable Neighbourhood: Kosovo’s International Involvement:
EU enlargement is part of its core identity and does not spare the case of Kosovo. On this matter, since the Belgrade Pristina Dialogue aims to reinforce Pristina's position in the International Arena, it also enables the EU's institutions to shape a new friendly pole in an often-hostile region. On its side, Kosovo has been vocal about its intent to become an active player in Europe, from the membership candidacy to the EU advanced in 2022 to the possibility of entering the Council of Europe after, in the next month, the CoE Parliamentary Assembly will release its verdict.
On this line, the new future envisioned for Kosovo overlaps with a détente within EU Institutions over the EU's relations with the country. Despite the persistence of a hostile bloc of member states - Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Romania, and Slovakia - that do not recognize Pristina's Authority due to local separatists issues, in April, the EU lifted the long-debated legal provision which required a VISA for Kosovar citizens entrance in the EU, signalling how, as stated by Article 4 of the Pact, the EU has all the intentions to support the global rise of Pristina.
In conclusion, Brussels' openness to a reformulation of Schengen in 2024 shows the Normative Power essence of European Institutions that, in pushing for Pristina to be a new front partner in the Balkans, do not seem willing to give up their protagonist role in the future of the Balkan Neighbourhood Developments.
