Between Washington and Beijing: the Silent Test of Europe’s Strategic Autonomy
By Olaia Mujika Anduiza, reading time 7 minutes
Image credits: Dreamstime
On October 9, China announced a halt on exports of rare-earth processing tools, battery equipment, and ultra-hard materials used in semiconductors, solar panels, and armor-piercing ammunition. These are essential for clean-tech and defense industries, and the EU relies on China for nearly 99% of its supply. However, in the last week of October 2025, China announced a one-year suspension of these export controls for both the EU and the US.
This suspension (importantly, not removal) is good news for the EU in the short term, as it temporarily eases pressure on European supply chains. Nevertheless, in the long run, uncertainty remains due to Europe’s deep dependency on Chinese resources, and the realization that this is about much more than access to critical materials. It is about ideology and global power structure.
Starting from the beginning, what do we need to know about China?
Western analysts often overlook the role of Chinese ideology in shaping Beijing’s worldview. Another key issue lies in the lack of clarity about what that ideology truly entails. This matters greatly, as Xi Jinping’s ideological and strategic project seeks more than economic advantage, which he is already achieving effectively. He also seeks systemic influence by reshaping global power relations and challenging the US-led liberal order, offering a Chinese alternative to it. Critical materials are a key part of that.
What is this alternative model about?
Xi ended the pragmatic, state-capitalist era of his predecessors and revived a form of Marxist nationalism rooted in Leninist control.
Internally, tighter Communist Party dominance over politics and society has been reinforced. This directly opposes Western liberal principles of pluralism, checks and balances, and individual rights and freedoms championed by the United States and the European Union.
Economically, there is stronger state intervention and tighter restrictions on the private sector. This state-centric economic planning contrasts with Western approaches; the US’ mixed free-market capitalism, where the private sector drives economic growth with minimal government interference, and the EU’s social market economy, combining free enterprise with extensive regulatory frameworks and welfare protections.
Externally, an assertive nationalism that challenges Western-led multilateralism, human rights, the rule of law, and other shared objectives is being exercised.
Much appears to align in China’s favor; it holds enough strategic leverage to compel engagement from Latin America to Europe, Africa, and even the United States, whether through debt, the Belt and Road Initiative, or control over essential resources. This dynamic legitimizes its model.
Particularly, by controlling critical minerals, China effectively commands the foundations of future technological and military power, spanning clean energy, advanced manufacturing, defense, and artificial intelligence. Such dominance amplifies its global ambitions and clarifies why its rivalry with Washington has evolved beyond economics into a broader struggle over influence, legitimacy, and leadership.
For that reason, China’s recent decision to suspend its export controls should not be mistaken for an act of goodwill. Few things ever are in international politics, and even less so when it comes to resources as scarce and essential as these. Instead, it is a calculated move within a much larger contest for strategic dominance.
Image credits: Stock Vault
China’s undeniable economic expansion and growing ideological influence challenge the EU’s identity as a normative power. As Beijing advances its governance model through economic initiatives, the EU’s capacity to project its own values and regulatory principles weakens, as the two systems stand in fundamental opposition.
But the challenges do not end there. The situation becomes even more serious given its deep dependence on China for critical resources. Beyond ideology or governance models, when these materials enter the equation, the issue becomes one of future and survival.
As if that were not enough, Europe also faces difficulties arising from being caught between China and the United States. This is clearly illustrated by the dispute over critical minerals: the EU is facing the consequences of China’s control over these resources as a byproduct of the China–US rivalry, finding itself caught in the crossfire rather than charting its own independent course. This exposes the Union to price volatility, resource insecurity, and, ultimately, to the risk of becoming an object rather than a subject of great-power competition.
Additionally, China’s pause on export controls is also tied to a diplomatic adjustment by Trump, who lowered tariffs on China instead of confronting Beijing in his usual style. This shows how serious the situation is: if even Washington must compromise with China, Europe’s leverage is even smaller. Here again, when China announced the suspension, the EU immediately reached out to Beijing to clarify whether it, too, would benefit from the measure, effectively checking whether Europe was once again being treated as part of the same package as the United States.
Related to this, it is especially concerning that Europe continues to be placed, and to place itself, always in the same category as the United States. This alignment is what drew the EU into this predicament and, for now, what has also helped it out of it.
As the EU’s model often aligns closely with that of the United States, the rise of anti-American sentiment (understood as a general psychological predisposition to view the US negatively, regardless of policy specifics) also undermines the EU’s image. This association leads some global actors to see the EU as identical to, or even subordinate to, US dominance, reducing its credibility as an independent player in international affairs.
The result is a structural paradox: the EU stands as an intermediate actor, ideologically Western but pragmatically tied to China, while remaining heavily dependent on both and increasingly aware of the need to distance itself from them.
Strategic Autonomy Begins with Action
The EU’s options to address these pressures are costly and often unpopular. Reducing dependence on China (critical materials, Member States’ debt, etc.) is no easy task, nor is setting boundaries with the United States, its closest ally in values, politics, and economy.
This tension explains the appeal of strategic autonomy, but this cannot be achieved through rhetoric alone. It requires gradual, realistic policies that empower European actors to act independently while maintaining stability within existing alliances. I recently heard Thibaut L’Ortye (Senior Director of Public Affairs at the American Chamber of Commerce to the European Union) emphasize the need to move “from saying all the right things to doing all the right things”. I could not agree more.
To follow that example, here is one small but concrete step that could start the process. As João Albuquerque (Director of Advocacy and Public Affairs at EuroCommerce, and former MEP) recently noted, we often speak about strategic autonomy but fail to help companies diversify in practice. A good first step could be empowering them through financial measures and incentives that help reduce dependency on China.
Autonomy is about standing on our own feet. So let’s start walking.
